Archive for June, 2004
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 30, 2004 at 10:49 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
I�ve always considered myself a free trader, believing that markets do a much better job than regulations when it comes to determining wages and prices. Thirty years ago, there were 40 or 50 wars raging across the world, and famines and plagues in China and India would kill tens of thousands of people. The world, for all its problems, is much better than that today, and I attribute most of that change to two things: the end of Soviet support for proxy wars and free trade. I supported NAFTA, WTO, and free trade, and still do. So you might think that I�d also be tempted toward the theory that free trade can transform North Korea. In fact, I do believe that real free trade could do exactly that, because it would inevitably mean a limited trade in ideas and the loss of the regime�s ideological control. The problem is, that won�t happen in North Korea as long as Kim Jong-Il has a say in the matter.
The Flaw in the “Change-Through-Normalization” Theory
Advocates of normalizing trade with North Korea tell us that if we�d only open the free trade floodgates, we could sit back and watch the Internet spread its liberating tentacles from Kumgang to Sinuiju, and eventually even to the gates of the gulags themselves. It�s not a new idea, however. Advocates of this view have been always forgetten about that other set of floodgates�the ones with Kim Jong Il�s hand firmly on the valve–to their financial peril. Recent history confirms that North Korea shrewdly uses the lure of openness and riches to extract as much profit and as many diplomatic concessions as it can, but it has never tolerated more than a very limited amount of free trade, and even that has always been hermetically sealed off from the rest of the country.
The �reform-through-normalization� theory is the logical bedrock (as opposed to the emotional superstructure) of the Sunshine Policy. Capitalists lacking in hang-ups about such distractions as human rights have been dutifully investing in North Korea�and walking away bankrupt�for years, which shouldn�t really surprise anyone. The people who built Kim Jong-Il�s atom bomb, his long-range missiles, and the world�s most ruthlessly effective and stubbornly resilient police state are obviously not complete idiots. If we are brilliant enough to see that economic penetration leads to ideological penetration, which in turn leads to unpredictable political change, why should we presume that the North Koreans are too dense to grasp the same concept? Well, they aren’t, of course. The North Koreans probably have a very good idea of what will happen if they open their country to the outside world and allow people to see how they live, and they know that it’s a scenario that involves plenty of torches and pitchforks. That�s why North Korea carefully questions repatriated refugees so carefully about whether they had any contact with foreigners after their escapes, and makes sure those who did don�t have the chance to spread the word. No one on earth understands the relationship between the control of ideas and the control of power than the North Koreans.
Past Attempts at Change-Through-Normalization
Thus, North Korea allows as much foreign trade as is both profitable and highly controllable. For example, North Korea has exported contract laborers to Russia for years. They work as loggers or construction workers in Siberia under gulag conditions, doing work that no Russian would do. While there, they are under constant supervision by North Korean minders, and for all their man-killing labor, they must hand over three-fourths of their pay to the Dear Leader.
Then came the Kumgang experiment. In the late 1990s, parades of affluent South Koreans infected with �unification fever� responded to glossy posters in travel agencies and booked expensive tours to that one little piece of the North they were allowed to see. They were herded on and off their two-star cattle barge, er, cruise ship, and offloaded at a coastal trail-head. From there, they were herded to the top of the mountain inside a fenced-off corridor, past murals praising the Dear Leader, eventually reaching a restaurant at the summit where the waitresses were not allowed to talk to either them or their foreign supervisors. One woman made the error of tying to help a North Korean find the loving arms of freedom, only to find hers cuffed behind her back, followed by a swift and scary ride to a cell in Pyongyang; she was later released, shaken but thankfully unharmed. Hyundai Asan, which ran the Kumgang tour business, ended up losing millions paying outrageously high commissions to the North Koreans, who (oddly enough) turned out to be just as cutthroat in their business negotiations as in their diplomacy (which is an oxymoron in the North Korean context). After the initial excitement and novelty of Kumgang died down, South Korean consumers returned to their tough-minded ways and balked at the exorbitant prices, and the business began bleeding money. In financial desperation, Hyundai Asan suggested building a gambling casino, but neither the South Korean government nor any private investor would dump more cash into the failing enterprise. The company president eventually flung himself from a 12th-story office window. Once again, the North Koreans were the only ones smiling at the end of the story.
The next great opening to North Korea was the Sinuiju Industrial Park, the brainchild of a Chinese-Dutch empresario named Yang Bin. This, too, was to be sealed off from the rest of North Korea and staffed by a few unquestionably loyal, handpicked workers. In fact, North Korea intended to empty out the entire population of 500,000 to make room for them. Mr. Yang forgot to ask China what it thought of the idea, however; it turns out, China didn’t exactly approve of the idea of North Korea breaking free of its economic dependence on Beijing. The Chinese government promptly arrested Mr. Yang for tax evasion (he got 18 years) and the Sinuiju project, too, was forgotten.
And who could forget the story (even if we forgot the name) of David Chang, who sold the North Koreans $71 million in grain but never got paid for it? His lavish contributions to Senator Robert Toricelli, in an effort to have the senator lean on the North Koreans, ended up getting Mr. Chang a stint in a federal pen and Senator Toricelli thrown out of office just a month before he would stand for re-election.
The ultimate example must be the crowning glory of the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-Jungs’ meeting with Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang. At the time, many observers who were more blessed with scholarship than common sense, predicted a dramatic diplomatic opening that would open the borders and reconnect the railroads, highways, and powerlines between North and South, an reunite thousands of divided families. Today, of course, we know that the summit was bought hundreds of millions, perhaps even billions, of dollars in illegal payments, and four years later, the trains, the juice, and the love still aren�t surging across the DMZ. And how much openness did all those payoffs buy, you may ask? In 2000, as Kim Dae-Jung was accepting his Nobel Prize, North Korea was still in a famine that had already killed two million people. So naturally, Kim Jong Il decided to spend the bribe money on a few dozen MiGs and a submarine.
As for the North Korean people, most of them have still never even heard of the Kumgang tours or the Kaesong Industrial Park, the latest great hope for openness and unification. The promise of Kaesong, if you can call it that, is North Korean labor–at just $58 a month, and without any fear of pesky (unapproved) strikes, we can be sure. Never mind how much of that money the workers themselves will ever see�it�s the emotional impact of the promise that�s going to vacuum up millions more in South Korean cash to keep the Dear Leader in Hennessey and razor wire, and his most loyal subjects eating at least adequately. But for the record, I�m predicting that the South Koreans will be forced to abandon the whole enterprise as soon as all the machine tools are installed.
Oh, and did I mention that in the meantime, North Korea got The Bomb?
What North Korea Wants from Trade
For this very reason, North Korea is willing to permit exactly as much free trade as it feels suits its interests. And what are its interests? Wrong question. The right question is what North Korea’s rulers think is in their interests. So cast aside the assumption that they really care that their people are starving. In Korea’s Animal Farm, some animals are much, much more equal than others, and the pigs in Willingdon are fatter than ever. North Korea takes care of those it trusts, but goes to great lengths to see to it that those it distrusts must struggle (often, without success) to survive. It’s documented in detail in this Amnesty International report. Meanwhile, in privileged Pyongyang, food is in ample supply for those who can afford it.
North Korea is not particularly desperate to put a chicken in every pot. It�s desperate to preserve its power, which it does by feeding those who maintain its apparatus of power. That means, above all, the people in Pyongyang, who are mainly elites, the security structure, party officials, and above all, the military. The North Korean regime has always been able to retain bouyancy by knowing when it�s time to pick someone expendable to pitch out of the boat, and above all, by stiff-arming the dangerous ideas of the outside world. As cited above, Amnesty International has documented North Korea�s use of food as a weapon against those of suspect loyalty in great detail, while others have documented the luxurious life of the elites. North Korea knows that it can�t trust the vast majority of its people to see how outsiders think, talk, and dress, and as a result, it won�t let them. Yet it does need a limited amount of foreign exchange to keep the army and the state goon squads fed and oiled, something it can certainly do with a relatively modest amount of money. For its essential needs, North Korea is willing to risk the exposure of outside influence to a limited degree, provided it retains absolute control over every person thus exposed. So if you�re wondering about the future of North Korean openness, look no further than the present. North Korea isn�t China. North Korea�s Mao died, but he wasn�t replaced by a Deng Xiaoping, he was replaced by Kim Jong-Il. As long as North Korea can continue to get wealthy but gullible investors and diplomats to hand over bundles of cash, he will continue to promise them that their investments will be richly rewarded. And he will just as surely continue to stiff them.
Posted by joshua on June 30, 2004 at 5:49 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
I�ve always considered myself a free trader, believing that markets do a much better job than regulations when it comes to determining wages and prices. Thirty years ago, there were 40 or 50 wars raging across the world, and famines and plagues in China and India would kill tens of thousands of people. The world, for all its problems, is much better than that today, and I attribute most of that change to two things: the end of Soviet support for proxy wars and free trade. I supported NAFTA, WTO, and free trade, and still do. So you might think that I�d also be tempted toward the theory that free trade can transform North Korea. In fact, I do believe that real free trade could do exactly that, because it would inevitably mean a limited trade in ideas and the loss of the regime�s ideological control. The problem is, that won�t happen in North Korea as long as Kim Jong-Il has a say in the matter.
The Flaw in the “Change-Through-Normalization” Theory
Advocates of normalizing trade with North Korea tell us that if we�d only open the free trade floodgates, we could sit back and watch the Internet spread its liberating tentacles from Kumgang to Sinuiju, and eventually even to the gates of the gulags themselves. It�s not a new idea, however. Advocates of this view have been always forgetten about that other set of floodgates�the ones with Kim Jong Il�s hand firmly on the valve–to their financial peril. Recent history confirms that North Korea shrewdly uses the lure of openness and riches to extract as much profit and as many diplomatic concessions as it can, but it has never tolerated more than a very limited amount of free trade, and even that has always been hermetically sealed off from the rest of the country.
The �reform-through-normalization� theory is the logical bedrock (as opposed to the emotional superstructure) of the Sunshine Policy. Capitalists lacking in hang-ups about such distractions as human rights have been dutifully investing in North Korea�and walking away bankrupt�for years, which shouldn�t really surprise anyone. The people who built Kim Jong-Il�s atom bomb, his long-range missiles, and the world�s most ruthlessly effective and stubbornly resilient police state are obviously not complete idiots. If we are brilliant enough to see that economic penetration leads to ideological penetration, which in turn leads to unpredictable political change, why should we presume that the North Koreans are too dense to grasp the same concept? Well, they aren’t, of course. The North Koreans probably have a very good idea of what will happen if they open their country to the outside world and allow people to see how they live, and they know that it’s a scenario that involves plenty of torches and pitchforks. That�s why North Korea carefully questions repatriated refugees so carefully about whether they had any contact with foreigners after their escapes, and makes sure those who did don�t have the chance to spread the word. No one on earth understands the relationship between the control of ideas and the control of power than the North Koreans.
Past Attempts at Change-Through-Normalization
Thus, North Korea allows as much foreign trade as is both profitable and highly controllable. For example, North Korea has exported contract laborers to Russia for years. They work as loggers or construction workers in Siberia under gulag conditions, doing work that no Russian would do. While there, they are under constant supervision by North Korean minders, and for all their man-killing labor, they must hand over three-fourths of their pay to the Dear Leader.
Then came the Kumgang experiment. In the late 1990s, parades of affluent South Koreans infected with �unification fever� responded to glossy posters in travel agencies and booked expensive tours to that one little piece of the North they were allowed to see. They were herded on and off their two-star cattle barge, er, cruise ship, and offloaded at a coastal trail-head. From there, they were herded to the top of the mountain inside a fenced-off corridor, past murals praising the Dear Leader, eventually reaching a restaurant at the summit where the waitresses were not allowed to talk to either them or their foreign supervisors. One woman made the error of tying to help a North Korean find the loving arms of freedom, only to find hers cuffed behind her back, followed by a swift and scary ride to a cell in Pyongyang; she was later released, shaken but thankfully unharmed. Hyundai Asan, which ran the Kumgang tour business, ended up losing millions paying outrageously high commissions to the North Koreans, who (oddly enough) turned out to be just as cutthroat in their business negotiations as in their diplomacy (which is an oxymoron in the North Korean context). After the initial excitement and novelty of Kumgang died down, South Korean consumers returned to their tough-minded ways and balked at the exorbitant prices, and the business began bleeding money. In financial desperation, Hyundai Asan suggested building a gambling casino, but neither the South Korean government nor any private investor would dump more cash into the failing enterprise. The company president eventually flung himself from a 12th-story office window. Once again, the North Koreans were the only ones smiling at the end of the story.
The next great opening to North Korea was the Sinuiju Industrial Park, the brainchild of a Chinese-Dutch empresario named Yang Bin. This, too, was to be sealed off from the rest of North Korea and staffed by a few unquestionably loyal, handpicked workers. In fact, North Korea intended to empty out the entire population of 500,000 to make room for them. Mr. Yang forgot to ask China what it thought of the idea, however; it turns out, China didn’t exactly approve of the idea of North Korea breaking free of its economic dependence on Beijing. The Chinese government promptly arrested Mr. Yang for tax evasion (he got 18 years) and the Sinuiju project, too, was forgotten.
And who could forget the story (even if we forgot the name) of David Chang, who sold the North Koreans $71 million in grain but never got paid for it? His lavish contributions to Senator Robert Toricelli, in an effort to have the senator lean on the North Koreans, ended up getting Mr. Chang a stint in a federal pen and Senator Toricelli thrown out of office just a month before he would stand for re-election.
The ultimate example must be the crowning glory of the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-Jungs’ meeting with Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang. At the time, many observers who were more blessed with scholarship than common sense, predicted a dramatic diplomatic opening that would open the borders and reconnect the railroads, highways, and powerlines between North and South, an reunite thousands of divided families. Today, of course, we know that the summit was bought hundreds of millions, perhaps even billions, of dollars in illegal payments, and four years later, the trains, the juice, and the love still aren�t surging across the DMZ. And how much openness did all those payoffs buy, you may ask? In 2000, as Kim Dae-Jung was accepting his Nobel Prize, North Korea was still in a famine that had already killed two million people. So naturally, Kim Jong Il decided to spend the bribe money on a few dozen MiGs and a submarine.
As for the North Korean people, most of them have still never even heard of the Kumgang tours or the Kaesong Industrial Park, the latest great hope for openness and unification. The promise of Kaesong, if you can call it that, is North Korean labor–at just $58 a month, and without any fear of pesky (unapproved) strikes, we can be sure. Never mind how much of that money the workers themselves will ever see�it�s the emotional impact of the promise that�s going to vacuum up millions more in South Korean cash to keep the Dear Leader in Hennessey and razor wire, and his most loyal subjects eating at least adequately. But for the record, I�m predicting that the South Koreans will be forced to abandon the whole enterprise as soon as all the machine tools are installed.
Oh, and did I mention that in the meantime, North Korea got The Bomb?
What North Korea Wants from Trade
For this very reason, North Korea is willing to permit exactly as much free trade as it feels suits its interests. And what are its interests? Wrong question. The right question is what North Korea’s rulers think is in their interests. So cast aside the assumption that they really care that their people are starving. In Korea’s Animal Farm, some animals are much, much more equal than others, and the pigs in Willingdon are fatter than ever. North Korea takes care of those it trusts, but goes to great lengths to see to it that those it distrusts must struggle (often, without success) to survive. It’s documented in detail in this Amnesty International report. Meanwhile, in privileged Pyongyang, food is in ample supply for those who can afford it.
North Korea is not particularly desperate to put a chicken in every pot. It�s desperate to preserve its power, which it does by feeding those who maintain its apparatus of power. That means, above all, the people in Pyongyang, who are mainly elites, the security structure, party officials, and above all, the military. The North Korean regime has always been able to retain bouyancy by knowing when it�s time to pick someone expendable to pitch out of the boat, and above all, by stiff-arming the dangerous ideas of the outside world. As cited above, Amnesty International has documented North Korea�s use of food as a weapon against those of suspect loyalty in great detail, while others have documented the luxurious life of the elites. North Korea knows that it can�t trust the vast majority of its people to see how outsiders think, talk, and dress, and as a result, it won�t let them. Yet it does need a limited amount of foreign exchange to keep the army and the state goon squads fed and oiled, something it can certainly do with a relatively modest amount of money. For its essential needs, North Korea is willing to risk the exposure of outside influence to a limited degree, provided it retains absolute control over every person thus exposed. So if you�re wondering about the future of North Korean openness, look no further than the present. North Korea isn�t China. North Korea�s Mao died, but he wasn�t replaced by a Deng Xiaoping, he was replaced by Kim Jong-Il. As long as North Korea can continue to get wealthy but gullible investors and diplomats to hand over bundles of cash, he will continue to promise them that their investments will be richly rewarded. And he will just as surely continue to stiff them.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 30, 2004 at 5:24 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
If you’re reading this from China, don’t miss the (hopefully) big pro-democracy demo in Hong Kong on July 1st. Last year, half a million people turned out and won a reprieve for their freedom. This year, Beijing is trying very hard to keep mainlanders from showing up and joining in. They sound pretty desperate.
Posted by joshua on June 30, 2004 at 12:24 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
If you’re reading this from China, don’t miss the (hopefully) big pro-democracy demo in Hong Kong on July 1st. Last year, half a million people turned out and won a reprieve for their freedom. This year, Beijing is trying very hard to keep mainlanders from showing up and joining in. They sound pretty desperate.
Posted by joshua on June 30, 2004 at 12:24 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
If you’re reading this from China, don’t miss the (hopefully) big pro-democracy demo in Hong Kong on July 1st. Last year, half a million people turned out and won a reprieve for their freedom. This year, Beijing is trying very hard to keep mainlanders from showing up and joining in. They sound pretty desperate.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 30, 2004 at 4:00 am · Filed under Uncategorized
That was the Plan B I heard floated on the day the six-nation talks hit the wall again. More here, scroll down. I actually caught John Loftus talking about this on TV as well, and he talked like a man with connections to the administration. Admittedly, that’s a sport in this town (and in fact, it’s no more challenging than this).
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 30, 2004 at 3:39 am · Filed under Uncategorized
. . . was the sentence for Takayuki Noguchi, who was caught trying to help two North Korean refugees escape. Both were born in Japan, but are now certain to die in North Korea. Soon.
More info here.
Quick . . . someone warn the riot police.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 30, 2004 at 3:26 am · Filed under Uncategorized
Few people have done more or risked more at the front lines to help North Korean refugees than Douglas Shin. If you google him, you will see that he’s been the subject and interviewee of a lot of big media, but if you meet him in person, his decency and modesty belie his accomplishments. Doug (actually, he’s an ordained minister, but you wouldn’t guess that from meeting him, either) has started a new Web site here, and I hope you’ll read him regularly for inside news about the struggle to change North Korea from within. The site’s provocative title is “Back to Pyongyang.”
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 30, 2004 at 2:28 am · Filed under Uncategorized
Here’s a comforting report for everyone who says that we must take North Korean promises not to transfer nukes to terrorists:
In December 2002, according to officials with access to the airport, a North Korean cargo jet delivering nuclear technology, including some weapons-grade uranium, was being unloaded at night under military supervision.
A container slipped and cracked on the tarmac, and everyone in the area was taken away for thorough medical examinations.
Apparently, the Iranians shut down the entire airport because they were afraid U.N. inspectors would detect residual radiation. Hmmm. S’pose Mohammad Al-Baradei has anyone en route? I’d like to see the proponents of European-style “soft power” talk their way out of this one. After all of their diplomatic genius failed us, it took a klutzy Iranian skycap to spill the, er, beans. Perhaps they need to stop hiring help from these guys.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 30, 2004 at 2:05 am · Filed under Uncategorized
Count me as a soldier in The Big Hominid’s flame war against the South Korean Ministry of Truth, but it’s hard for me to get as excited about hit counters as I do about beatings, arrests, isolation, and intimidation of dissenters with the apparent cooperation / acquiesence of the South Korean government. The Marmot, ever careful to avoid a hasty conclusion, doesn’t accuse the MIC of censorship (ahem, are you listening, Korea Herald?). Blocking blogs–even for nearly a week–may or may not be censorship, but the South Korean government certainly is censoring plenty of speech that runs counter to its views, or at least being pretty selective about protecting it, which is the same thing. So please protest, but don’t forget to ream them one for letting pro-North Korean goons shut down Radio Free North Korea.
Don’t see a pattern yet? Read this.
And this.
And this.
Read this, too.
Either the rule of law has completely broken down, or Roh is letting these guys strangle freedom of speech on the other side of the DMZ. Meanwhile, he’s putting North Korean “news” on the net. Your tax dollars at work.
Of course, if you want to protest to someone who might actually listen, I recommend you send your letter here. Once you’ve flamed Congress, nothing else will ever feel the same. Trust me.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 30, 2004 at 2:00 am · Filed under Uncategorized
I’ve predicted (here and here) that the Korean reaction to the murder of Kim Seon-Il would not be to support the deployment of troops to Iraq, but to hate both America and the entire muslim world. Given a few days, however, someone was sure to find the tortured logic that somehow makes this mostly America’s fault. The wait is now over.
If you bet against me on that one, I’d like to call in my chips now (hat tip: Jeff). This Korea Herald “analysis” is one for your scrapbook of Uri reasoning. Follow this logic: Kim’s boss, in his third version of just when he reported Kim kidnapped, now claims he informed AAFES. Yep, the PX guys. Which means the U.S. Embassy and military knew. Which means the U.S. government knew and failed to tell the Korean government. Which means the U.S. is responsible for his death.
Sheesh. And we’re inviting these guys into Iraq? I guess I’ve heard worse ideas.
Posted by joshua on June 29, 2004 at 11:00 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
That was the Plan B I heard floated on the day the six-nation talks hit the wall again. More here, scroll down. I actually caught John Loftus talking about this on TV as well, and he talked like a man with connections to the administration. Admittedly, that’s a sport in this town (and in fact, it’s no more challenging than this).
Posted by joshua on June 29, 2004 at 10:39 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
. . . was the sentence for Takayuki Noguchi, who was caught trying to help two North Korean refugees escape. Both were born in Japan, but are now certain to die in North Korea. Soon.
More info here.
Quick . . . someone warn the riot police.
Posted by joshua on June 29, 2004 at 10:26 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
Few people have done more or risked more at the front lines to help North Korean refugees than Douglas Shin. If you google him, you will see that he’s been the subject and interviewee of a lot of big media, but if you meet him in person, his decency and modesty belie his accomplishments. Doug (actually, he’s an ordained minister, but you wouldn’t guess that from meeting him, either) has started a new Web site here, and I hope you’ll read him regularly for inside news about the struggle to change North Korea from within. The site’s provocative title is “Back to Pyongyang.”
Posted by joshua on June 29, 2004 at 9:28 pm · Filed under Uncategorized
Here’s a comforting report for everyone who says that we must take North Korean promises not to transfer nukes to terrorists:
In December 2002, according to officials with access to the airport, a North Korean cargo jet delivering nuclear technology, including some weapons-grade uranium, was being unloaded at night under military supervision.
A container slipped and cracked on the tarmac, and everyone in the area was taken away for thorough medical examinations.
Apparently, the Iranians shut down the entire airport because they were afraid U.N. inspectors would detect residual radiation. Hmmm. S’pose Mohammad Al-Baradei has anyone en route? I’d like to see the proponents of European-style “soft power” talk their way out of this one. After all of their diplomatic genius failed us, it took a klutzy Iranian skycap to spill the, er, beans. Perhaps they need to stop hiring help from these guys.
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