Archive for June, 2006
Posted by joshua on June 30, 2006 at 1:33 pm · Filed under Anti-Americanism, The Fifth Column
I’m certainly no expert on those who collaborated to enslave their brothers under fascist tyranny six decades ago. Some may have done genuinely awful things; others may have been “mere” profiteers. Some may have acted more voluntarily than others. The passage of six decades certainly complicates such questions. That’s why there are statutes of limitations.
On the other hand, I can’t help but note the absence of any official list with more contemporary application, so here’s my effort at a modest post-DEROS public service to the Republic of Korea:
“Wu,” of the The Pan-Korean Aliance for Reunification, who recently tried to slip a loyalty oath to Kim Jong Il to a visiting North Korean official.
The members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions who shouted, “We will unite with the workers of the North to fight against the U.S.!”
The members of the same union — the largest in Korea, by the way — who violently barred the U.S. Ambassador from attending a media interview shortly after he criticized North Korea for counterfeiting U.S. currency.
Kim Tae-Il, President of the KCTU, who said, “During the May 1 North-South Workers’ Rally in Pyongyang, the workers of North and South agreed to unify to carry out the anti-American struggle…. The center of that struggle with the United States is Daechu-ri, Pyeongtaek.”
Professor Song Du-Yul, a/k/a Kim Chul Soo.
Pak Se-Gil of the Korean Government Employees’ Union (KGEU), who wrote a pamphlet for the rank-and-file that was cribbed from North Korean Juche ideology. The KGEU is now a part of the KTCU.
The members of the banned, violent, far-left student group Hanchongryon who said this as they left for a solidarity trip to Pyongyang: “Let us eliminate anti-unification pro-war forces which intend to cast fire clouds of a nuclear war on the heads of Koreans.”
Whoever was on the “To:” line in 670 secret dispatches suspected (known?) to have arrived in South Korea from the Workers’ Paradise last year (or was the number closer to 80,000?).
Park Seong-Hwan, the folk singer who brought us such catchy numbers as “Fuckin’ USA,” “Go to Pyongyang,” and most recently, “Kick Them Out,” a risible anti-American screed later found to have borrowed spurious accusations about the U.S. Army from a North Korean textbook.
Professor Kang Jeong-Koo, who claimed last year that North Korea’s 1950 invasion of the South was a war of unification (which is technically true) and that General MacArthur was a “war criminal” for getting in the way. Just for extra fun, Professor Kang closed with this: “Let’s achieve unification by succeeding to the spirit of [the great leader’s home town].”
Finally, let’s not forget the Korean Teachers’ Union, which created an obscene “educational” video for Pusan schoolchildren that celebrated 9/11. Not prima facie evidence of North Korean collaboration, but it wins points for style.
Now, I’ve frequently and emphatically expressed my opposition to prosecuting these walking embarrassments for nonviolent expression of their pro-North Korean views (though it’s delectable visualizing them spending the next five or ten years rooting for wild grasses in the hills near Chongjin). The best answer to nonsense is to expose it. And if we can agree on the silliness of prosecuting those who are trying to undermine South Korea’s democracy today, it’s surely silly for the state to sit on available evidence fo six decades before convening a politically motivated “truth commission.”
Posted by joshua on June 30, 2006 at 11:17 am · Filed under WTF?, Unintended Humor, Korean Politics, Appeasement, Abductions
This is supposed to be a happy occasion. Let’s not bicker and argue about who killed who.
– Monty Python and the Holy Grail
[P]ointing out mistakes and bickering over what is right and wrong is not helpful, and in the end the injury rebounds on the abduction victim and the victim’s family….”
– Unidentified official, defending South Korea’s low-key reaction to a statement by South Korean abductee Kim Yong Nam, under the careful observation of North Korean minders, that he was “rescued” by a passing North Korean ship in 1978, when he was still a boy.
This, in spite of the admissions of one of the captured North Korean spies who abducted him from a beach. South Korea’s leftist government, which has provided billions in unconditional aid and investment to Kim Jong Il’s regime, has never publicly demanded the repatriation of its 468 kidnapped citizens, or the hundreds of South Korean POW’s still held since the Korean War, or conditioned the provision of aid on their release. Its “Unification Ministry” recently attempted to censor reporters when North Korea bristled at their reports describing other South Korean abductees as having been kidnapped.
Posted by joshua on June 30, 2006 at 5:59 am · Filed under "United" Nations
Here, at National Review. The name Boutros Boutros Ghali has already come up. I’ll be interested in gaining any insight into why the U.N. did nothing for the North Korean people while Park’s friend and fellow bagman Maurice Strong was Kofi Annan’s Special Envoy to North Korea. Previous posts here.
Update: Strong has issued a statement denying any involvement in Oil for Food, but stating, “I have continued to maintain a relationship with Mr. Park. Indeed, as a native of North Korea he has advised me on North Korean issues in my role as UN Envoy.” So an indicted bagman for a genocidal tyrant is acknowledged as a sage on how the U.N. ought to deal with another genocidal tyrant.
Posted by joshua on June 29, 2006 at 12:26 pm · Filed under Human Rights, Europe, Activism, Human Trafficking
… courtesy of Freedom House. This issue discusses Europe’s increasing concern for the North Korean people, but focuses on human trafficking. Their definition of human trafficking doesn’t just involve the movement of enslaved people, but also involves the movement of things enslaved people are forced to make. I particularly recommend this issue to those interested in such issues as Kaesong and other exports from the North; this issue contains accounts of gulag inmates being made to produce products for export.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 29, 2006 at 11:33 am · Filed under Appeasement, Japan & Korea, Japan, Abductions
[Update: This picture from the Chosun Ilbo, taken as Kim watches his family leave Kumgang, says it all.]
I sometimes get e-mails from a liberal NGO, asking me to support its North Korean family reunion project. These always leave me feeling divided, because I know for a fact that some of those involved are completely sincere in their concern for the people in North and their relatives on the outside. But then, I see how those reunions always turn out, and I wonder whether as a North Korean, I wouldn’t consider something like this to be more torture than it’s worth, emotionally.
Not that the decision is likely theirs. Take the case of Kim Yong-nam. In 1978, when he was still a boy, Kim disappeared from a beach near his home town in North Cholla province. Kim later married Megumi Yokota, whom the North Koreans abducted from Japan when she was just 13, and whom the North Koreans claim committed suicide in 1994. The North Koreans even provided a set of ashes, but when the Japanese tested them, they turned out not to be hers. But listen to what Mr. Kim, ever under the Dear Leader’s paternal watch, is telling us:
“I went on a raft to avoid fighting with companions that I went to the beach with,” Mr. Kim said. “After drifting in the water for a while, I was rescued by a North Korean ship.”
He said he learned later that the ship had docked at Nampo, on the peninsula’s Yellow Sea coast, and decided to stay there because of the hospitality of the North Koreans. “For the first few days, I couldn’t eat or sleep, but the North Koreans’ friendly and special treatment comforted me,” he said. “After learning that I could study without paying tuition in the North, I thought I would study there and return later.”
All stated without apparent irony, which isn’t an approved state of mind in North Korea. Still, there are a few odds things about this, such as the question of why Mr. Kim never wrote home to tell mom of his wondrous times in the Land of Friendly and Special Treatment. I have helpfully attached a map showing that busy North Korean shipping lane — fenced off by several small South Korean islands, yet — from where Mr. Kim was “rescued.”
There’s one other little inconsistency in there:
Mr. Kim’s explanation contradicts the statement of a North Korean agent who was captured in the South in 1997. Kim Gwang-hyeon told authorities here that he had kidnapped Mr. Kim as he waited for a ship to pick him up after completing a mission here. “At the time, the boy was crying on the beach alone after being bullied by his friends,” the North Korean spy said.
Korean reporters noted some of these inconsistencies, despite being required to submit their questions in writing in advance. The American media briefly reported this story as the case of a kidnapped South Korean “reunited” with his family, without mentioning the circumstances or duration of what no honest person should ever call a “reunion.”
Mr. Kim’s ventriloquized body also had harsh words for the government of Japan, which was so untrusting as to conduct a DNA test on the “remains” of his wife, Megumi Yokota. One of Megumi’s kidnappers, you may recall, was actually caught in South Korea. Before Kim Dae Jung let him go, he described how Megumi, then 13, sat in a room deep in the hold of the ship that carried her to servitude in a finishing school for spies, and how she sobbed and cried for her mother. Today, there’s an acclaimed feature film about Megumi’s story in the festival circuit.
It’s difficult to even imagine the inner pain Kim Yong-nam must have experienced, seeing his mother without the chance to really tell her of his emotions at seeing her again after all these years, forced to deliver this fraudulent accounting of the fate of a woman who had been his wife and the mother of his child. In the midst of the latest Tokdo distraction, Megumi’s mother, Sakie, met Yong-Nam’s mother and offered kind and moving words about her son-in-law:
“I am so lucky to have a South Korean son-in-law, not a North Korean. I am so happy that I can hope that our families may meet one another again.” He said the couple “loved each other and had such a beautiful child” — Hae-gyong, who North Korea says is their daughter - “a healthy and sweet girl. I thank Young-nam for taking such good care of my granddaughter and I thank you, too.”
Sakie also met with President Bush in April. North Korea refuses to let Yong-Nam and Megumi’s daughter leave North Korea or speak freely with anyone.
Kim Yong-Nam’s body was abducted nearly two decades ago, and it is being abducted away from Kumgang again, without a peep from the government whose duty it is to protect him. It’s no less sad to see how his mind and soul have been abducted, too.
And betrayed.
Update: More at the Daily NK.
Posted by joshua on June 29, 2006 at 4:36 am · Filed under Appeasement, NK Military, ROK Military
This story is too moving and too maddening to do justice in a post, so just read for yourself.
You will recall the words and actions of one of the widows, whose own government snubbed the memory of her husband and his five comrades. She announced her intention to leave Korea and go the United States, whose ambassador at least sent her a letter of condolence.
.
Posted by joshua on June 29, 2006 at 4:36 am · Filed under Korean Politics
Roh is at 14%, Uri at 12.
Posted by joshua on June 29, 2006 at 4:01 am · Filed under Human Rights, Refugees, Southeast Asia
About a dozen North Korean defectors are staying in a Southeast Asian country while seeking asylum in the United States, the South Korean government said Thursday, confirming a local newspaper report.
On reading further, it’s apparent that the country in question is Thailand, Let’s hope that these refugees are in that group, as it would be a step up from jail. The story also appears to refer to the Shenyang Four.
Posted by joshua on June 28, 2006 at 6:54 pm · Filed under Korean Politics, Censorship
No, I don’t believe that a government gagging its own state-funded think tanks through the employee disciplinary process is a freedom of speech issue. Call this one a quality of speech issue. A government is an inherently political creature, and if it wants to exert political control over the publicly expressed views of its officials, then so be it. There’s always the private sector….
But you have to wonder exactly what a government is getting for its money if it won’t let think tanks think, don’t you?
Posted by joshua on June 28, 2006 at 6:42 pm · Filed under NK Economics, China, Appeasement, China & Korea, Diplomacy, Abductions, Counterfeiting, U.S. & Korea
Really, this piece by Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki is well reasoned and said. Even if I disagree with much of it, I think they have a good grasp of which threats we ought to be worrying about. The debate about whether regime change would work is competely speculative until we actually try it in earnest, of course. At this point, they had me:
[T]he administration should build its North Korea policy around the notion that we need to present Pyongyang with a choice — improve its behavior, reform its country, and engage with the world, or retreat further into isolation and lose many of the benefits it enjoys now (especially from South Korea and China, to the tune of more than $2 billion a year in aid and trade). We should focus on substance, not process; on core values, not tactical judgments.
But then, we have this:
To make this policy workable, we need to make it appealing in Beijing and Seoul. That means offering enough positive inducements, should North Korea be willing to try the path of reform that Vietnam and China itself have taken in the last 30 years, to show that we are willing to work with the regime under the right circumstances. Only if a sincere effort at engagement fails will China and South Korea consider the sorts of economic coercion needed to make Kim Jong Il and his cronies in Pyongyang feel real pain from their actions.
(emphasis mine)
“A sincere effort at engagement?” If all of the things we have done or offered to do over the last decade-plus still don’t amount to a sufficiently “sincere effort at engagement” for Chinese and South Korean sensibilities, then this is an eternally vanishing goal. After all of South Korea’s “sincere efforts at engagement,” it still can’t reunite one of its kidnapped citizens with his octagenarian mother for more than a few hours of being watched like the Unabomber’s mom on her annual visit to Supermax. Here, if I’ve ever seen one, is a prerequisite that swallows what seems, at first, to be a very sensible policy.
At least my kids will have something to blog about.
No question, putting severe pressure on North Korea would be much easier with the help of Seoul and Beijing, but you have to play the cards you’re dealt, and in China’s case, there’s really only so much we can expect. We can hope that Seoul will move closer to the U.S. position after its general elections in 2007, and we still have plenty of influence in South Korea if we’re willing to use it. Beijing will continue to make as much mischief as its interests allow, but there are ways to raise the strategic and financial costs of supporting North Korea for China, too.
Posted by joshua on June 28, 2006 at 1:01 pm · Filed under U.S. Law, "United" Nations
Park formerly served as a “Special Advisor” to Maurice Strong, a wealthy, uber-connected Canadian leftist who in turn was Kofi Annan’s Special Envoy to North Korea. Strong and Park have now both been implicated in the U.N. Oil-for-Food scandal. During his tenure, Strong was notable for a deathly silence on human rights. He resigned after the OFF allegations emerged.
Today, Park is charged with being an unregistered Iraqi agent, in violation of the Foreign Agents’ Registration Act. Writing in the National Review Online, Claudia Rosett reports from Park’s trial, in New York:
The defendant, South Korean businessman Tongsun Park, is charged in the Southern District of New York with acting as an unregistered agent of Saddam’s Iraq — which tried through various means, especially the manipulation of the 1996-2003 Oil-for-Food program, to end the U.N. sanctions imposed after Saddam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Park’s lawyer, Michael Kim, says the 71-year-old Park is “absolutely not guilty.”
….
Alleging that “Cash by the bagful was sent from Iraq to the United States and doled out here by an Iraqi agent to Tongsun Park,” Farbiarz outlined a tale of secret swaps of messages and money in New York cafes and restaurants; night-time meetings at the Sutton Place official residence of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali; a close encounter with longtime U.N. eminence Maurice Strong, who served as a top adviser to both Boutros-Ghali and then to Kofi Annan; and an episode in which Park in 1997 picked up cash from Saddam’s number two man in Iraq, Tariq Aziz, and “drove out of the Iraqi desert over the Jordanian border.” (Boutros-Ghali, Strong, and Annan have all denied any wrong-doing in relation to Oil-for-Food.)
Park has a long history with allegations of corruption dating back to the 1970’s “Koreagate” scandal. Click here for some of the extensive posting I’ve done on the subject.
And get this: Park even has a web site, which focuses heavily on Korean nationalism, a la Robert Kim, but which seems to be all in English. Go figure. The site, wisely I’d say, says nothing about the charges, and contains no information that might connect Park to the government of North Korea, his birthplace.
Posted by joshua on June 28, 2006 at 12:20 pm · Filed under An Alliance?, U.S. Military, U.S. & Korea, ROK Military
… Korea started paying the cost of its own defense. Which is why the most dovish South Korean president ever is forced to seek a very large increase in defense spending:
South Korea’s defense ministry said yesterday that it has requested a 9.9 percent increase in the defense budget for 2007.
….
In a proposal submitted to the Ministry of Planning and Budget, the military seeks to secure 24.75 trillion won ($25 billion) for the coming year, up from a revised 22.5 trillion won this year, the defense ministry said in a statement.
The ministry plans in 2007 to spend 6.91 trillion won, or 27.9 percent of the total defense budget, to build up its military capacity, up from 25.8 percent this year. The ministry has already mapped out a 2006-2010 defense strategy. Under the plan, it will spend 27.6 billion won next year to launch a project to purchase guided weapons, including joint direct attack munitions with an integrated global positioning system and long-range anti-submarine torpedoes.
In 2007, the ministry will also start a project to secure an additional 20 “F-15 fighter-level” jets to beef up its air defense capability.
Do a line-by-line comparison of this budget increase and what the USFK had provided; it’s apparent that aside from a long-overdue pay raise for the ROK troops, this is a downpayment on post-USFK independent defense.
Meanwhile, in completely unrelated news, ruling party lawymakers continue to fret over the political cost of stiff tax increases. Yes, this will be a good thing for both Korea and the United States.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on June 28, 2006 at 12:06 pm · Filed under Diplomacy, Washington Views, U.S. & Korea
Balbina Y. Hwang was nominated as a special assistant to Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
….
On issues pertaining to North Korea, the analyst made clear that a hardline stance would continue to be be taken. She said diplomacy would stand at the forefront of dealings with the North, but the North Korean nuclear issue could only be resolved through pressure on Pyongyang.
She said Washington’s open criticism of the North’s human rights record and a series of financial sanctions imposed by Washington on entities and banks linked to North Korean illicit activities were in line with the overall principles of democracy and should not be linked to ongoing nuclear talks with the North.
[Correction, 2/22/07: Ms. Hwang e-mails to describe the above quote, taken directly from the Joongang Ilbo piece linked at the bottom of this post, as “[i]naccurate, false and misleading …, as well as a completely inaccurate misreporting of my statements.” She goes on:
For the record, I am not “special assistant” but Senior Special Advisor. More importantly, the quote below which you attribute to me was in actuality a complete and purposeful misrepresentation of my comments, and was removed by the original Korean media outlet who published it, along with a statement of apology. I request that you REMOVE this IMMEDIATELY from your website.
I would only point out to Ms. Hwang that (a) these are the JI reporter’s words, not mine, (b) newspapers don’t notify bloggers when they correct or retract published articles, and (c) one cannot simply remove things from the Internet. Instead, I am posting this correction, since the quote will still be available in Internet search engines and archive sites regardless. This way, the record is corrected along with the erroneous original. End correction.]
… the latter being a departure from my personal orthodoxy that it’s all inextricably linked, because we can’t solve all of these issues whack-a-mole style, and because transparency and respect for human life are at the root of every one of them. The North Korean Human Rights Act also mandates that human rights be a part of our negotiating agenda, although that leads to some complex separation-of-powers issues.
I actually had a chance to talk with her at length once, and she’s actually quite a nice person, though I suspect she’ll find the job frustrating. Read the rest here.
[Update: I think honesty requires me to make a second correction above. I’m always happy to comply with a polite request to correct the record, but gratuitous, self-important rudeness doesn’t impress me, particularly coming from a diplomat. Maybe Ms. Hwang simply doesn’t grasp how hyperlinks and block quotes work, although patient explanation was pointless.]
Posted by joshua on June 27, 2006 at 6:31 pm · Filed under NK Economics, Censorship, U.S. & Korea, Democracy
Look what happened yesterday when the Korean government tried to engage its citizens in public discourse on a Free Trade Agreement with the United States.
The hearing, organized by the Trade Ministry, had just begun at the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry building in central Seoul when the protesters interrupted a speech by Kim Jong-hoon, Korea’s chief negotiator, in its opening moments. Catcalls rained down on Mr. Kim, and several protesters approached the podium, scuffling with government officials who tried to intervene.
After about 10 minutes, Mr. Kim withdrew and the session was postponed until the afternoon.
It was no more successful. Protesters again charged for the podium, shouting, pushing and shoving and jabbing fingers into Mr. Kim’s face. The meeting broke down into knots of pushing, shoving protesters and bureaucrats before the ministry gave up and canceled the second attempt.
The article makes no mention of arrests, although it does report that the government gave up and yielded the debate to the thugs. I wonder how many voters were prescient enough to set aside real questions about the FTA because they didn’t want to be whacked or trampled in a melee. That’s how lawlessness drives out debate, and an illustration of how democracy cannot survive without the protection of law.
Posted by joshua on June 27, 2006 at 12:59 pm · Filed under Geopolitics, An Alliance?, China & Korea, U.S. & Korea
A top official from the National Security Council on Wednesday threw his weight behind a change in Korea’s geopolitical strategy away from what he called the “Cold War camp diplomacy” in East Asia, pitting a northern alliance of North Korea, China and Russia against the southern alliance of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan.
“In future, Korea will break from the framework of confrontation and switch to open security cooperation,” the official said. “As a dynamic actor, Korea will play a balancing role in Northeast Asia.”
– The Chosun Ilbo, March 30, 2005, quoting “a top official from [Korea’s] National Security Council”
How can you tell the difference between a camp diplomacy by any other name and playing a balancing role? Answer: a camp follower is a supplicant who serves one or more masters without appreciably advancing his own interests. A balancer exerts sufficient influence on the policies of other nations to preserve political equilibrium (presupposing this to be a desireable state of affairs). A balancer takes the initiative in responding to crises and in coordinating a regional strategic vision. It identifies attainable objectives in light of a realistic appraisal of its strengths and weaknesses. It makes itself a must-stop focal point of regional diplomacy, a valued ally, and a feared adversary. It pursues its objectives quietly when possible, and publicly only when it doing so serves the totality of the interests of its people. At least, that’s what I think Lee Jong-Seok the “top NSC official” meant.
Granted, we must all play the cards we’re dealt, but does this description sound more like, say, Thailand, Pakistan, or today’s South Korea?
Here are a few grafs. As you read them, ask yourself two questions. First, how much impact does South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun’s administration appear to have on the diplomatic positions of the various countries? Second, how balanced are the differences between Roh’s government and those of other nations of influence?
First graf:
Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon on Tuesday told his Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing the two countries must make diplomatic efforts to ensure that North Korea does not launch a missile and returns to six-country talks on its nuclear program. At a meeting in Beijing, Seoul’s chief diplomat urged his hosts to convince North Korea to resolve the matter.
Li said China had already told the North and other involved countries of “its interest” in the missile question. “It’s unacceptable for the issue to be allowed to raise tensions or aggravate the state of affairs,” Li was quoted as saying in comments suggesting China has told North Korea to abandon the missile launch.
Incidentally, I believe the Chinese had already told the North Koreans this, and meant it. I don’t think a launch is in China’s interests. One more:
In remarks apparently aimed at the United States and Japan, Mr. Li also reportedly said Beijing has emphasized the search for a peaceful resolution to other “relevant parties.” He called on Seoul to join Beijing in more efforts at mediation and dialogue.
That last one won’t be a very hard sell. Now, compare those grafs to this one, which deals with Roh’s interaction with his American counterpart:
Song Min-soon, President Roh Moo-hyun’s Blue House security advisor, said yesterday that Mr. Roh will meet U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington in September.
Mr. Song said he would go to Washington early next month to plan the visit with Stephen Hadley, his counterpart in the U.S. government.
The somewhat unusual announcement of the visit even before preparations were well under way was probably related to a growing sense of unease here about strains in the U.S.-Korea alliance, which culminated in editorial charges by the Chosun Ilbo newspaper that the two leaders were no longer talking. The Blue House responded sensitively to those charges two days ago.
Ban jets right into Beijing to display complete harmony with the Chinese view. Both join a call for protagonist and object alike to show restraint, presumably meaning in both the provocation and the defense therefrom. With this threat looming (but perhaps receding), Roh can’t get on W’s calendar until September and is conspicuously absent from his rolodex, if recent reports are to be believed. Nor did South Korea join in today’s U.S. call for North Korea to show us the rocket’s “peaceful” payload.
At least with respect to the actions of the South Korean government, score this round for China.
This does not necessarily mean that South Korea as a whole is drifting into the Motherland’s loving arms. Roh is mortally weakened, there are signs of a backlash and rightward reaction among Korean voters, and even his own party — its Chairman, recently considered a Roh loyalist, no less — is taking shots at Roh’s diplomatic impotence:
Moon Hee-sang, a former party chairman, took Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok to the woodshed Friday at a Unification Committee hearing. He called on the administration to stop provoking Koreans to believe that the Roh administration is “left-wing.” He also stressed the importance of Korea’s military alliance with the United states. “The government should keep reiterating its desire to strengthen the alliance and earn trust,” he said, “but the problem is that Washington doesn’t trust us.”
He also took the minister to task for not protesting strongly against a warning by Ahn Kyong-ho, a leader of a recent delegation from Pyongyang, that the peninsula faced a “fire of war” if conservatives here regain the Blue House.
To be completely fair to Roh, I have little doubt that he’s being thrown overboard for trying to implement the very policies today’s Uri critics advocated yesterday. This attack strikes me as cynical in the extreme. It is also indicative of the utter dissolution of Roh’s political base that I can’t name a single Korean politician of national standing who supports him, other than his own Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and UniFiction Minster. And even this assumes much.
In other words, I don’t read too much from Roh Moo Hyun cozying up to the Chinese. It’s hard to say where South Korea will end up until the 2007 elections, and that further saps Roh’s power in dealing with other nations.
The comparison is an imperfect one, but it calls to mind that in 1994, Kim Young Sam’s opinion carried enough weight in this town that he was able to stop a strike on Yongbyon, at great cost to U.S. interests, just two years after Roh Tae-Woo established diplomatic relations with China. He also began talks with North Korea, though not without the expectation of reciprocity there, too, as Kim Y.S. — crook or not — never forget that North Koreans were also his country’s citizens. This, ladies and gentlemen, is balancing. Does anyone seriously believe that South Korea occupies a place of real influence in regional diplomacy today? That is the consequence of subordinating statecraft to emotion. If you’re a slave of emotion, you’re a slave of everyone who learns to manipulate it.
If William Perry or Newt Gingrich were Secretary of Defense today, who believes that Roh could stop either of them from launching a preemptive strike on North Korea? Here is a case where the Koreans counsel caution. Notwithstanding the wrongness of their reasons, they are right, yet they lack the credibility to be recognized as right.
Contrast this to the wily diplomacy of the North Koreans, the Chinese, and the Japanese. Yesterday, I noted how North Korea’s episode of projectophilia was driving Japan into the U.S. camp. You can see this reflected in the quality of the relationship between the U.S. and Japanese leaders (not counting matters of taste, obviously….). Barring something exceptionally unlikely, Japan’s leaders will emerge from this crisis with their nation’s power enhanced. South Korea’s will not.
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