Archive for April, 2007
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 30, 2007 at 6:55 am · Filed under Anju Links
1 It has now been 16 days since North Korea violated every single pledge it made in the course of the February 13th agreement, notwithstanding our return of $25 million in proceeds of crime, no strings attached, in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718. Latest word has North Korea’s demand for the return of the money — which was not part of the February 13th deal — evolving into a demand that the United States grant a general amnesty and immunity over the laundering of funds from North Korea’s illegal activities.
Would anyone actually try to facilitate that? Of course. You already know who.
2 Or Else, What? Back in March, I predicted that the bipolar U.S. reversal of February 13th would lead to U.S.-Japan frictions and a visit from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and that has come to pass. There was no public discussion of the issue that I suspect was the most contentious — North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens and its seemingly inconsistent desire for removal from the terror list — but there was a more general warning to North Korea over its noncompliance:
U.S. President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe warned North Korea on Friday that they would take a tougher stance toward the communist nation if it does not honor its commitments on nuclear disarmament.
Bush and Abe expressed concern that North Korea missed an April 14 deadline to start shutting its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and warned of steps such as sanctions if it did not comply.
“Our partners in the six-party talks are patient but our patience is not unlimited,” Bush said, referring to the six-way negotiations involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. [Reuters]
Their scheduled five-minute meeting lasted 40 minutes. That ought to mean something. In the end, both leaders agreed to give North Korea yet more “leeway” in violating meeting its obligations, but Bush said, “We have the capability of more sanctions.” See also this AP story. Separately, Foreign Minister Taro Aso met Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and they will also meet with Defense Secretary Robert Gates. According to rumors I’ve heard, the U.S. side will pressure Japan to relax its demands for the return of its abducted citizens, but I predict Japan will be firm. Note to South Korea: this is how mature nations practice diplomacy when they take issue (in this case, justifiably) with U.S. foreign policy. Observe the complete absence of juvenile public antagonism. The Japanese just send their heavy hitters to the United States to meet with our heavy hitters, and to talk to them. Let’s hope Japan’s brand of diplomacy will be rewarded.
3 Pyongyang Spring Update: Did North Korea display a Taepodong I at its last big military parade? The Chosun Ilbo thinks so [or possibly, it was an entirely new model] [via IHT].
4 Confronting Betrayal: North Korean defectors are invited to give their views to the U.S. government, in the wake of its capitulation to North Korea, and they speak bluntly:
The Defense Department said in the past the U.S. prepared for the crumbling of authoritarian regimes by educating defectors from those countries and letting them take a role in rebuilding their countries. They asked whether North Korean defectors could play the same role. They also asked how the U.S. can help and intervene in the process.
The defectors urged the U.S. to employ strong pressure and dialogue at the same time in dealing with North Korea, so outside power can accelerate democratization from within. The U.S. officials promised to help North Koreans rebuild their nation in an efficient way. [….]
At the State Department, the defectors criticized Washington for hastily lifting financial sanctions against the North and failing to raise the issue of human rights abuse. They claimed North Korea was simply using the Yongbyon nuclear facilities it no longer needs as a means to get international pressure lifted.
But officials defended U.S. policies toward the North. The officials assured the defectors that the U.S. has not given up on North Korea’s human rights violations, but the closure of the Yongbyon nuclear reactors is a starting point, and the six-party dialogue framework is designed to deal with the nuclear problem, not human rights. Officials stressed that there are plenty of options to pressure North Korea if it fails to fulfill its part of a Feb. 13 denuclearization agreement. [Chosun Ilbo]
This entire article is an absolute must-read.
5 The Daily NK reports that North Korean authorities have ordered the banning of all Japanese made goods from North Korea within 3 years. A lot of mid- and junior-level bureaucrats are going to be awfully unhappy about giving up the perks — the bicycles, watches, and color TV’s — they worked so hard to earn.
6 Stage 4 Watch: What began as a crackdown on the smuggling of subversive goods has evolved into a red guard purge to reverse the spread of capitalism in Sinuiju:
[I]nvestigations are being held throughout all of Shinuiju city. Authorities, the Safety Agency and investigating teams have united to confiscate items such as foreign CD’s, capitalist-style clothing and computer programs. Also, any devices that could be used as a means of foreign communication such as TV’s, radios and mobile phone are also being strictly regulated.
The source said, “Authorities are enforcing strict control over Shinuiju city to use it as a confrontation with capitalism and socialism” and “An order was made to protect the border gateway and that the former guard post (Shinuiju) must not be shaken.” The source confirmed that the goods caught at customs included computer software, CD’s, and foreign books including the bible. [Daily NK]
The Daily NK also has another fascinating photo essay of Sinuiju, where the infiltration of subversive business models has eased the misery of life in North Korea.
7 Stage 5 Watch: Also in Sinuiju:
Two young adults in their 30s, who harbored resentment against North Korea’s power organs, stabbed a Social Safety officer (police) with a deadly weapon and fled with a gun and seven bullets, reported a North Korean insider on the afternoon of the 23rd.
The source said, “This event took place on the 19th, in Baektodong (Southern Shinuiju), North Pyongan. The stabbed Safety officer is in serious condition, but whether or not he died has not been reported.”
Baektodong is about 4km south from Shinuiju and the third detention cell of the People’ Safety Agency is located there.
Loss of weapons has occurred in North Korea from time to time, but an event where a weapon was stolen after stabbing a Social Safety officer is rare, so this event is being closely watched. North Korean citizens cannot possess small arms. [Daily NK]
Gee, we could fix that, couldn’t we? Give the people bags of rice, and a few apparatchiks will eat for a day. Give the people Tokarevs and you sow the seeds of a more equitable society.
Some background on the theoretical stages of regime collapse here.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 29, 2007 at 11:27 am · Filed under NK Military, Google Earth
[For images of North Korea’s nuclear sites, click here; for updates and commentary on North Korea’s latest nuclear test, click here; for more Google Earth imagery of North Korea, click here.]
North Korea’s airfields are some of the most interesting places to spy on, and often, some of the easiest to spot. Generally, you can see a large airfield from about 10 miles up, with or without high resolution coverage. Although you can’t identify aircraft without high resolution, as you will see, even with high resolution, the image quality varies from disappointingly blurry to remarkably crisp.
I cross-referenced much of what I saw here with Global Security, an excellent source generally, although its limitions when it comes to North Korea are both clear and understandable. Some of the airfields Global Security marks don’t exist where noted, and in at least one case, I was able to identify a type of large transport helicopter that they don’t list in the North Korean inventory. Thus, in some cases, and thanks to the miracle of Google Earth, this post may actually be more definitive and authoritative — though less complete — than the information on the Global Security site, and should at least be read as a supplement to it. Here’s a quote from Global Security’s summary and analysis of the North Korean Peoples’ Army Air Force:
As of 1996 the North Korean air force consisted of six air divisions under the direct control of the national Air Command: three are composed of fighter wings, two of transportation wings, and one for fighter training.
North Korea has approximately seventy air bases, including jet and non-jet capable bases and emergency landing strips, with aircraft deployed to between twenty and thirty of them. The majority of tactical aircraft are concentrated at air bases around P’yongyang and in the southern provinces. P’yongyang can place almost all its military aircraft in hardened–mostly underground–shelters. North Korean aircraft are sheltered in underground hangars and plenty of runways are available. In the KPDR there is absolutely no private vehicle ownership but many highways with concrete surfaces and arched reinforced concrete tunnels (for example the superhighway linking Pyongyang with Wonsan), that in case of hostilities are sure to be used as military airfields. It thus seems highly improbable that the NKAF would be knocked out in one strike. North Korea deployed about fifty percent of its fighters in the front area which makes a possible surprise attack to all areas of South Korea. In 1990-91, North Korea activated four forward air bases near the DMZ, which increased its initial southward reach and decreased warning and reaction times for Seoul.
More than 420 fighters, bombers, transport planes, and helicopters were redeployed in October 1995, and more than 100 aircraft were moved forward to the three air bases near the DMZ. More than 20 Il-28 bombers were moved to Taetan which shortened their arrival time to Seoul from 30 minutes to 10 minutes. Over 80 MiG-17s redeployed to Nuchonri and Kuupri are able to attack Seoul in 6 minutes. By these redeployments North Korea intends to make a first strike with outdated MiG-17s and the second strike with mainstay fighters such as MiG-21s and Su-25s.
Here’s an overview of the North Korean military airfields that can be seen on Google Earth. What’s most notable is the nearly complete absence of civil aviation.
Those with numbers assigned are visible with high resolution. Those simply marked “airfield” are visible with low resolution only. Numbers in bold below correspond to the numbers marked on the overview map above.
1: MiG-17’s and 19’s are two of the three most common fighter aircraft on North Korean airfields. The 17’s have the stubby wings with the rounded ends; the 19’s are more sharply swept and angular.
2: The other common type is the MiG-21, with its distinctive delta-shaped wing. Kim Jong Il purchased 40 of these from Kazakhstan at the height of the Great Famine, when people were wandering in from the countryside and dying in heaps in front of train stations. Some of the MiG-21’s pictured here may be Chinese-made F-7’s, which have slight extensions on their wingtips. According to the Global Security map, this is Chunghwa AB.
Frequently, the MiG-21’s you see don’t appear to be in working order. Some are clearly stripped of parts, decaying, or even sitting in ponds of standing water. Many appear to be mere decoys.
You can see a better close-up view at the airfield marked 13. The planes on the left are MiG-17’s.
3: These swing-wing fighters are probably MiG-23’s. Global Security doesn’t list North Korea as having the only other aircraft this could be, the MiG-27, which is based on the same airframe and indistinguishable from the MiG-23 with this resolution. The 23 is a fighter; the 27 is a ground-attack aircraft, and much more advanced.
4: There are thirty of these blurry things, and if you can identify them, you know something I don’t. The don’t look like any of the older MiG or Sukhoi models. Could these be North Korea’s MiG-29’s? Or could they be something else entirely? The image quality isn’t good enough to even make a firm guess.
Global Security identifies this location as the Headquarters of the 1st Air Combat Command, Kaechon AB.
5: You can see many more MiG 17’s, 19’s, and 21’s here, at Wonsan AB, right next to what I believe is one of Kim Jong Il’s palaces. See also the location marked 13.
6: I found large bombers in one location, at an airfield near Sinuiju. These ancient leviathans are Il-28 “Beagles,” first flown by the Soviets in 1948. The Chinese built their own version of the Beagle under license as the H-5. You can still see a number of these on Chinese airfields.
Global Security claims that North Korea has 80 Il-28’s. You can see more than 40 on this airfield. The others could be underground, or there could be another airfield, such as the Taetan airfield to which Global Security refers in its summary.
Note that half of the airfield was imaged during summer and half during the winter (thus, we could be counting some planes twice, and some not at all). In the second image, you can see a camouflage net at the end of the taxiway, covering the entrance to what may be an underground hangar. In the third image, the Beagles’ Klimov VK-1 turbojet engines have blown and melted the snow right off the ground.
7: These are the only helicopters I’ve found in North Korea, and I’ve searched far and wide. If you’ve found others, by all means, please tell me where. This is a group of about a dozen Mil-8 utility helicopters and a few Mil-4 observation helicopters. According to Global Security, North Korea only has 15 Mil-8’s. [See update below.]
These four very large craft that appear to be Mil-26’s. The Mil-26 is the largest and most powerful helicopter in the world, according to the Federation of American Scientists.
Interestingly, Global Security does not list North Korea as having any of these — or any other large helicopter — in its inventory. Thus, with the exception of a large number of tiny Mil-2 Hoplites, you’re looking at a good share of the North Korean helicopter force right here.
Equally interesting: were an insurgency to break out in North Korea, the government could count on neither a good network of roads nor a large force of helicopters. That means that if insurgents could be supplied with food, arms, and ammunition in a remote area, the army would have trouble accessing them, and probably couldn’t count on much support from road-bound armor or artillery, either.
8: Here are some of the An-2 “Colt” biplanes that North Korea uses for both civilian and military purposes. Reportedly, some of these biplanes were built in North Korea under license. Don’t underestimate them because they’re biplanes. Though old and slow, they have an amazing amount of lift and can take off and land on very small unimproved runways. With their wood and fabric structure, they’re also very difficult to detect on radar. In the event of war, North Korea would use them for the delivery of special forces and paratroopers for deep penetration missions. These are at a small airstrip and could be for civilian use.
9: These, however, clearly appear to be for military use, judging by the revetments in which they’re parked.
10: The North Koreans are second to none at tunneling, and here is one of two front-line airfields — see also number 14 – where you can’t see any working aircraft on the surface, but you can clearly see the underground hangars at the ends of the curved taxiways leading from the main airfield. See also the airfield marked 15.
11: The most modern aircraft I’ve seen in North Korea is the Su-25 ground attack aircraft, which was first used in combat by the Soviet Air Force in Afghanistan. North Korea has about 30 of them, according to Global Security. If so, this appears to be most of them.
If the Soviets first deployed the Su-25 in the mid-1980’s, you would think that the North Koreans wouldn’t have gotten them until the mid-1990’s. That happens to correspond to the beginning of North Korea’s Great Famine, which killed approximately 2 million people, most of them between 1994 and 1998. North Korea’s agricultural production and food supply have never recovered, and it remains dependent on the aid of the same neighbors it threatens. It has received approximately $200 million in international food aid from the U.N. World Food Program alone each year ever since (until it kicked out most of the World Food Program staff at the end of 2005). Assuming a unit cost of $12 million per aircraft and accessories, you’re looking at approximately $216 million worth of Russian airplanes. That’s enough to feed all of the 6.5 million North Koreans included in a typical year’s World Food Program appeal for a year, with enough left over to throw in some extra sugar rations.
12: Finally, here is an aircraft that confused me for some time because of its familiarity to World War II vets, airplane enthusiasts, and dope smugglers everywhere. Clearly, this is a DC-3, a/k/a C-47, right?
Close. On further research, I learned that the Soviets built a copy of the DC-3 under license as the Lisunov Li-2. That appears to be what we have here.
Update: NK Econ Watch points out this helipad in the middle of Pyongyang, 2 miles East by Southeast of the May Day Stadium, on the North bank of the Taedong River. There are six Mil-8 Hips sitting on the tarmac.
Update 2: Here’s an underground runway being built right through a mountain:
More commentary on this site here.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 26, 2007 at 7:50 am · Filed under Human Rights, Activism
[Updated below with a report on the Congressional briefing. There was some very chilling testimony today.]
[Update, 4/26: Some great news about refugees in Thailand, and a video link to one of Tuesday’s events.]
First, please digg this post, and please tell your friends to do the same.
For those who don’t know why this issue needs more attention — including yours — please witness Camp 22 and its horrors, learn the grim fate of refugees sent back to North Korea today, and read how Kim Jong Il splurged on weapons and personal luxuries while two million of his people starved to death.
Click for a schedule of events, and how you can help >>
Read the rest of this entry »
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 26, 2007 at 7:22 am · Filed under Six-Party Talks, WMD, Japan & Korea, Refugees, Terrorism (NK), Abductions, Southeast Asia, Terrorism/Iraq, America
* It has now been 13 days since April 13th, the day North Korea was supposed to have shut down the Yongbyon reactor, begun discussions on the full extent of its nuclear weapons and programs, invited in U.N. inspectors, and rejoined six-party talks (to include actually talking). North Korea has (surprise!) broken every one of those agreements. Victor Cha has since reportedly warned them that our patience is limited. So in Pyongyang they ask ….
* Or Else, What? There are no consequences attached to North Korea’s noncompliance except slight delays in the payoff schedule. Mr. Axis of Evil himself says there’s little we can do to pressure North Korea, since we don’t give them aid. Tell that to Stuart Levy; indeed, Treasury has exposed so much dirt in North Korea’s finances that it still can’t get its laundered crime money out of the collapsing Banco Delta.
* U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695, passed last July 15th, said the following:
2. Demands that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching;
….
5. Underlines, in particular to the DPRK, the need to show restraint and refrain from any action that might aggravate tension, and to continue to work on the resolution of non-proliferation concerns through political and diplomatic efforts;
Now, here’s a look at some of the ballistic missiles North Korea put on display to add Freudian zip to its big April 25th military parade.
* Bonus for everyone whose name is not Alejandro Cao de Benos: girls marching in miniskirts, although I’m not seeing the beauty here that I tend to when the ensemble is chosen voluntarily. Here’s a thought: can I ever look forward to the day when girls in Pyongyang will wear sun dresses? Pyongyang doesn’t seem like a sun dress kind of place, does it?
* Speaking of North Korea and terrorism, the Chosun Ilbo picks up a story about the sole North Korean survivor of the Rangoon bombing plot that killed 21 people, including four South Korean officials, on October 9, 1983. The bombing was carried out on Kim Jong Il’s personal orders, something we presumably learn from Kang Min-Chul, who saved his own life by talking under Burmese interrogation. For that reason, Kang can’t go back to North Korea, yet South Korea — you guessed it — won’t take him either:
In a meeting with South Korean officials, Kang apologized for his actions and expressed hope to settle in the South. Former governments considered bringing Kang to Seoul, but the current government is reluctant, according to National Intelligence Service Director Kim Man-bok. In his parliamentary confirmation hearing on Nov. 20 last year, Kim said North Korea had argued that Seoul was behind the bombing and might be handed an opportunity to say, “I told you so” if Kang comes to the South. [Chosun Ilbo]
North Korea denies any role in the bombing, having called the accusation “preposterous and ridiculous.” Does the denial of known past terrorism bear on the sincerity of any promise to refrain from future terrorism?
* Three teenage North Korean refugees South Korea’s embassy in Vientiane tried not to help have arrived in Seoul.
* For those who can’t wait for mine, Claudia Rosett has published a fine review of Marcus Noland and Stephen Haggard’s “Famine in North Korea.” Spoiler alert: what she says about the book’s ending is gravely disappointing, since I’m through most of the pity, analytical part. I suspect I’ll end up sharing Ms. Rosett’s conclusion. I also like her title: “Let Them Eat Nothing.”
* Remember when I told you about the two kids North Korea abducted from Japan years ago? Some people think they found the kids’ father … on a list of concentration camp prisoners.
* Being at war sucks, and there probably ends the national consensus. You’ll get no argument from me on the major premise. Still, in light of the Democrats’ alternative, here is a list of other possibilities we’re starting to think about that suck even more: surrender to al-Qaeda, ethnic cleansing, genocide, a massive refugee crisis spreading conflict to neighboring states, a wider war in Afghanistan, a de facto terrorist-controlled state in Anbar, a nuclear Iran dominating the Middle East, shopping mall bombings and roadside bombs in America, and politicians like Harry Reid, who vote to surrender in the same wars they voted to get us into in the first place.
The political temptation to pander to our urge for peace and comfort at any price, even with willful blindness about the consequences, did not end with 9/11; it just seemed that way for a while. But it’s grown much more difficult to harmonize that pandering with truly patriotic statesmanship, which is why the Democratic majority can only support that policy by the thinnest of partisan margins, even when it’s laden with pork and stripped of consequence by a veto threat.
We cannot be safe at home when al-Qaeda has a safe haven anywhere on earth. We can fight them there or fight them here, and I wish more candidates — including at least one of the Democratic candidates who voted to get us into this war – were presenting us with that choice at a time when we need to face it.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 25, 2007 at 6:49 am · Filed under WMD, Human Rights, Human Trafficking, "United" Nations
* Arirang, Child Exploitation Tourism: Haven’t you ever wondered about how such young children are taught such precise choreography, and why those robotic smiles are frozen on their little faces?
The reality of Arirang is different however, according to vivid testimony of the parents whose children participate in the performance. Their children’s eyes are tense after robust mechanical drilling by their director.
The training period for the Arirang is over 6 months. Particularly delicate dancing or movement may require training for a year or more during which students give up studying and their private lives. The performances last from two to four months. As in the army, every participant belongs to a company, battalion and regiment and participates in regular meetings for evaluation and peer criticism.
They train in both dazzling sunshine and snowstorms. Thousands of preschoolers perform choreographed rope-jumping stunts, hand-standing, and hand-walking while singing, “The way for victory with the great general” in unison. They practice a single movement thousands of times.
Five and six year old children emulate military parade walking techniques that require exhausting straight leg kicks to a 60 cm height, toes straight, followed by a floor kick. A day’s training in this technique leaves the children weak and dizzy. [Daily NK]
The Daily NK calls on the U.N. to inspect (like they’re inspecting Yongbyon?). Bad move, I say. Knowing the moral corruption of the U.N., they’d probably invite North Korea to join the infamous ranks of the Human Rights Council.
* Will Treasury Lift Non-Proliferation Sanctions Against North Korean Arms Dealers? The Chosun Ilbo, citing Arirang News, says that “Washington said last Monday that this year North Korean institutions are off its blacklist of suspected arms traders with rogue countries like Iran and Syria.” I’m not sure just what to make of that. The most potent sanctions for WMD proliferation are those under Executive Order 13,382, something we haven’t been nearly aggressive enough about applying. But checking the Web site of the Office of Foreign Asset Control, which administers sanctions programs, multiple North Korean entities are still listed. Ordinarily, OFAC is very good about updating its on-line publications if something changes. Furthermore, anyone can sign up as a subscriber to Treasury’s e-mail alerts, which would likely have announced these rule changes. I didn’t receive any such message. The report doesn’t have sufficient detail for me to even verify if it’s true, but it’s just very hard to see how Washington could de-list North Korean entities so soon after pushing for the passage of two U.N. resolutions that limit North Korea’s arms trade.
* No Pyongyang Spring: The North Koreans held a big military parade yesterday, on which its ballistic missiles were on display for the first time, at least for several years. If that was meant to be a confidence-building gesture, then I guess we have “Kim Jong” Bill Richardson to thank for it. There’s no confirmation yet that a Taepodong II was displayed — it’s the one that may be able to hit the United States — but the rhetoric was more proof, if any is still needed, that there has been no fundamental shift in North Korea’s world view:
Earlier in the day, North Korea vowed to strengthen its military power against all odds on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of its army.
“The Korean People’s Army is invincible. We have a mighty war deterrence to safeguard the interests of the country and the safety of the people,” KCNA said.
The Rodong Sinmun, the organ of the ruling Workers’ Party, also stressed that the strengthening of the military should be given top priority no matter how hard the people’s livelihood becomes.
“In order to protect sovereignty and independence it is necessary to counter the military hegemony of the U.S. imperialists by force of arms. This is the truth taught by the historical experience of the Korean revolution and the present times,” it said. [Yonhap]
Nope, no perestroika there (and I have to wonder which juicy morsels Yonhap opted to leave out). On the contrary, North Korea has made its WMD programs a keystone of its domestic propaganda, claiming that only blackmail will end their “march of tribulation.” It’s the old Barrel of a Gun concept again.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 25, 2007 at 6:46 am · Filed under Six-Party Talks, Appeasement, WMD, Japan & Korea, Terrorism (NK), Abductions, U.S. Politics
As I noted here, at the end of Update 4/24 to my North Korea Freedom Week post, the State Department is now rumored to be seriously considering removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. This conflicts with signals State had sent earlier, and as I noted here, would probably trigger a rebellion by conservatives in Congress.
With Japan’s Prime Minister set to visit Washington next week, unverified gossip holds that the Bush Administration will put pressure on Japan to soften its objections to removing from that list until North Korea accounts for all suspected Japanese abductees. Fresh raids on North Korean-linked Chongyron headquarters in Tokyo suggest that Japan is likely to resist American pressure (ht: The Marmot). Those raids could reveal new evidence of significance to this question.
Key House staffer Dennis Halpin, the former U.S. Consul General in Pusan and a Korea expert, works for Ileana Ros Lehtinen, the Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Yesterday, Halpin brought up the possibility of State de-listing North Korea, and said that his boss, anticipating such a move, had asked the Congressional Research service to freshen its research on this issue in light of that possibility. That report was released yesterday.
Here is the entire document.
The CRS report adds much valuable evidence to this discussion. However, I also found the new CRS report to be both overinclusive and underinclusive. The majority of the incidents in the CRS report, though useful for providing context, do not fit my definition of “terrorism,” so I did not quote CRS’s descriptions of them. I have quoted only those passages that I believe fit the definition of “terrorism,” at 18 U.S.C. sec. 2331, or acts that fairly contribute to it.
[A]ctivities that involve violent … or life-threatening acts … that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and … appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping ….
Since State’s argument, at least as I understood Mr. Halpin to characterize it, is that “bygones should be bygones,” I included only incidents occurring since 1996. For example, I did not consider ordinary border violations to be acts of terrorism, nor did I consider espionage or other non-violent clandestine means to gather information or spread influence. I did not include many mentions of WMD programs, except in cases where WMD were proliferated to other known sponsors of terrorism. Here is what I did include:
- Assassinations and kidnappings, whenever the original act or the “continuing offense” of abducting or holding the victim was linked to a political demand;
- Harboring of terrorists, as a “continuing offense;”
- The provision of WMD technology to listed sponsors of terrorism or terrorist groups, with the exception of ballistic missiles, which clearly aren’t suitable for terrorist use;
- Sponsorship or encouragement of others, including South Korean citizens, to commit acts of violence;
- Penetration of the territory of other nations by armed military personnel under circumstances suggesting that their mission may have included carrying out acts of violence or intimidation;
- North Korea’s direct terrorist threats through its state media, such as those threatening specific newspapers, political parties, or the people of other countries, when those threats were linked to a particular political motive or goal. That includes its regular “sea of fire” bellicosity.
- North Korea’s denial of its previous documented involvement in terrorism, though not in itself a terrorist act, is a significant factor in the credibility of its decision to renounce terrorism, so I included it in the chronology.
I note that the CRS missed numerous incidents that merit mention, and I’m going to add updates and links to this post later. You’ll recognize what I added because those portions will not be blockquoted, and I’ll mark them as “OFK Updates.” The blockquoted portions that follow are taken directly from the CRS report. Read the rest of this entry »
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 25, 2007 at 6:18 am · Filed under Refugees, Southeast Asia
Roughly 80% of the refugees — 314 to be exact — are women. The refugees, arrested by Thai police over the last three months, face almost certain death if sent back to North Korea. They are demanding that they be allowed to travel to South Korea. An NGO representative accuses South Korea of failing to help them:
However, “For whatever the reason, the South Korean government is not bringing these refugees who have been waiting for release even though the procedures have been finalized and the airplane tickets have been obtained” the affiliate said and added that there were even rumors to suggest that the refugees at the immigration centre would be denied the tickets altogether. [Daily NK]
South Korea’s Foreign Minister denies that:
Regarding the hunger strike by the 400 defectors, Minister Song Min Soon of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “We are aware that such an issue has arisen,” and “We are making efforts to come to some sort of agreement with Thai authorities in order to solve the matter.” [Daily NK]
Yonhap adds some statistical context:
Activists claim that 622 North Korean defectors were arrested since 2003 at the checkpoint of Mae Sai in northern Thailand. Of those, 367 entered the country illegally last year. [Yonhap]
Conditions in the Thai jail are said to be severely overcrowded and unsanitary, although they’re no doubt much better than they would be in China or North Korea. The hunger strike puts South Korea in a difficult position. They can either allow the 400 to be sent back to Kim Jong Il’s concentration camps — which would be especially hard to do in an election year — or they can allow another mass airlift such as the one from Viet Nam in 2004, which caused the North Koreans to have another of their contrived tantrums.
More info when I have it.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 24, 2007 at 7:19 am · Filed under Appeasement, Human Trafficking
Update: South Korea may be reconsidering the expansion plans after all.The Kaesong Slave Labor Park may want to reconsider its expansion plans in light of the Daily NK’s new breakdown casting doubt on just how successful the existing venture really is. Of 23 businesses that were supposed to have started operations at Kaesong since 2005,
- 4 have abandoned their space reservations;
- 1 or 2 more are considering abandoning their reservations;
- 4 have placed their space reservations on hold;
- 6 or 7 are at some stage in the process of “preparing” to start operations; and
- 7 have actually started operations. [Daily NK]
Of the 6 or 7 that are still “preparing,” the Daily NK notes that under Kaesong’s rules, operations were supposed to start within 6 months of the signing of a contact. Yet after 18 months, an unknown number of those companies are in breach without either starting work or paying liquidated damages for breach.
To what do we owe this flat start, since the cost of labor is no doubt a relative bargain in constrast to the wages demanded by the feisty cadres of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions down South? On closer examination, North Korean government’s regulations may well be disadvantage enough to outweigh the advantage of cheap labor. Several North Korean demands remain unresolved, including proposed charges for entry and exit permits and the issuance of passports to South Korean workers. Park rules surrounding the laborers’ working conditions also remain unresolved, no doubt because South Korea wants to be able to answer importers’ and others’ questions questions about international labor standards without making those rules a deal-breaker for Kim Jong Il.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 24, 2007 at 6:04 am · Filed under NK Economics, China, Appeasement, Human Rights, China & Korea, Kremlinology, Human Trafficking, "United" Nations
* North Korea is now eleven days past the April 13th deadline by which it agreed to shut down and seal the Yongbyon reactor, make a meaningful showing at another session of six-party talks, begin discussions about the full extent of its nuclear programs, and invite U.N. inspectors back in. As of today, it has failed to fulfill any of those conditions. I just wanted to point that out in case Chris Hill is reading or Kim Jong Bill drops in for a status update on that “breakthrough” he claims to have brokered.
* Power Comes by the Barrel.
China, North Korea’s main benefactor of energy resources, did not export any oil to its impoverished neighbor for the second straight month in March, Chinese customs figures showed Monday. The zero shipment in March put the total of China’s crude oil exports to the country in the first three months of this year at 52,089.93 tons, down 48.4 percent from a year earlier, the General Administration of Customs said. [Kyodo]
Treat this with the same suspicion you’d treat anything else the ChiComs say. They want us to think they’re playing ball.
* … And by the Bushel?
Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung on Monday said Seoul will start sending rice aid to Pyongyang once North Korea starts meeting its obligations under a Feb. 13 six-nation agreement. He indicated the North can get rice aid if it honors just one of the requirements — shutting down its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon or readmitting inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. [Chosun Ilbo]
Treat this with the same suspicion you’d treat anything else the Unification Ministry says. They, too, want us to think they’re playing ball.
* Kremlinology Update:
According to reports, Kim Kyok-sik, a former general, was promoted to the chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army, and Kim Yong-chun, the former chief of the general staff, was promoted to vice chairman of the National Defense Commission. [Chosun Ilbo]
* Like several of the world’s most tyrannical regimes, China is a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council, which means that, in the U.N.’s view, it “upholds the highest standards in the protection of human rights.” If so, and if you believe that the U.N. really does speak with great moral authority, then this story should tell you just how grave the condition of humanity has become:
Authorities in China’s southwestern Guangxi region have forced dozens of pregnant women to a hospital in Baise city to undergo abortions, the women and their relatives said [….] “They said they were giving me an injection to induce labor. But they injected it into the fetus, and when the baby was born, it was already dead,” a woman who had been seven months pregnant told RFA reporter Fung Yat-yiu. [RFA]
This is an absolute atrocity, and you’ll never see it reported anywhere else, with the possible exception of the Epoch Times or other niche media. I wonder whether “pro-choice” groups in other nations taken this issue on, and if not, why not.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 23, 2007 at 12:46 pm · Filed under Uncategorized, Six-Party Talks, Appeasement, WMD, Korean Society, Diplomacy, Southeast Asia, Kremlinology, "United" Nations, Drugs & N Korea, Money Laundering
* The Ides of April. I’ve previously blogged about the replacement of Premier Pak Pong Ju with Kim Yong Il. Now, we learn that Kim Kyok-Sik is taking over as the new “military first,” to borrow a tired expression, which technically makes him second only to Korigula himself (ht: Richardson). Two other old party hacks have gone off to that Eternal Party Congress chaired by Mephistopheles himself, or soon will: Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun and Marshall Cho Myong-Rok.
All in all, plenty of North Korean bureaucrats must be plotting, conniving, and stabbing each other in the back for those top jobs now. It’s a pity they can’t all end up here.
* Just in case anyone is still paying attention, it has now been ten days since North Korea first violated its agreement to shut down its 5-MW reactor at Yongbyon. Despite the inconclusive signals of North Korean satellite theater, there are no firm indications that North Korea even plans to shut it down. To know for certain, we’d have to have inspectors there to verify that, but of course, North Korea also violated a concurrent agreement to invite those inspectors back to the North. For that matter, North Korea also violated every other commitment it made on February 13th.
We just never learn.
* Confidence-Building, North Korean Style:
“The basic nature of the U.S. imperialists to bring down our socialism can not be changed,” the newspaper of the ruling Workers’ Party was quoted as saying April 14 in a report by the (North) Korean Central Broadcasting Station, monitored in Seoul.
Referring to the country’s “strong war deterrent,” interpreted as meaning its nuclear capability, the newspaper said the people could look forward confidently with a guarantee for the nation’s survival and prosperity. [Yonhap]
Somehow, this does not bespeak a Pyongyang Spring of reform, perestroika, or coexistence.
* DPRK Negotiations Manual, Chapter 6: How to get anything you want from South Korea for free:
Step 1: Submit your list of demands. Be sure to specify something useful to the core defenders of the revolution, rather than to class enemies (for example, insist on rice, and refuse corn, the food of expendable counterrevolutionaries).
Step 2: When the South Korean puppets meekly beg you to keep your last set of promises, stomp away in feigned outrage.
South Korea’s chief delegate, Chin Dong-soo, urged North Korea to quickly implement the nuclear deal, saying it would be “a shortcut to draw firm support from the international community on inter-Korean economic cooperation,” South Korean spokesman Kim Jung-tae said, according to pool reports. The North’s chief delegate, Ju Dong Chan, made unspecified angry comments to South Korean officials and walked out, the reports said.
Ju objected to tying the nuclear deal to inter-Korean economic cooperation, Kim said.
The North also rejected calls from a Washington lawmaker to return a U.S. warship captured in 1968 while on an intelligence-gathering mission off the North Korean coast. “Return? What do you mean by return? [The ship] is such an important thing,” Ju told Chin, who asked about the USS Pueblo during a lunch meeting that preceded the economic talks. “As we already decided not to do that, that’s it,” Ju said, shaking his head. [AP, Kim Kwang-Tae, via Time]
Step 3: Enjoy the bounty of decadent capitalism.
South Korea appeared set to accept North Korea’s request for food aid on Saturday, despite Pyongyang’s failure to meet a deadline to shut down its nuclear reactor as part of a disarmament deal. [AP, Jae Soon Chang]
* Just When You Think It Couldn’t Get Any Worse ….
At the economic talks, Ju proposed setting up a branch of a North Korean bank in an industrial zone jointly run with South Korea in the North’s border city of Kaesong. Twenty-two South Korean firms operate factories in the enclave, funneling $740,000 to the communist regime every month in unmonitored transactions that could be potentially diverted to weapons programs. [AP via Time again]
Not that anyone cares, but I’d just like to point out that there couldn’t be a more obvious vehicle for laundering money and violating U.N. Security Council 1718. Why is it only unilateralism when we do it, and when it’s done with dozens of other nations (but not the French)? If you want to know why the U.N. is a worthless institution, just look at how quickly its members states, including the United States, forgot Resolutions 1695 and 1718. I guess we can put their shards on the rubbish heap where they threw the U.N. Charter.
* Writing in the Asia Times, Bertil Lintner describes North Korea’s heroin trade, and its Burma connection:
Significantly, the heroin that was seized in Taiwan and Australia was of the Double-UO-Globe brand, the most infamous brand produced in laboratories controlled or protected by the United Wa State Army, a government-recognized militia that operates in the Myanmar sector of Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle, one of the world’s main drug-producing areas.
[….]
[A] clandestine military cooperation program was re-established in 1999. In that year, Myanmar bought about a dozen 130mm M-46 field guns from North Korea, and since 2002 between 15 and 20 North Korean technicians have been stationed at a naval base near Yangon, believed to be helping Myanmar to equip some of their naval vessels with surface-to-surface missiles.
North Korean tunneling experts have also been spotted in the new Myanmar capital Naypyidaw. Military-ruled Myanmar is just as cash-strapped as North Korea and Western narcotics officials suspected a barter deal - weapons and technology for drugs - although that has never been proven.
Do not miss this one.
* Projection, Continued. What? Foreigners experience (gasp) discrimination in South Korea?
Given this atmosphere, how would South Korean society react if an immigrant commited a crime similar to the Virginia Tech massacre? [The Hanky]
I’m guessing it would probably be a lot like 2002 and 2003:
I mean, what kind of a society would break out into mass mobbery in reaction to one isolated tragic event? Who would turn hatred of a friendly allied nation into fodder for popular movies and songs? Who would use another nation’s most painful living memory as an occasion to show its hatred? Who would discriminate against an entire national group, commit multiple acts of random violence (here, here, here, here, here), or peddle hate to the kiddies in school (here, here, here, with extra points for the approving reference to 9-11)? What nation would seek political advantage from one tragic event by propogating hatred for an entire nation (here, here, and here), much less find it to be a winning electoral strategy? And where would such hatred find broad societal acceptance? Surely not in an educated, developed, industrialized society. No civilized people in our times could subscribe to the inspiration of the world’s most brutal and backward system of government, one that openly espouses racism and is willing to kill as many babies as necessary to prove its commitment to that notion of purity. [Update 8]
Like that, only a lot worse. And that’s why South Korea’s Asshat of an Ambassador called for Americans not to engage in the kind of reprehensive behavior the low characters of his own country engaged in, with the tolerance and (sometimes) the encouragement of their elected leaders. Lee Tae-Shik, with his unique perspective on intolerance in practice, has a lot of chutzpah.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 23, 2007 at 10:39 am · Filed under Famine & Food Aid, Blogs & Blogging
I will have to miss the “Failure to Protect” panel today (see NK Freedom Week schedule, below). If you can be there, I’d like to post your observations, anonymously or otherwise. Regular readers, commenters, and fellow bloggers are especially welcomed.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 20, 2007 at 10:13 pm · Filed under Human Rights, Washington Views
[Update: video of the event and full text of the speech below]
So I went to this yesterday, thanks to the kind invitation of the organizers, and left with the usual sense of guilt I feel every time I meet Jay Lefkowitz. Lefkowitz has acquired an understandable “Oh sh*t, not that guy again” expression whenever he sees me. If I were him, so would I. Even when I’ve been critical of him, I’ve said that Lefkowitz is sincere, highly intelligent, and well informed on the issues. Unfortunately, he’s also become a complete non-entity in the Bush Administration’s North Korea policy. The best evidence for that is the almost complete absence of Korean media when he speaks these days. They know the game; they’re following Chris Hill instead.
(They occasionally pause to misquote him, so this time, he stated very clearly that countries should not import products from Kaesong. Good.)
My fear is that Lefkowitz’s sincerity and good intentions may actually be harming this cause by mollifying its proponents, who ought to be feeling the outrage of betrayal. For example, Lefkowitz suggested that North Korea wouldn’t be removed from the terror list until it accounted for international abductees (later he backed off of this). He also said that there would be no full normalization of relations without significant human rights improvements, but admitted that North Korea isn’t even willing to discuss the issue in the “normalization” working group, and implicitly conceded that neither he nor his office have a seat at the table. Instead of proposing bold initiatives, he spoke of gradual process without specifics or benchmarks. He’s neither a commanding presence nor a dynamic speaker, but he’s a gifted polemicist, and you can see how much his knowledge of the subject matter has sharpened in a short time. He articulates lofty principles as if he believes them, because he really does. But this sincerity can mislead people into thinking that it bears some relation to actual policy.
After the speech, he took questions. I asked the first one, which came very close to this: Read the rest of this entry »
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 20, 2007 at 2:09 pm · Filed under Korean Society, America
[Update: Link fixed; sorry!] My good friend Adrian Hong of LiNK fame has ended the debate on the anti-Korean backlash (that never was) with this piece in the Washington Post.
Korean Americans do not need to apologize for what happened Monday. All of us, as fellow Americans, feel tremendous sorrow and grief at the carnage. Our community, as it should, has expressed solidarity with and sent condolences to the victims, and as Americans, Koreans certainly should take part in the healing process.
But the actions of Cho Seung Hui are no more the fault of Korean Americans than the actions of the Washington area snipers were the fault of African Americans. Just as those crimes were committed by deranged individuals acting on their own initiative, and not because of any ethnic grievance or agenda, these were isolated acts by an individual, not a reflection of a community.
I would add that even a crime based on an ethnic or religious grievance only reflects on a larger group to the extent that the criminal’s views reflect the larger group’s views. Now, my favorite part:
Further, it is inappropriate for the Korean ambassador to the United States to apologize on behalf of Korean Americans and speak of the need to work toward being accepted as a “worthwhile minority” in this nation. While the Korean ambassador represents the interests of Korean nationals in the United States, and the interests of the Republic of Korea, he does not speak for naturalized Koreans here.
Absolutely. Adrian deserves kudos for dethroning Ambassador Lee from his imagined dominion over everyone of Korean ethnicity within our borders. I once met Lee briefly — though not enough to make much of an impression — but just about everything Lee has said this week has succeeded mightily at pissing me off, from his public expressions of concern that Americans would react with discrimination and violence, to this. For a guy whose job is to represent his country favorably, Lee Tae Shik could use a semester of remedial charm school.
The Korean claim to guilt and shame on behalf of Cho Seung Hui is well-intentioned but misguided. We are Americans first. While we share an affinity with Korea and appreciate and respect Korean culture, at the end of the day we are Americans. Our president is in the White House, not in the Blue House. And our response to this crisis should be as Americans, not as Koreans.
Read the rest on your own.
Finally, here’s an opposing view. The writing style of the commenter called “Wolmae” is as distinct as a fingerprint. There is only one person I know who writes like this. I won’t tell you who he is, but I will say he’s someone I respect very much, and whose views generally align closely with my own. He doesn’t happen to agree with me this time, although I think the passage of time is proving — thankfully — that there isn’t much of a foundation for his fears. Just the same, don’t miss it.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 19, 2007 at 6:07 am · Filed under WMD, Korean Society, Kremlinology, "United" Nations
* Cho Myong Rok, who is probably the second or third-most important North Korean official, is reported to be dying. Cho is the one Kim Jong Il designated to visit Washington and meet with President Clinton years ago.
Doctors expect the 79-year-old vice marshal to live another month or two, as he already had one of his kidneys removed 10 years ago, and has gone through treatment for cancer in his intestines, the organization said.
Here’s a brief Global Security profile. The report comes soon after word of the replacement of Premier Pak Pong Ju, another of the top echelon. One can hope that so many personnel changes at the top will start a new round of purging and backstabbing that will further sap the regime’s cohesion. He’ll be with Saddam soon enough.
* Projection, Perhaps? I wonder why a major South Korean paper would run with a piece of baseless and sensationlist garbage that stops just short of predicting an anti-Korean progrom in surburban Virginia because of the Virginia Tech murders. I see absolutely no sign of this here, and I question the judgment of people pulling their kids out of school or secluding themselves in their apartments. Could it be because they understand the temptation to project blame on entire nationalities just a little too well? In any event, the fears appear to be unsupported (and to me, deeply insulting).
* I’m not sure how meaningfully, but 31 nations have now taken at least some domestic measures to implement UNSCR 1718, which limits North Korea’s trade in WMD components, weapons, and luxury goods.
* One Man’s Story. I’m always interested in stories about how ordinary North Koreans live through hunger, and how they come to the decision to reject their government and leave.
At that time, the greatest obstacle to our play was hunger. When you run around and play, you need food to regain your energy. There were even times we had no strength to sit up and play. Rather we lay, slumped. During those times, we sat around day-dreaming. We would play truth or dare and pretend to smoke with cigarette butts we had secretly collected and talked nonsense while lamenting over our lives. [Daily NK]
It’s sad to think of kids having to grow up like this; at the same time, their resilience and the loyalty of their friendships strikes you.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on April 18, 2007 at 9:36 pm · Filed under Human Rights, Refugees
Human Rights Watch, one of the industry bigs that (until now) had been mostly absent from the discussion of human rights in North Korea, has made an important entry into that discussion, via this Washington Post op-ed by Kay Sok. Ms. Sok makes several important points here, and the first of these is how North Korea’s version of socialism is a recipe for selective deprivation as a weapon of class warfare:
Many of these North Koreans crossed the border because the state failed them. North Korea claims to have a socialist system under which all citizens receive free food, education, medical care and housing. But the reality is that only the country’s elite enjoy such privileges. The rest of the population is left to fend for itself. Undertaking the dangerous and difficult journey to China is a form of self-defense. The North Korean government fails to feed its people but then persecutes them for trying to survive.
The second point is what a bunch of sick, heartless fascist thugs the Chinese police are:
A 59-year-old North Korean woman told us about her deportation from China and punishment in North Korea. Her crime? She had left without state permission, which is considered an act of treason. “I went to China because I had no food at home. But I had to live in hiding there, so I tried to go to South Korea,” she said. “I was caught. The Chinese police took all the money I saved. They beat and kicked me.
Finally, Ms. Sok tells us that the North Korean regime has intensified the brutality of those whom China repatriates to the North:
When I was sent back to North Korea, things got even worse. They made me strip, and a doctor searched my vagina to see if I hid any money they could confiscate. They treated me like an animal, because they considered me a traitor.” After serving a prison sentence, she escaped to China again in September.
A 42-year-old woman from Haeju said she was deported from China in December 2003 and served 18 months in a North Korean labor camp. “Every day, I saw someone dying. We were given a fistful of powdered corn stalk, three times a day, and people had trouble digesting it. Many people died after having diarrhea for a week,” she said. “They left patients in the hallway outside toilets. So many people died, they wrapped bodies in plastic sheets and buried them in a mountain.”
Often in the past, North Korea had been relatively lenient to some of its nationals who were sent back: traders, those who had crossed just to get food, and those who had no contact with South Koreans, Westerners, Japanese, or missionaries (those who had contact with those latter groups were generally as good as dead, either quickly or slowly). That deplorable situation is changing for the worse as North Korea tries to restore control over the border, a matter of survival for Kim Jong Il’s rule.
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