Archive for October, 2007
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 29, 2007 at 7:06 am · Filed under Six-Party Talks, Deprogramming
If you’re reading this, you’re bearing with me despite the light blogging of late. Thank you. I make a habit of not talking about my work here, but suffice to say that it carries significant responsibilities that sometimes leave no time and energy for other things. At times like these, when there is very little time left over, I owe that time to my family. Thank you again for your understanding, for continuing to stop by, and for your e-mails.
Wall Street Journal drama critic Terry Teachout asks why the New York Philharmonic should serenade Kim Jong Il. I hope, in accordance with his usual practice, he’ll skip the performance to which the famous orchestra is said to be giving “serious consideration.” Regular readers know that I yield very little to anyone on the Bolton Rigidity Scale; I see no resolution to North Korea’s proliferation, military, or humanitarian threats as long as Kim Jong Il remains in power, and I see no way to end that threat without some bloodshed (though I’ve always felt that North Koreans must be the ones who remove him, with inspiration and material assistance from us). Anyone who still believes in the non-violent overthrow of Kim Jong Il — as some conscientious people still do — need only look at the example of Burma. In societies such as these, all power comes from the barrel of a gun, and when no moral force or suasion can prevent soldiers from obeying orders to fire on the crowds, more earthly means are needed to force tyrants from their palaces. At least, not until a different view of the world takes hold with sufficient strength that it can be expressed openly and discussed with others.
So clearly, the New York Philharmonic isn’t going to change North Korea much for the better, but many more exchanges like this could change it significantly. Recently, I disappointed Professor Lankov by denying him much of a debate on regime change. We simply agreed on too much in the end. Like Lankov, I believe that the cultural penetration of North Korea — in those rare instances when it’s permitted to reach the people — can sow doubts, often in unexpected, subtle ways. I am still just naive enough to believe that if the orchestra’s music moves the souls of some in the audience, that alone will cogently refute crude state propaganda which holds that all Americans are soulless big-nosed baby-killers. The audience will certainly be composed exclusively of members of the elite, so the reaction will be impossible to measure. This will be an audience with marginally more prior exposure to the outside world, but much less freedom to show any reaction whatsoever.
On the other side of the ledger, what good can this concert do for Kim Jong Il? Certainly it can’t confer any political or moral legitimacy that Madeleine Albright and Christopher Hill haven’t already. The musicians will probably have to take the obligatory tour of juche monuments, though I’m completely unafraid that this will set off a wave of juche enthusiasm in Manhattan except among the usual suspects. The converse — an adverse reaction to the eerie idolatry and control — seems more likely. The musicians will certainly have to pay some inflated hotel rates and air fares, and there is a point at which that degree of financial support could change my mind about this, but based on what I know now, I doubt that the concert will be a significant financial windfall for the regime.
The result of this concert is likely to be minimal in either direction, then. In principle, however, this concert shows more characteristics of “good” engagement (ie., engagement with the North Korean people) than “bad” engagement (thinly disguised subsidies to Kim Jong Il’s worst designs, from which the North Korean people are excluded). The more we can reach the North Korean people through permissive and non-permissive means alike, the better. The more glimpses the North Korean people can catch of a freer, happier, more prosperous world, the better to stimulate their curiosity, envy, and hope. Recently, Kang Chol Hwan addressed a group where I was in attendance. Kang said that his break with the regime was predestined because he was one of those born with the freedom gene. Not everyone has that gene, but as long as the endeavor does not do more harm than good, it is to our advantage to reach others whose freedom genes lie latent.
See also:
* The Chinese have arrested North Korean dissident and escaped political prisoner Lee Sang-Hyuk. This is something I wish I had more time to talk about, and my hope is that other bloggers will pick up on this story and run with it.
* The Joongang Ilbo reports: ” A senior Japanese official has warned the United States that relations will suffer if Washington removes North Korea from its list of terrorist states, amid stepped up efforts to end Pyongyang’s nuclear drive. Relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang remain tense in part because of the communist state’s kidnappings of Japanese civilians, an issue that arouses deep emotion in Japan.” Set aside the question of whether Agreed Framework 2.0 will disarm North Korea; history will decide that soon enough. Was it worth the diplomatic price to alienate the Japanese people and government on an issue of enduring importance to them, for the sake of appeasing a South Korean government that lost popular support two years ago and a North Korean regime that lost it decades ago?
* Last week, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on the six-party process. I wasn’t able to attend, which is regrettable, because some of the recent writings by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen had suggested that Republicans would react with considerable skepticism in light of the Syria/Orchard story. While I found no direct suport for that belief, I did find this indirect support, in the form of a skeptical view by Rep. Brad Sherman of California, a very realistic and plain-spoken Democrat who has become one of the Committee’s more influential voices.
As we review testimony from today’s witness [Chris Hill], we need an explanation of how the Administration intends to monitor North Korea’s commitments. This is all the more important given the IAEA’s marginal involvement in the verification process. Will you have the resources, access and information needed to provide unequivocal confirmation that North Korea is meeting its obligations? For instance, how does the Administration plan to remove or discard 8,000 fuel rods from the reactor? [….]
We also need to know how the outstanding issues such as uranium enrichment and North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal will be handled.
I would also like the witness to comment on the Administration’s plan to remove North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, to provide additional shipments of fuel and other aid, and other commitments made on the U.S. side of the equation.
Views such as these mean that Congress may not appropriate funds for aid or heavy fuel oil for North Korea unless the White House explains exactly what we know about what happened in Syria in September. Here is a link to Chris Hill’s opening statement. I haven’t had time to read it carefully, but it does contain the howler that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 remains in effect.
That concludes the Korea updates.
Read the rest of this entry »
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 23, 2007 at 5:50 am · Filed under Anju Links
* John Bolton is now actively lobbying against Agreed Framework 2.0, drawing dozens of GOP congressmen to speeches he’s giving to influential policy groups (ht: Evan). His efforts appear to have gained new traction with the Syria revelations, and the Administration’s inordinate secrecy from Congress about those revelations probably isn’t doing any good for congressional relations (but may be fueling suspicions). Yes, Bolton probably suspects that his enemies in the State Department torpedoed his confirmation, and he probably holds a few grudges. But agree with Bolton or not, you have to concede that he has risked making powerful enemies by placing principle over party loyalty.
* One of Bolton’s unrealized goals at the U.N. was reform, and today, there are allegations of cronyism against Ban Ki Moon.
* The Heritage Foundation’s Bruce Klingner lays out what’s missing from Agreed Framework 2.2, the latest joint statement in the Administration’s unfolding North Korea exit strategy. It’s a few weeks old and I’m sorry to have missed it, but it’s well worth reading, and spot-on in its recommendations.
* Take a few minutes to read the story of Steve Kim, who spent the last four years in a Chinese prison for trying to help North Korean refugees. I’ve been seeing a flood of articles lately calling for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics because of China’s support for the world’s most repellent regimes. Burma may have more to do with that than North Korea, where our State Department lavishly praises China for its willingness to play diplomatic king-maker, but don’t forget what China’s policies mean for North Korean people: torture; oppression; sexual exploitation; literally dragging them back to prolonged deaths with wires through their wrists and noses; and putting placing bounties on them as if they were vermin. If you wouldn’t attend Michael Vick’s games because of his torture and murder of dogs, surely Hu Jintao’s torture and murder of human beings justifies a boycott of Hu Jintao’s Olympics.
* More hand-biting from North Korea, accusing well-known hegemonistic expansionist Roh Moo Hyun of violating its territorial waters. How odd, since I’m eagerly awaiting the transition of power and start of the North Korean influence scandals relating to the Roh Administration and the former Uri Party. Three sources of intense curiosity to me: National Assembly member Im Jong In, the still-unnamed “major government offices,” and the still-unnamed cabinet secretary.
* I realize I haven’t commented on Comrade Chung’s nomination. I like the idea that he’s running, because win or lose, we will now have a referendum on appeasing North Korea and Yankee-bashing, which Chung represented more than any other Korean politician with the possible exception of Roh himself. You can’t lose if you don’t enter, and we should be glad that despite his broad name recognition and friendly treatment by TV media (but not the newspapers), Chung is way behind in the polls.
* There are two excellent new citizen-journalist reports from Iraq, from Michael Yon and former Special Forces operator Jeff Emanuel. Yon, not a knee-jerk critic of the media, thinks there’s a wide gap between events on the ground and perceptions here, and lays out an ambitious plan to reshape media coverage with a focus on small-town papers. Both Yon and Emanuel are supported entirely by reader contributions.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 21, 2007 at 6:34 am · Filed under NK Economics, Kim Jong Il, Famine & Food Aid, China & Korea, Diplomacy
[Updated below]
We often hear reports that China has curtailed or cut aid to the North Korean regime. I’ve usually been skeptical of those reports because I believe that Kim Jong Il’s arch-patron China wants us to believe that it’s being “helpful” in disarming North Korea of its nuclear programs, but actually considers it a useful distraction for American power in the region.
Now, a new report claims that China is holding up cross-border rail traffic to the North over an absurd case of hand-biting: North Korea not only demands trainloads of aid, it scraps the Chinese rail cars the aid arrives in (and probably sells them back to China as scrap). Despite inconsistent statements by some Chinese officials, I rate this report as more credible than previous ones, and I’ll tell you why in a moment:
China has reduced rail freight traffic to North Korea in recent weeks, holding up some shipments of humanitarian aid to the impoverished country, an aid agency and rail authorities said on Friday. The move was apparently taken in anger over Chinese rail cars going missing in North Korea, where analysts say they are sometimes disassembled and sold as scrap metal.
“A lot of Chinese rail cars have piled up in North Korea and have not come back,” said an official in the cargo division of China’s Railways Bureau in Dandong, the Chinese border city through which most freight to North Korea passes. “So on this side, we reduced the number of rail cars going to North Korea,” said the official, who declined to be identified. [Reuters]
This report comes by way of a trusted reader (thank you) and a reliable source I’ve been asked not to name. It’s a name you’d probably recognize. There is also independent confirmation:
“We have 8,000 tonnes of maize and wheat flour that has been purchased and is ready and we are unable to deliver it to the people who need it,” said Paul Risley, the Asia spokesman for the World Food Programme. The food was sorted and bagged but was being held up on the China-North Korea border, he said. “These delays have postponed critical food distribution for our beneficiaries.” [….]
ReliefWeb, a United Nations-run Web site, said in an Oct. 15 report that transport of the WFP’s food stocks to North Korea were “critically affected by the cessation of cross-border movement of railway wagons from China following a long-pending dispute over delays”.
The excellent Anna Fifield has more in the Financial Times, via the Freepers.
It would be easy to read too much into this. After all, this is probably more the result of Kim Jong Il losing control over his own society and economy than a scheme to rip the Chinese off for the price of scrap metal. Still, it’s hard to imagine how Kim Jong Il, who presumably has enough manpower to guard large steel objects, let things get to this point. Nor can we rule out any course of North Korean action merely because it happens to be irrational. It may be time for a few more us to simply admit that we aren’t equipped with the mentality required to understand or predict North Korean behavior.
For example, some readers will recall this post, in which I passed along reports that North Korea had also counterfeited Chinese currency. The blatant, self-defeating illogic of such a course defies belief. Yet it’s not much more illogical or incredible than the idea of Kim Jong Il earning a relative pittance from counterfeiting dollars at the risk of bringing down the awesome wrath of the U.S. Treasury Department, or kidnapping Japanese citizens to train spies, at the cost of billions in trade and remittances. And what fool can’t see that shooting missiles over Japan and testing nukes would merely drive Japan into America’s arms, force even the U.N. into action, and further annoy the Chinese? (Yes, I think that actually testing one was a step too far, even for China.) My all-time favorite: stealing the trucks that the late Hyundai chairman Chung Ju-Yung used to send 1,000 cattle to the North at the height of the Great Famine. Kim Jong Il has slapped the faces of his South Korean benefactors more times than I could recount in an hour.
You also have to wonder how much Kim Jong Il earned from selling Syria a nuclear reactor, as details about the discovery and destruction of that reactor are gradually coming to light and putting intense pressure on President Bush to justify, and even reconsider, the value of a nukes-for-aid deal that could still lead to the full normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations, an incalculable benefit to Kim Jong Il. Now, Bush is forced to say things like this:
‘’They have declared that they will show us weapons and get rid of the weapons programs, as well as stop proliferation…. If they don’t fulfill that which they’ve said, we are now in a position to make sure that they understand that there be consequences.'’ – President George W. Bush, Oct. 17, 2007, via Kyodo
You never know. It might not be all talk. While some optimistic reports are laying out a road map for normalization before President Bush leaves office, Chris Hill has just been quoted as demanding that North Korea hand over its plutonium before things move forward. And even normalization talks will have to show some progress on human rights, a difficult contingency to even imagine given where things stand right now. So far, Kim Jong Il has done absolutely nothing that can’t be undone in an instant, and still seems as unlikely as ever to do so.
What a difficult thing it is to be a friend to Kim Jong Il. Throw him a lifeline and he’ll pull you into the whirlpool. Consider: Roh Moo Hyun squandered billions of dollars and his presidency to save him. George W. Bush squandered much of his support among foreign policy conservatives and key members of his own party. And only a few accountants in the Forbidden City know how much China has squandered on preserving his misrule. Kim Jong Il’s dependence on so many outreached hands won’t doom him, but his incomprehensible persistence in biting them could, especially in the hour of his greatest need. Which, again, is now:
According to the study conducted by DailyNK in late September this year, the rice price in the northern part of North Korea increased by 500 North Korean won on average between early July and September. In the market in Sinuiju of North Pyongan Province, the rice price rose from 980 Won/kg to 1,400 Won/kg. [….]
It was believed that the surge in food prices resulted from the massive flood damage which stroke North Korea in early and middle August. When vast areas of land in South Pyongan and Hwanghae Province, the major granary of North Korea, were submerged during the flood, it was expected that domestic crop production would decrease. [Daily NK]
Here’s my post on the floods and their impact on the food situation. The Daily NK report adds several other important details, which I’ll try to put in context. Recall that in North Korea, rice is the food of privileged people only, and the poor who can afford to eat at all eat corn. Corn prices appear to be stable, so for now, there is no immediate threat of famine. The shortage of rice means that the North’s relatively privileged citizens are facing a significant and adverse change of lifestyle because domestic production is sharply down, and because (as the Daily NK also reports) international aid isn’t flowing in. The problem may be further compounded by hoarding.
For now, the regime is still issuing rations, but those rations will only last through the winter. A new Reuters report, quoting a South Korean think tank, notes that state food stockpiles are nearly gone. Without a major new infusion of aid, things could be desperate by spring, typically the hungriest time of year, right after winter stores run out.
Kim Jong Il may not be ”crazy,” but we give him too much credit if we infer from this that he is rational. In the past, he has reacted quite rationally to clear threats and deterrence, but given an opportunity to grab at some relatively trivial gain, he has a disturbing tendency to make irrational and inept reaches. Somewhere in his storied collection of cartoons, Kim Jong Il must have a few seasons of “Pinky and the Brain.” He seems at times to have pattered his life after it. Few leaders in history have done so much to weaken themselves, their subjects, or their nations to achieve such dubious benefits.
In the short-term, Kim Jong Il always seems to come out ahead in his diplomacy with other nations, but it’s hard to know how much to credit him for this when he is arguably as much a beneficiary of his squabbling foes’ ineptitude as the architect of masterstrokes. History will be decided, as so often before, by the balance of incompetence.
Update 1: The Republican rebellion on North Korea spreads, as another influential GOP member joins Ileana Ros-Lehtinen in asking, “What happened in Syria?”
Over the last few weeks, State Department officials have reported major diplomatic breakthroughs that will roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, allow Pyongyang to be removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terror list, and normalize relations between our two countries.
North Korea reportedly has agreed to disable its nuclear facilities and has, as it has done many times before, promised to give a full accounting of its nuclear program. The latest deadline is Dec. 31, 2007. Congress has been asked to support this agreement, which State Department officials claim will benefit our nation and promote regional stability. [Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Peter Hoekstra in the Wall Street Journal]
You’re on your own for the rest, because it’s behind the Wall of Subscription. Pete Hoekstra is the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, chaired semi-ably by third choice Silvestre Reyes. (Reyes had me as a fan early on and then lost me with that regrettable Shiite-Sunni business). Ros-Lehtinen, as you probably know, is ranking member of House Foreign Affairs. I’m officially glad she became the ranking member. Not all of the other choices might have been as good, and one Dick Lugar is enough for one Congress.
Ordinarily, I’d be understanding of White House secrecy on intelligence matters, but secrecy from the intelligence community and ranking members of congressional committees is another matter. It’s genuinely odd how secretive and adversarial the relationship between the White House and congressional Republicans has become on North Korea, and State’s efforts to talk them out of their nukes. Clearly, those who are actually running Bush’s Korea policy don’t see themselves as Ros-Lehtinen’s or Hoekstra’s co-partisans.
A hat tip and a recommendation to this post at Michelle Malkin’s blog, which explains why the proposed Law of the Sea Treaty could threaten our efforts to enforce the Proliferation Security Initiative against the North when (not if) diplomacy fails. Again. I haven’t read the treaty and can’t offer much intelligent commentary on it, but I do know that any legal, moral, or physical space the U.N. occupies becomes a haven for anarchy.
See also:
The Norman Hsu story has just reminded of what I liked the least about Al Gore in 2000. The L.A. Times tracked down the contributors whose money Hsu was bundling into Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Many lacked the independent means to make those contributions, others were legally ineligible to give them, and still others appear not to have existed. Spoken but unproven so far are suggestions the Chinese government played a role in this.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 20, 2007 at 9:59 am · Filed under Uncategorized, Southeast Asia, Iran
Burma’s generals, confident that they have reestablished the rule of terror, have just relaxed their curfews and bans on public assemblies. It’s exceedingly depressing to write about yet another ongoing atrocity that no one has the courage or vision to really fight, and Burma is another of those atrocities. If the Administration thinks that modest sanctions like these will end the slaughter, it’s fooling no one:
The president directed the government to freeze any U.S.-controlled assets held by 11 senior Burmese officials, and he widened the net with an executive order expanding sanctions to those who assist such officials or the Burmese government, starting with 12 individuals and entities. He also ordered tighter restrictions on the export of goods such as high-performance computers to Burma. [WaPo]
You can read summaries of our sanctions against Burma here and here. They’re fairly comprehensive already. We don’t import much of anything from Burma. Although we can export most items to Burma, financial services are a very important exception. The main impact of the new sanctions will be on junta members’ assets in the United States, and since it’s doubtful that they have much money here anyway, the likely impact is questionable. But there is Biparitsanship! Sure, that means nothing if you’re at the pointy end of a rifle in Rangoon, but it sounds great on the think-tank circuit, does it not?
The Bush Administration may have been encouraged by the results of its sanctions against North Korea, and the best evidence we have is that their effect was devastating. North Korea is probably an exception to the general rule, however; it has few valuable legal exports and a stunted network of trading partners, which makes it uniquely vulnerable to attack at select chokepoints. Burma abounds in timber, gems, oil, and gas, and every one of its neighbors buys those products from its generals. Sanctions against Burma will be difficult to negotiate and even more difficult to enforce. They may weaken the generals more than, say, stones or packages of ladies’ undergarments, but sanctions won’t drive the generals from power. Only the people of Burma can do that, and to do it, they will need guns, which nobody is even talking about sending them. Indeed, a credible threat to arm and train dissidents may be the only threat that can force dictators to negotiate a kinder, gentler tyranny in which dissent can still survive.
Iran’s ongoing inflexibility in its nuclear diplomacy with the United States and Europe, may have inspired Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to send this strong new signal about Iran’s money laundering. The mention of money laundering suggests that the Bush Administration may be thinking about applying PATRIOT 311 sanctions, the single most devastating weapon in our financial arsenal. You will recall a PATRIOT 311 designation declares an entity to be one of special concern for money laundering and bans U.S. financial institutions from holding corresponding accounts for any bank that holds assets for that entity. In simple terms, it forces every bank on earth to choose between that account holder and the American financial system, which effectively means the global financial system. The effect is to cut the offending entity off from global finance. It is the measure we used to nearly destroy Banco Delta Asia, which was once Kim Jong Il’s principal foreign bank.
Treasury previously applied Executive Order 13,382, which allows the freezing of assets suspected of use to proliferate WMD’s, to Iran’s Bank Sepah in January. With diplomacy failing, the administration must be thinking very hard about other options. It would like to be rid of the mullahs, may be forced to launch air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and knows that attacks would probably rally the population to the regime, at least for a while. It also knows that Iran’s economy is a basket case, and that economic warfare is more likely to advance its long-term goals. My guess is that any military options will be brief and limited, that the main thrust will be economic, and what we’re seeing are probing attacks aimed at finding the regime’s vulnerabilities. Like Burma, Iran has much to sell to the rest of the world, but its economy is far more developed than those of either North Korea or Burma. Its population is also far less isolated from outside information and far more likely to express its discontent in the streets.
Finally, Iran’s petroleum-based monoconomy makes it relatively vulnerable, but our dependency on it does the same to us. Without securing an agreement by other oil producers to expand production in advance, it’s questionable that the West would attack the one Iranian commodity to which it is an admitted addict.
See also:
* Trickle, trickle: the United States is preparing to accept a whopping 32 more North Korean refugees from Thailand.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 15, 2007 at 8:55 am · Filed under Anju Links
* North Korea is building or repairing the fences around its nuclear test site in the northeast. What reports like these don’t mention, however, is that directly to the northeast of that test site lies Camp 16, one of North Korea’s more horrendous concentration camps. And if the Daily NK’s December 2006 report of a mass escape is true, it might be that the North Koreans are actually repairing the camp’s fences, not the test sites. Hopefully, an intrepid and informed journalist who is reading this will find out which side of the test site is the focus of those upgrades.
* How North Korea Wins: South Korea sells out the United States (for the domestic political appeal of anti-American nationalism), the United States sells out Japan (for the domestic political appeal of diplomacy at any price), and now, Japan’s Foreign ministry says his country needs secret talks with North Korea, since no other nation is going to help Japan get its abducted citizens back. This is how allies are lost, and on North Korea, Japan had been our last true ally.
* John McCain delivers a superficial response when asked about North Korea on a Sunday talk show: let’s enlist China’s help. Yes, and maybe the Anti-Defamation League can enlist Mel Gibson’s help, too. McCain seems not to grasp that China’s interests lie far from ours. China wants U.S. power in Asia to be distracted by a psychotic runt with nukes, and it certainly does not want Korea unified, especially as a U.S.-friendly state. China is no more afraid of North Korea’s nukes than it is of Pakistan’s. So if the status quo is acceptable to China and unacceptable to the United States, why should we expect China to help relieve us of a problem it would prefer we continued to have? Bonus: can anyone tell me what the “Cato Agreement” is?
* A Southern North Korea: In Burma, where a New York Times reporter persuaded a few fearful acquaintances to risk it all to describe the ghastly, claustrophobic terror that chokes Rangoon’s atmosphere now. Amid this grim story, one light moment: “What fun is it to get drunk when you can’t talk?” The people of Burma do not lack courage, but they lack guns and ammunition. The Nobel Committee and the U.N. can’t free them. They can only do that themselves now, and they can’t do it nonviolently.
* For those who don’t care to read my comments on Iraq, you can quit here.
For the rest of you, here are some very optimistic reports from two unlikely sources: the AP, and the editorial page of the Washington Post, which said this:
A congressional study and several news stories in September questioned reports by the U.S. military that casualties were down. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), challenging the testimony of Gen. David H. Petraeus, asserted that “civilian deaths have risen” during this year’s surge of American forces.
A month later, there isn’t much room for such debate, at least about the latest figures. In September, Iraqi civilian deaths were down 52 percent from August and 77 percent from September 2006, according to the Web site icasualties.org. The Iraqi Health Ministry and the Associated Press reported similar results. U.S. soldiers killed in action numbered 43 — down 43 percent from August and 64 percent from May, which had the highest monthly figure so far this year. The American combat death total was the lowest since July 2006 and was one of the five lowest monthly counts since the insurgency in Iraq took off in April 2004.
During the first 12 days of October the death rates of Iraqis and Americans fell still further. So far during the Muslim month of Ramadan, which began Sept. 13 and ends this weekend, 36 U.S. soldiers have been reported as killed in hostile actions. That is remarkable given that the surge has deployed more American troops in more dangerous places and that in the past al-Qaeda has staged major offensives during Ramadan. Last year, at least 97 American troops died in combat during Ramadan. Al-Qaeda tried to step up attacks this year, U.S. commanders say — so far, with stunningly little success.
The trend could change quickly and tragically, of course. Casualties have dropped in the past for a few weeks only to spike again…. U.S. military commanders have said that no reduction in violence will be sustainable unless Iraqis reach political solutions — and there has been little progress on that front. Nevertheless, it’s looking more and more as though those in and outside of Congress who last month were assailing Gen. Petraeus’s credibility and insisting that there was no letup in Iraq’s bloodshed were — to put it simply — wrong.
Let’s hope that trend continues. It’s true that past reductions in casualties haven’t been sustained, but here, the drop is very deep indeed — profound, really. Another optimistic take on the Shiite “awakening” comes from the Christian Science Monitor.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 14, 2007 at 7:25 am · Filed under Six-Party Talks
Israel’s air attack on Syria last month was directed against a site that Israeli and American intelligence analysts judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, apparently modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile of nuclear weapons fuel, according to American and foreign officials with access to the intelligence reports. [N.Y. Times, David Sanger and Mark Mazzetti]
Even among other journalists who cover this story and the White House, Sanger is well known for having good sources in this administration. So what else does this tell us? The appropriate degree of skepticism with which to view any conclusion by North Korea apologist expert Leon Sigal:
The news of a possible nuclear connection between North Korea and Syria is “complete nonsense.” … This is another one of those games that the Boltons of the world play when they see the negotiating track getting serious,” Sigal explained, “which is they throw some threat on the table to try to derail talks that turns out not to be quite the threat they made of it. “From what I have seen, there is simply no evidence what so ever of any North Korean nuclear connection to Syria. My guess is that at the end of the day we will learn the Israelis found something quite different.” [Daily NK]
Uh huh. Now, returning to the Times story, here’s what we don’t know:
Many details remain unclear, most notably how much progress the Syrians had made in construction before the Israelis struck, the role of any assistance provided by North Korea, and whether the Syrians could make a plausible case that the reactor was intended to produce electricity. In Washington and Israel, information about the raid has been wrapped in extraordinary secrecy and restricted to just a handful of officials, while the Israeli press has been prohibited from publishing information about the attack.
Apparently, the reactor was in its early stages. To some in the White House, that was a good reason to leave it alone and let it build, which is probably the same thinking other administrations engaged in with respect to North Korea in 1991 and Iran in 1998. This softly-softly approach eventually and reliably brought us to major international security crises with each country’s advanced nuclear weapons program because year after year, we assumed that eventually, each would be reasonable enough to be cajoled into a diplomatic disarmament. Or, we were simply in denial. But now read this:
“There wasn’t a lot of debate about the evidence,” said one American official familiar with the intense discussions over the summer between Washington and the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel. “There was a lot of debate about how to respond to it.”
Any nuclear technology or material transfer would be a violation of U.N.S.C.R. 1718, but would not directly violate the vague February 13, 2007 deal or the even more vague September 19, 2005 deal, except maybe for this part of the former: “The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust. . . .” To which I say: if North Korea felt itself free to engage in nuclear proliferation — said to be a “red line” before any deals were inked — then the worthlessness of these deals is already apparent.
Republicans in Congress are sensing the opportunity to propogate the obvious, as their rebellion against their president comes into the open. In the October 7, 2007 Washington Times, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee writes:
Mr. Kim’s latest demand is to have his regime removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. If granted, this coup would remove sanctions that deny North Korea access to development loans from international financial institutions. It would also make foreign investment more attractive since Pyongyang’s stigma as a charter member of the “axis of evil” would be replaced with a U.S. seal of approval.
Removing North Korea from the terrorist list would not only be morally wrong, but harmful to our efforts to dismantle that country’s nuclear weapons.
A resolution of the tragic issue of Japanese nationals taken forcibly to North Korea, including that of a 13-year-old girl, remains a prerequisite for all Japanese. But Pyongyang refuses to explain or make amends for these past actions.
To reward North Korea without a full accounting of these and other cases would be to remove its incentive to cooperate and thereby undermine Japan’s willingness to consider a broader agreement.
Unresolved kidnappings are but one reason to keep Pyongyang on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Far more serious is the possibility it continues proliferating nuclear technology and weapons. The Times of London reported the Syrian complex recently destroyed by Israeli air strikes contained materials linked to a North Korean ship that were “labeled as cement but suspected of concealing nuclear equipment.” If true, this would not be the first such incident, as Pyongyang’s connections to the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market are well-documented.
What has the State Department reaction been to the unsettling events in Syria? Chief U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill, in a news conference last month, said “the issue does not change the goal of what we’re aiming for,” namely denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. His response, however, is one of closing the barn door after the horse is out. In addition to ending the direct threat to the U.S. from North Korea, our goal must be to eliminate the possibility North Korea will sell nuclear weapons to rogue regimes and terrorists. That may be just what Pyongyang is doing with the Syrians.
True, but remember that the State Department isn’t a self-governing autonomous zone. President Bush is responsible for its actions.
Kim Jong-il counts on our impatience for an agreement of any type to secure the deal he wants, to have his regime propped up by the West, and to survive. But based on his past behavior, there is no reason to assume he will voluntarily give up all his weapons, regardless of any piece of paper he might sign. He must be forced to do so.
If we are to have any confidence of truly ending North Korea’s nuclear threat, we must change our deal-at-any-cost approach to the negotiations and stop making unilateral concessions to the regime. Instead, we must insist on Pyongyang’s taking complete, verifiable and irreversible steps to dismantle its nuclear program. North Korea should earn its rewards, or it will simply come to view them as its by right. [Washington Times]
We’ll see what decisions get made, if any, in December.
See also:
* Japanese diplomatic sources are now whispering to reporters that the United States will not stand with them in securing the release of Japanese hostages before North Korea is removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Does our diplomatic class understand just how broad and deep Japan’s emotions run on this issue? There are plenty of reasons, simple and complex, why America is hated in so many places, most of them related to being big, conspicuous, and the object of envy. One reason we often can’t avoid is the expectation by almost every nation that we intercede on its behalf against some hated neighbor. In this case, where Japan’s specific grievance is so legitimate, and our support had been so strong so recently, I suspect we’re buying ourselves decades of unpopularity in Japan for no good reason.
* Don’t forget: LiNK’s fundraiser gala is coming up on October 24th.
* One cost of doing business with North Korea is accepting its censorship. In September, President Bush spoke to the U.N. General Assembly and said, “In Belarus, North Korea, Syria, and Iran, brutal regimes deny their people the fundamental rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration.” Bush’s words were a transparent reach for people like myself who no longer believe he means those words, and since we’re so often expected to pay no heed to what North Korea says — see recent comments by VanMidd — North Korea should have recognized as much and understood that Bush’s words were both meaningless and his prerogative to speak. It’s not as though the Rodong Sinmun has stopped with its anti-American diatribes. Instead, KCNA announces: “The DPRK cannot overlook the brazen-faced remarks made by the U.S. chief executive against his dialogue partner on the international arena.”
* China is feeling wounded about the fracas between its police and South Korean diplomats in Beijing. The first question is whether the Chinese should be in the business of arresting North Korean refugees in the first place. Their signature on the Refugee Convention answers that.
* More worrying rumors are filtering out about North Korea’s food situation. It looks like the weather system that brought last summer’s floods to the country’s rice bowl were quite literally the perfect storm. And because less food can now be shipped to the traditionally food-deficient provinces of the North and East, everyone will share in the misery.
* Targeted U.S. raids are reducing the Mehdi Militia, our second-most dangerous enemy in Iraq, into a poorly led and increasingly unpopular collection of street thugs, according to the New York Times. Good intelligence and skillful execution have allowed us to pluck Sadr’s best commanders out of his network and defenestrate him, and that turns out to have been a much wiser option than killing him outright. My other reading leads me to believe that other, smaller Mehdi cells are still very competent, dangerous, and well trained, but not capable of commanding nearly as much influence with the population as they could a year ago. The favorable shift in Iraq remains politically fragile, as the government is still based on the very different political conditions that existed two years ago. Would this not be a good time to call for new elections? On their conclusion, the Iraqi government ought to convene a nationwide reconciliation conference where the tribal leaders can sit down, make their deals, and agree to sew their national patchwork back together.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 12, 2007 at 7:19 am · Filed under Anju Links
* Irrational Exhuberance, via the AFP’s P. Parameswaran: “A team of US experts left Tuesday for North Korea to disable the hardline communist state’s nuclear weapons arsenal in a crucial phase of a six-nation disarmament pact.” Mr. Parameswaran is a good enough fellow, but the first sentence of his report is absolutely false. Not only are U.S. experts not on their way to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, North Korea has yet to declare what, specifically, that arsenal consists of or where it is kept. In fact, some of North Korea’s recent statements cast doubt on its agreement to give up its nuclear arsenal. Just yesterday, it held a parade to celebrate that arsenal. A correction is in order. How, you ask, do I manage to sustain my pessimism in a world where everyone else believes in fairies? Easy. I know the history.
* Second Thoughts? If you haven’t yet read Richardson’s post or the NYT story he links, it appears that the Syria story is giving some members of this administration second thoughts about Agreed Framework 2.0. The NYT story is badly written, and does a generally poor job of laying out the various suspicions and what evidence support each of them. While the publicly available evidence is in considerable conflict and probably a small part of the picture, I’ve done several posts to lay it all out: here, here, and here.
* What Then? As I mentioned here, the South Korean election gives us good cause to keep that debate behind closed doors until December. Then, if the evidence supports the allegation that North Korea cheated, the Administration — that is, Condi Rice herself – needs to lay it out in painstaking detail. And to those who will say there is nothing we can do about it anyway short of war, nonsense. If half-measures worked this well, imagine what a true economic blitz could do to the palace economy. Because the idea is to destroy Kim Jong Il’s palace economy while engaging and empowering ordinary North Koreans, we should simultaneously extend a sincere and generous offer of food aid, strictly conditioned on North Korea letting us distribute it fairly. As I’ve explained here, North Korea may not be in a position to refuse this time.
* Korea Without the Alliance. A reader and friend sends what looks to be a fascinating report from the National Bureau of Asian research. My friend tells me that Nick Eberstadt was one of the contributors, meaning there’s got to be some fiber in there somewhere. I haven’t had time to read it yet, but that doesn’t mean I’d deny you the pleasure.
* China-Refugees Update. Yesterday I reported that Chinese police has hauled away four North Korean refugees and roughed up several South Korean diplomats at a South Korean school in Beijing. Today, reader Sonagi sends a link to a Korean-language link to the Hanky(!) with a picture of a man trying to shred a Chinese flag in front of the ChiCom Embassy in Seoul. Nice to see China get at least some guff over its treatment of North Koreans, an absolute atrocity. You have to wonder if anyone would try to stop him if it was an American flag. On further thought, strike that.
* Yet another step toward taking apart al-Qaeda’s infrastructure in Iraq. I have made a habit of not commenting on casualty trends, because it’s apparently bad luck. Instead, just scroll down and see the charts in the left-hand column, and this.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 11, 2007 at 7:05 am · Filed under Korean Politics, Appeasement, Inside NK
So what will be the enduring effect of the meeting between Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il? I could speculate, but others have already done that. Simply read the divergent brands and ask yourself: who is better informed and grounded in reality: a semi-random sampling of ordinary North Koreans, or a New York Times reporter? (Big hint: it’s Norimitsu Oniishi, who is almost always over his head when he strays beyond culture and fluff stories). I’ll just observe that it’s got to be pretty scary for the North Korean authorities when the people are this well informed, and when it’s this easy for them to turn outward for information.
If the meeting was all about perception and little substance, how was it perceived?
If you needed any further proof that Sunshine isn’t reforming North Korea, it would be striking any mention of ”reform and openness” from the conversation — yes, even on South Korean government Web sites — at North Korea’s insistence. Ten years and seven billion dollars later, reform is not only an off-limits topic up North, the censorship is moving to the South. I ask: who changed who here?
The North also forced South Korea’s president to watch its propaganda mass games. A South Korean professor saw a comparison to the large Nazi rallies of the 1930’s, a comparison I’ve often drawn here, concluding that it was a costly tribute to one man’s vanity (though “megalomania” seems more apt). Even one of the visiting South Korean ministers was embarrassed.
Somehow, I don’t think this will win Roh’s political descendants — who still don’t even have a candidate — many votes.
See also:
* Chinese police have arrested four would-be North Korean defectors at a South Korean international school, and South Korea actually plans to file a protest. Really? What did the Chinese have to do to cause that? For starters, rough up a few South Korean diplomats.
* It’s always interesting to watch the AP’s Anne Flaherty try to contain/conceal her rage when Democrats succumb to patriotism: “Our soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen and Guardsmen aren’t fighting as Democrats or Republicans but as Americans.” This is the kind of “journalism” that created the market for Fox News, excessive and ham-handed an opposite as it may be. Anne: in the name of all that is holy, quit your job and start a blog. Less widely reported: more trouble for Al-Qaeda, which may have lost more of its key facilitators and its last major Iraqi ally, and which (along with Shiite radicals) has failed to bring off the “Tet” that I had expected. Keep fingers firmly crossed.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 9, 2007 at 7:18 am · Filed under Six-Party Talks
Does this sound like a country that’s made the decision to give up its nuclear arsenal?
The North’s main Rodong Sinmun newspaper ran a lengthy editorial to mark the anniversary, imploring the poverty-stricken population of 23 million to rally around Kim, the official Korean Central News Agency said.
“Never forgettable are acclamations of October, 2006, when we shouted hurrah again and again at the top of our voices in admiration of General Kim Jong Il who unfolded an eternally clear sky of peace, prosperity and hope above the heads of the 70 million people,” the state-controlled paper said, referring to both North and South Koreans.
The nuclear test was a “truly great miracle,” the paper said, sending the North “soaring as a powerful and great nation” at a time of hardship. [AP]
Not if you have even a basic familiarity with North Korean propaganda.
Now, I’m of the opinion that the Bush Administration intentionally signed a deal that it knows will solve nothing to give it cover for a quiet exit from office without having done anything to actually solve the problem. Nothing at this time suggests otherwise. Indeed, the recent stories about North Korea giving nuclear materials, equipment, or technology to Syria do much to support my theory, given the Administration’s reaction.
But there is another (admittedly unlikely) option.
If the North Koreans are already cheating, and if we’ve already caught them cheating, this isn’t the time to say it. Solving the North Korean problem will be far easier without a South Korean government as determined as Roh Moo Hyun’s to undermine any pressure we put on the regime. Scrapping Agreed Framework 2 now would refocus the attention of Korean voters and give the left a last chance to set America up as the bad guy before December’s election. Let’s hope that American policy-makers are smart enough to know that the less South Koreans think about the North in the next few months, the better. I give them credit for that much.
What else happens in December? North Korea is supposed to hand over a full declaration of its nuclear programs. So indulge this dream of mine: that would be a good time to state that the declaration is incomplete and proceed to levy the Mother of All Sanctions. After all, we pretty much expect that the declaration won’t be complete. Who expects anything else? So what then? Most likely, we’ll keep stalling pressing the North Koreans for a more complete explantion. Then there’s a less likely option:
If this diplomatic game fails, I don’t really see another diplomatic game in the future. This [the Bush administration] is a tough administration negotiating in regards to nuclear weapons. If the North Korea side can respond with commitment.
[….]
The administration will not negotiate agreements that will go beyond this term. I do not know to what extent President Bush considers denuclearization a realistic goal, but if the goals are not reached, it is not our [US’] fault. [Victor Cha at the Daily NK]
Like I say, irrational. I don’t think anyone sees a military option, which leaves only sanctions (which actually worked surprisingly well). They’d have to be pretty severe sanctions to have much effect in a year, at most.
See also:
An interesting report on the three main private organizations broadcasting into North Korea.
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 7, 2007 at 11:10 am · Filed under Six-Party Talks, Appeasement, Diplomacy
Washington was plunged into sleepy apathy this week as ABC News reported that the Bush Administration ingored, then failed to act on intelligence about nuclear proliferation and potential terrorism that could have endangered millions of lives. The report claims that the Secretary of State and the President received credible reports that North Korea transferred nuclear technology to Syria, but suppressed the information to save a troubled diplomatic deal, and even sought to tip the Syrians off.
The latest report follows a previous Washington Post report that the Administration restricted the evidence — including “dramatic” satellite images – to only a few senior Administration officials, thus withholding it from U.S. intelligence agencies.
The revelations will not be followed by outcries for congressional hearings or the appointment of an independent counsel. Journalists will not go to jail when subpoenaed to testify, and John Bolton will not do a beefcakey photo spread for Vanity Fair after being presented to us as a whistle-blowing martyr, persecuted for speaking truth to power.
Still, I thought some of you might be interested anyway:
The September Israeli airstrike on a suspected nuclear site in Syria had been in the works for months, ABC News has learned, and was delayed only at the strong urging of the United States. In early July the Israelis presented the United States with satellite imagery that they said showed a nuclear facility in Syria. They had additional evidence that they said showed that some of the technology was supplied by North Korea.
You will recall that I’ve presented several theories about just what the Israelis struck in Syria in September, where, and why. Some claim it was missiles or missile tech, others claim that it was chemical warfare equipment. The theories aren’t mutually exclusive, but the preponderance of publicly available evidence suggests that nuclear techology or material was at least one of the targets, no matter how desperately proponents of declawed and neutered diplomacy desperately wish it to be not so (for the benefit of Leon Sigal, who must have been serving on a sequestered jury last month, allow me to link to reports in the New York Times; Washington Post; Washington Post; Sunday Times, London; Haaretz; and Fox News).
The desperation is understandable if you exclude the grave realities and think only of what an embarrassment it could be for Mr. Sigal, Selig Harrison, David Albright, and their strange new bedfellows at State. If true, this would be a flagrant violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718. You will answer by telling me that nothing the U.N. says is worth a warm pitcher of spit. Point taken. Ditto the NPT.
Less clear is whether it would be a flagrant violation of the Bush Administration’s vague new deal with North Korea, a/k/a Agreed Framework 2.0. Not that it matters. If this blatant act of proliferation is a violation, it’s just the latest example of “before the ink is even dry” that proves (again) the inescapable truth about dealing with Kim Jong Il. But if one can say that such an act as this is permissible under AF 2.0 and consistent with its continuation, the deal and the diplomatic process in which it’s being baked are so deathly flawed as to have no value for our nation’s security. This is the diplomatic equivalent of Willie Horton getting away with raping his parole officer.
One U.S. official told ABC’s Martha Raddatz the material was “jaw dropping” because it raised questions as to why U.S. intelligence had not previously picked up on the facility. Officials said that the facility had likely been there for months if not years. “Israel tends to be very thorough about its intelligence coverage, particularly when it takes a major military step, so they would not have acted without data from several sources,” said ABC military consultant Tony Cordesman.
A senior U.S. official said the Israelis planned to strike during the week of July 14 and in secret high-level meetings American officials argued over how to respond to the intelligence. Some in the administration supported the Israeli action, but others, notably Sect. of State Condoleeza Rice did not. One senior official said the U.S. convinced the Israelis to “confront Syria before attacking.” Officials said they were concerned about the impact an attack on Syria would have on the region. And given the profound consequences of the flawed intelligence in Iraq, the U.S. wanted to be absolutely certain the intelligence was accurate.
Initially, administration officials convinced the Israelis to call off the July strike. But in September the Israelis feared that news of the site was about to leak and went ahead with the strike despite U.S. concerns. [ABC News]
So why would the Bush Administration tolerate a risk this grave, a leap this profound across the storied Red Line? Set your Wayback Machine for July 16th. On that day, three months behind schedule, and after getting the Federal Reserve to launder $25 million of its drug and counterfeiting money, North Korea finally shut down its worn-out plutonium reactor at Yongbyon, moments before it would have collapsed from age and overuse. Now do this Google search: “Bush and ’rare diplomatic success.’”
So I ask: whose legacy matters more than the security of the American people?
Posted by Joshua Stanton on October 3, 2007 at 6:55 am · Filed under Six-Party Talks, Diplomacy
Update: A reader was kind enough to send a copy of the latest six-party joint statement, which you can read here. Some of the key langugage:
2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31 December 2007.
A deadline. I like deadlines. But this adds no clarity that nuclear “programs” means nuclear “weapons,” and nothing about inspection or verification beyond Yongbyon.
3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.
Gee. I wonder why they put that in there. Two other things you may want to read carefully: the vague implied linking of abductions to the terrorism list that isn’t quite a link, and the equally vague talk of what reciprocal steps the North Koreans will have to take to get off the list. Like all of these joint statements, it’s hopelessly vague. Just the way North Korea likes them. One day, Selig Harrison will be able to write that North Korea didn’t technically violate this.
Original Post:
The United States said on Tuesday it had approved a tentative deal for North Korea to disclose all its nuclear programs and disable its Yongbyon atomic plant.
“We have conveyed to the Chinese government our approval for the draft statement,” State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters. Separately, the top U.S. negotiator with North Korea said he expected China to announce the deal, hammered out over the weekend in talks among the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, in the next day or two. [Reuters]
There aren’t many details out there about the new Agreed Framework 2.2, but the basic outline of it seems to be that North Korea will fully “disable” Yongbyon and fully declare all of its nuclear programs by the end of the year. It’s not clear whether this is a hard deadline, or whether it’s reduced to writing. Nor is it clear whether or how numerous technical disagreements over the meaning of “disable” have been resolved, or whether North Korea is back to admitting that it has been enriching uranium (although it recently did admit purchasing the equipment to do so).
Whatever the Israelis found and destroyed in Syria appears to have dissuaded neither North Korea nor the United States from continuing with this deal. No reports are yet suggesting that North Korea will be removed from the terror list immediately.
My problem with all of this is a much simpler one than of the devil hiding among details. My problem is that I can’t suspend my disbelief of anything the North Koreans say. The word of the North Koreans will never give us any security; we’ll always worry about what they haven’t declared and won’t let us inspect. Given North Korea’s extensive network of underground facilities, we won’t even know what doors or hatches to knock on. In America, the debate over this deal is divided into two camps: those who can’t suspend their disbelief, and those who are determined to find a way in the name of some illusory “greater good.” Everyone shares the disbelief. It’s just a question of how far you’re prepared to go to rationalize it away.
See also:
* In Congress, members from both parties have introduced a bill that seeks to force North Korea to account for some specific terrorist links and acts before it can be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. A reader was kind enough to forward the full text of the bill. It contains some fairly shocking assertions, including claims of links between North Korea and Hezbollah. One of the bill’s conditions is the release of the Rev. Kim Dong Shik, whom North Korean agents kidnapped in China in 2002 while he was assisting North Korean refugees. In his new book, Andrei Lankov claims that Rev. Kim died during interrogation, shortly after the North Koreans abducted him. Let’s hope this bill does better than previous efforts.
* Here’s some perfect timing: the Daily NK reports that a shipment of North Korean arms was intercepted recently before it reached the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a listed terrorist group.
* Is it me, or does Kim Jong Il appear to take Roh Moo Hyun about as seriously as I do? If the media have no substance to talk about, they will talk style. The style story here is one of Roh receiving a welcome fit for a new ambassador from Burkina Faso. I can’t imagine how this will boost Roh’s preferred successor in the polls — especially since one hasn’t been selected yet — but I could be wrong. More here.
* LiNK has recently received some substantial donations, and like any smart advocacy group, it’s seeking to use its new wealth as seed money with a traditional Washington fundraiser where it hopes to attract wealthy donors. The venue and program look impressive. You can purchase tickets here. It’s clearly a big financial risk they’re taking, and I wish them great success.
* ABC News reports that underground railroad worker Steve Kim has been released from a Chinese jail. If you think ABC should do more stories about this, please leave a comment. While the coverage is sympathetic, I saw a glaring omission in the report.
* This humble blog is ranked Number Nine among Korea blogs by this calculus, whatever it is. While the numbers and weighting look like witchcraft to the uninformed (me), it’s nice to see that someone is paying attention, especially given that may of those higher on the list are about food, technology, society, or other things that this blog doesn’t talk about.
* I’m suspicious of the Eugene Bell foundation, because it recently received a “frienship” medal from the North Korean government, and because you don’t win Kim Jong Il’s friendship by asking hard questions and without paying for it. Based on this document, I infer that the Bell foundation is having some success at convincing Democrats in Congress, particularly Carl Levin, to start a U.S. counterpart to the “family reunions” that South Korea does. They’re tightly monitored and controlled, and South Korea pays plenty for them. Still, I favor even tightly controlled reunions as long as the North Korean goverment doesn’t earn income from them. Incidentally, if you’re in Washington, Stephen Linton of the Bell Foundation will present a program on what rural North Koreans know about the outside world.
* The North Koreans caught a guerrilla cameraman, and part of their torture of this man was — literally — to hamstring him. For a moment, I was tempted to believe this was a trend toward liberalization from the usual, but then I asked myself how long a man who can’t walk will last here. The answer: probably longer than he’d want to.