As State Department official Sung Kim heads for Pyongyang to try to save Chris Hill’s failing deal, North Korea is trying to be unambiguous about just how much it’s willing to give.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il told a Chinese Communist Party official Wednesday that there is no change in Pyongyang’s stance of implementing a six-party agreement on the North’s denuclearization, China’s official Xinhua News Agency reported. Kim made the remarks when he met with Wang Jiarui, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s international liaison, the report said. [Kyodo]
Not clear enough for you?
“The DPRK (North Korea) side’s stance of advancing the six-party talks and implementing the various agreements jointly reached has not changed,” China’s official Xinhua news agency quoted Mr Kim as saying. [BBC]
Not to worry, say the Chinese. It can all be worked out … sometime after last January 2009, I suppose.
The Chosun Ilbo says that the Chinese official visited Pyongyang at State’s request. According to the BBC, the visiting Chinese official carried a secret message from Hu Jintao, which I assume could be phrased succinctly: “stall!“ So now the Chinese have checked the block.
NOT LOOKING GOOD FOR KEVIN G. HALL: A reader e-mails a detailed article — co-written by Bradley K. Martin, no less –that drives a few 3-inch sheetrock screws into the coffin of Hall’s piece of work. If you’re not yet saying “enough already” to all of this, the updated post is here.
DAVID ALBRIGHT, CALL YOUR OFFICE: “N. Korea ‘Slowing Disablement of Nuclear Facilities.’” North Korea is in full stall mode, so the United States and China are sending more diplomats to cajole and supplicate in Pyongyang. The self-anointed Nostrafriggingdamus of Korea bloggers predicts no change in Kim Jong Il’s position, but offers none as to whether there will be a change in ours. What I did predict, and still expect, is that this crappy deal will become an issue in the election.
WHAT’S FOUR OR FIVE NUKES AMONG FRIENDS?
Larry A. Niksch, the Congressional Research Service specialist on North Korean nuclear development, said in an interview yesterday that other problems have arisen with the North Korean disclosure.
“The Bush administration had estimated the North Korean production of plutonium to be 50 kilograms,” Mr. Niksch said. “The North Koreans have disclosed 30 kilograms, which is at the lower end of the range” of what the U.S. thinks it might have produced.
“The gap is significant as it is four or five atomic bombs,” he said. [Washington Times]
They could be telling the gospel truth. And we’d still be idiots to believe a word of it.
NKHRA UPDATE: Twenty-three North Korean defectors will come to the United States from a refugee center in Thailand within the next two months or so. That’s twenty-three, on top of thirty-seven by the Hankyoreh’s figures, or about fifty according to other estimates I’ve heard.
DLP BREAKS FROM PYONGYANG: The power struggle between North Korean sympathizers and more democratically minded leftists continues within the Democratic Peoples’ Republican Labor Party:
“We strongly protest at North Korean authorities for their attempt to destroy the party’s independence and self-reliance” in the so-called Ilsimhoe case. “We demand that North Korea immediately stop interfering with a progressive party of the South.” [Chosun Ilbo]
The party has expelled former Vice Secretary General Choi Ki-young and former Central Committee member Lee Jung-hoon, both of whom are now doing time for spying for North Korea. Recall that among the accusations against Il Shim Hue was a report that North Korea tried to use its DLP puppets to influence the Seoul mayoral election.
THOSE POOR PERSECUTED UNIONS. President-Elect Lee was about to meet with Central Committee leadership of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, which may still receive government funding, until Lee’s people pointed out that the Chairman of the KCTU was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant for an “illegal” rally last October. The government, commendably, turned down the KCTU’s offer for its Chairman to answer police questions at some location other than a police station. Here’s the KCTU’s response to that:
Lee Sok-haeng in a New Year’s press conference on Jan. 10 warned the KCTU will lead a general strike across all industries to cut off power and gas supply and halt the operation of railway and flight operations if the incoming government “continues to ignore and suppress labor.” Lee Myung-bak has said he will deal with the KCTU in accordance with the law, even though the labor organization “has reorganized itself into a combat headquarters.” [Chosun Ilbo]
I wish President Lee the best of luck. I don’t have to agree with leftish views to see how Korean politics and society could benefit from having a democratic left that isn’t beholden to genocidal fascism.
BURMA HAS CHARGED ten dissidents in connection with last year’s failed uprising. The junta is unmoved by moral authority, and by now, it’s safe to say that moral authority has lost interest in Burma. What the Burmese people need isn’t more of the drum-circle good will that the “international community” loves to dollop out. What they need is guns.
I heard “Korea,” and I think I probably heard ”North” somewhere, but I did not hear “North Korea.” It’s nice that President Bush stands against genocide in Sudan. Seriously. It would be better than “nice” if Bush would do something meaningful to stop it. It’s too bad, of course, that he chose to end his term as an abettor of a genocidal regime in North Korea. North Korea was even left out of his catch-all list of repressive nations abroad. I remember hearing Belarus, Zimbabwe, and Burma, but only the latter of those is even in North Korea’s league. Charles Krauthammer thinks this means that Bush has given up on nuclear non-proliferation. Brit Hume also noticed that Bush mentioned Zimbabwe and Burma, but not North Korea.
The bad news is that Bush didn’t mention North Korea. That’s also the good news. If Bush felt optimistic or confident about his new North Korea policy, don’t you suppose he’d have at least mentioned it? He didn’t tout it, he didn’t draw attention to it, and he didn’t expend any capital on it. (Kudos to Krauthammer for reminding us why he had no reason to.) There wasn’t even a velvet-glove warning for Kim Jong Il to deliver a complete declaration. Draw your own conclusions about what that means.
Update: Scott Johnson at Powerline noticed it, too:
Beyond references to the Afghanistan and Iraq fronts, the second half of the speech was notable less for what it said than what it didn’t say. Where the Bush administration has focused its diplomatic efforts, its diplomacy has traced a Clintonian arc. North Korea was not even mentioned. How go the efforts to hold North Korea to its commitment to declare its nuclear programs? Interested listeners will have to look elsewhere for an answer. [Power Line]
That “elsewhere” link leads to a Real Clear Politics piece by Richard Halloran. Halloran is a deep thinker, but his piece is an effort to educate an audience that hasn’t been following the issue as closely as you have. He reviews the stalled state of Agreed Framework 2.0 and narrates the rising conservative disgust with it.
OUR FIFTEEN SECONDS: I’m extremely pleased to see reader and friend CPT Jon Stafford getting great circulation for his must-read article, “Finding America’s Role in a Collapsed North Korean State.” Richardson had previously linked to a video discussion between the online editors of The Weekly Standard and Foreign Policy that scratched the surface of the problem, just. Today, Bradley Martin, author of “Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader” has an article discussing it in somewhat greater depth at Bloomberg news. This humble blog, specifically this comment by Prof. Andrei Lankov (book review here; interview here), also got a nice little plug.
FEEDING HAND, UNBITTEN: North Korea has released Canadian pastor Kim Je-Yell, whom they had jailed in the miserable and remote northeastern city of Chongjin:
Kim had been bringing dental supplies and setting up clinics in northeastern North Korea for nearly a decade with official approval, the report said. The Voice of America radio station said Kim had written in a statement during an interrogation that he had criticised the North Korean regime and tried to establish a church in the North. [AFP]
THE LAST WORD – HELL IN HAMHUNG: Now and then, I see something that’s not new, but which is too interesting not to mention. This time, Jack at DPRK Forum links to this 1997 article by the Washington Post. There are other good links at Jack’s post, including recent news that eight people, including a member of the North Korean parliament, were executed publicly. I’ll direct you there for those rather than hork all of his links. This one, however, was too good to pass up:
The orphanage is divided into several small rooms, with playpens for the smallest infants. Almost all the children are malnourished, with browning hair, bald patches on their scalps and sores on their heads and faces. The most severely malnourished are listless and unresponsive.
There are 198 children under age 4 at the orphanage, and about 20 percent are expected to die because they arrived too late to be helped. About 70 percent of the children here were orphaned when their parents died of malnutrition or disease, Choi said. The other 30 percent simply were abandoned and left for dead by parents too poor and too hungry to feed them.
“Some parents just put them outside on the street and leave them to nature,” Choi said. “Sometimes people pick them up and bring them here.” And other times? “They just die.” The orphanage is surrounded by high hills covered with graves and stone markers. It is an old burial ground, she said. But there are also many new graves.
The scenes of deprivation and hardship go on and on. There is a massive 1950s-era hotel in the town, but it is cold and apparently empty. Since power is rationed, the electricity has been turned off. There are factories here, but they stand idle. No smoke comes from the chimneys; there is no activity inside the gates. Outside, people mill around, apparently with little to do. Nearly everyone here — hospital workers, hotel employees, even the official government guides — talked openly about the fuel shortage and lack of electricity. [WaPo, Keith B. Richburg, Oct. 19, 1997]
Hideous. Further down, much baseless hope was then (as now) placed in the idea that Kim Jong Il might reform to spare his people such misery. Baseless – except for the regime’s williness to accept micro-credit from the UN Development Program. By now, we know how that worked out.
One of the most interesting take-aways from Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard’s book, “Famine in North Korea” (my review: part 1; part 2; their response) was that the famine in South Hamgeyong — Hungnam and Hamhung — may have been even worse than the terrible events in North Hamgyeong, which were brought to our eyes by refugees within fleeing distance of China. A nearly 2,000 refugees by Yoonok Chang actually found that although few refugees from South Hamgyeong made it to China, the consensus among refugees was that conditions there were worse than the border regions where most of the refugees surveyed were from. This is just one of the reasons why some estimates may actually understate the Great Famine’s death toll.
North Korea’s nuclear program dates back to the construction of a ”research” reactor in the 1960’s. The images on this post show three of North Korea’s four known plutonium reactors, its unfinished light-water reactors, its missile test site, and its nuclear test site. First, here are some overviews. Click the thumbnails to see full-size images. Read the rest of this entry »
THE STREETS ARE NOT PAVED WITH GOLD: North Korean refugees talk about working two jobs, missing their families, immigration paperwork, English, and surviving. It’s not perfect, but it sure beats the alternatives:
“During the March of Starvation 10 years ago, I lay in my bedroom after having had nothing to eat for three days and thought, ‘So this is how people die.’ For me to be here is like a dream. I do not have anything in North Korea and China, but I have something in the U.S.,” said Choi Mee Hyang (female, pseudonym) excitedly.
She relayed her impression regarding the freedom she gets to experience in the U.S., “In China, I hid the fact that I was North Korean. Now though, I proudly say that I am a North Korean.” [Daily NK]
It wasn’t long ago that Mr. Lefkowitz’s comments, which also recommended linking human-rights to security issues with the North, would have been a fair reflection of President Bush’s own views. But apparently not any more, as Mr. Bush has accepted Ms. Rice’s judgment that one more “Dear Mr. Chairman” letter, or one more aid shipment, or one more diplomatic concession will cause Kim to change his ways.
State is even claiming that North Korea has fulfilled the requirements necessary to get itself off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, one of Pyongyang’s key demands. A contrary assessment is provided by the Congressional Research Service, which recently noted “reports from reputable sources that North Korea has provided arms and possibly training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.” State also seems to be ignoring, or suppressing, evidence of Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation, which was brought to light after Israel destroyed an apparent North Korean nuclear facility in September.
We understand why Ms. Rice would be unhappy to hear her policy contradicted by Mr. Lefkowitz. We would be more understanding if that policy had any record of success. Kim Jong Il has now had nearly a year and two deadlines to fulfill his nuclear promises and shows no intention of doing so. Chances are he now figures he can wait out this Administration and hope for better terms from President Clinton.
On present course, Ms. Rice is setting President Bush up to spend his final year begging Kim to cooperate by offering an ever growing and more embarrassing list of carrots. Mr. Bush would do better to listen to Mr. Lefkowitz, while ordering Ms. Rice to introduce him to the Chinese and Russians. [Wall Street Journal]
“Foreign diplomatic sources” have told Fox News that Chris Hill has floated the idea of accepting a declaration that omits information about North Korea’s proliferation — to Syria, for instance – or its suspected uranium enrichment programs.
With North Korea almost a month overdue on its obligation to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs and materiel, the Bush administration — under increasing pressure from American conservatives to take a harder line with Pyongyang, or abandon the talks altogether — is now considering accepting a declaration that would be less than complete, carving out the two most contentious issues for later resolution, sources told FOX News. Read the rest of this entry »
[Update 2: A reader points out that Reuben F. Johnson is the source of both the Weekly Standard and Jane’s stories. I admit that I’m not familiar with Johnson’s work, but when a story comes with specifics, it’s more persuasive than when it comes without.]
Kim Jong-Il’s regime could collapse within six months, bringing chaos to North Korea, observers and intelligence sources in Asia have told Jane’s. [. . . .]
I know, I know: saying that North Korea’s regime could collapse in six months is a lot like saying someone else could step forward to accuse Bill Clinton of sexual harassment sometime between now and November. There’s a certain unpredictable inevitability to either contingency. This would have been an Anju Link, except that it’s Jane’s Country Risk News saying it, and they are offering some specifics to back this up. I report, you decide:
Any apocalyptic scenario has to be taken with a grain of salt; in 1997 the Central Intelligence Agency predicted the collapse of North Korea within five years. However, there are reasons for the heightened levels of concern; in particular, the recent actions of Kim Jong-Il and other North Korean officials are being interpreted as signs that the regime is nearing its end.
Tellingly, the ‘Dear Leader’ is in the process of moving financial resources to ensure that his assets are portable should he have to go into exile, according to some sources.
The centrally controlled economy has also now ceased to function and the food distribution system is near breaking point. With loyalty to the regime at an all-time low, another sign of trouble is the regime’s diminishing ability to prevent people from leaving the country. [Jane’s Country Risk News]
And there it ends, at the subscriber’s wall. (For you subscribers or SIPR-Net users, if you send me the rest of this, you can have one of my kidneys or my chisel mortiser. Take your pick, and bring plenty of plastic sheeting.)
You will recall that I wasn’t very persuaded by a similar prediction at the Weekly Standard last November, but Jane’s does cite some known facts that support its position. Our limited knowledge of events inside North Korea supports the existence of a sharp downward trend:
Disease Spreads. For several years now, we’ve been reading of major outbreaks of typhoid, paratyphoid, typhus, scarlet fever, measles, and most recently, drug-resistant tuberculosis. This may reflect the worsening food situation and dysfunctional health system, but it probably also reflects the fact that North Korea’s borders have sprung leaks. Today, we’re more likely to hear about things we wouldn’t have heard about five years ago.
Palace Economy Damaged. The sanctions of 2005-2006 did lasting damage to the palace economy. The transfer of Kim Jong Il’s assets is interesting: it might mean what Jane’s thinks it means, or it might mean that Kim Jong Il reads this blog and wants to protect himself against another round of sanctions. It could also be a sign that slowly, banks are losing their fear of dealing with him. If we continue to relax sanctions, the palace economy will gradually recover and we’ll lose our leverage over the regime.
Increases or reductions in aid from the United States, South Korea, or China could dramatically change the regime’s survival prognosis. Then again, if I were of a conspiratorial frame of mind, stories like this might be a good way to use intel leaks to mollify disgruntled collapsists.
My take on this: the conditions for collapse have probably existed for a decade, and those conditions probably are intensifying. In past years, the probability of collapse might have been 10% per year. This year, it might be 25 or 30%. The fact that it hasn’t happened yet owes nothing to the contentment of the North Korean population; the people have voted. The problem is fear. There have been many isolated acts of rebellion, dissent, and even mutiny, but so far, no one in a position to make collapse happen has dared to try, and no one can do it alone. The decisive factor won’t be food or even information. It will be fear.
HEY, MEND THIS FENCE: President-Elect Lee Myung Bak has sent Chung Mong-Joon to the United States to “mend fences” which implies the obvious — relations between the United States and South Korea have deteriorated. The Hanky runs down how it went. While I’m sure Dick Lugar and Chuck Hagel won’t be a tough audience, if Lee wants to repair some of South Korea’s well-deserved reputation for anti-Americanism, he can start with his own damn side of the fence.
HOSTILE POLICY: I missed the 40th anniversary of the Pueblo Incident, but Richardson and GI Korea didn’t forget how a U.S. Navy ship became a must-see (literally, as in “or else”) stop for visitors to Pyongyang. Maybe when they’re not feeling so hostile, they can gas it up with some of that heavy fuel oil and sail it to Incheon.
WHEN YOU HEAR “COUNTRY OF ORIGIN” in the South Korean context, always assume the South Koreans are trying to smuggle Kaesong products into an FTA with some country. It worked with us.
THE PENCIL BOMB: One of the better new North Korea blogs, along with the excellent DPRK Forum, is the North Korea Monitor, which dares to ask, “What are they showing the kiddies in Pyongyang?” Nothing, of course, if the electricity isn’t working, but when it is, they’re teaching them to hate us.
[Update 28 Jan 08: I’m going to keep flogging this story until I’ve corrected the record. A reader (thank you) directs me to this Bloomberg story by none other than Bradley K. Martin and Hideko Takayama. This one is second only to Steven Mihm’s for the quality of its investigative reporting. If you’ve read Martin’s book, you’ll already know that he’s no neocon collapsist, to say the least.
Takayama and Martin interviewed Yoshihide Matsumura, “whose Matsumura Technology Co. supplies counterfeit-detection machinery to Japan’s post offices, banks and law enforcement agencies.” Matsumura extingishes whatever remained of Klaus Bender’s credibility by pointing to a rather significant fact Bender missed:
Some say the North Koreans aren’t capable of producing such high-quality fakes. German author Klaus W. Bender wrote in the Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung newspaper in January that North Korea’s machinery from Switzerland-based KBA-Giori SA, “is completely antiquated, unsuitable for printing the ’supernote.”’ Giori machines are used to print real dollars.
Matsumura disagrees. “I know the printing process and I have seen Giori machinery,'’ he said. “It doesn’t matter that it’s old. Maintenance is what counts.'’ In Matsumura’s analysis, North Korea’s own notes — which he called far superior in printing technique to yuan notes produced in neighboring China — most likely are made using Giori machinery for about 80 percent of the process. Additional machinery is needed to print the won notes because they are more colorful than U.S. bills, he said. [Hideko Takayama and Bradley K. Martin; emphasis mine]
I might speculate about how Bender got this critical fact wrong. North Korea actually uses three different types of currency. Bender may have gotten his hands on some of the worthless hoi-polloi scrip. Not that careful research tends to be a hallmark of kook conspiracy theorists, or the journalists who try to pass them off as serious news sources.
Martin and Takayama then cite direct and circumstantial evidence linking North Korea to the distribution of supernotes:
Matsumura, whose Tokyo-based company started in the counterfeit-detection business around the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, said North Korea’s early efforts were often seized in quantity from diplomats and trade officials. Japanese authorities continued to confiscate counterfeits in shipments from Wonsan, North Korea, until they banned the entrance of North Korean ships late last year.
And this:
Matsumura says the printing techniques and ink used on the most recent fake $100 bills are identical to those used in producing North Korea’s own 100-won bill.
“North Korea has used front companies to purchase ink for currencies,'’ Matsumura said. “Any country that makes automobile paint can make the ink.'’ The volume needed for a major print run could be transported in a single large paint can, he said, estimating the cost of producing each fake note at around four U.S. cents.
Matsumura, like Mihm, points to a printing house in Pyongsong as the source of the supernote. So, incidentally does Kim Il Nam, a former North Korean diplomat who relates his experience getting caught passing supernotes (inadvertently, he says). End update.]
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has just released its report on the UN Development Program’s North Korea scandal. Previous postings here concern the U.S. Ambassador’s original complaint, Ban Ki Moon’s unrealized promises of a full investigation, and the suspicious termination of a whistleblower. First, the main findings:
1. UNDP operated in North Korea with inappropriate staffing, questionable use of foreign currency instead of local currency, and insufficient administrative and fiscal controls.
2. By preventing access to its audits and not submitting to the jurisdiction of the UN Ethics Office, UNDP impeded reasonable oversight and undermined its whistleblower protections.
3. In 2002, the DPRK government used its relationship with the United Nations to execute deceptive financial transactions by moving $2.72 million of its own funds from Pyongyang to DPRK diplomatic missions abroad through a bank account intended to be used solely for UNDP activities and by referencing UNDP in the wire transfer documents.
4. UNDP transferred UN funds to a company that, according to a letter from the US State Department to UNDP, has ties to an entity involved in DPRK weapons activity.Read the rest of this entry »
Q Is the administration about to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism?
MS. PERINO: No. Right now where we are is waiting on the North Koreans to provide a complete and accurate declaration of their nuclear activities. So we’re continuing to wait for that. We still have people on the ground helping with the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. So at this point that’s where we are.
Q So it would be premature to say that that’s going to happen?
MS. PERINO: To say the least.
Recall that just yesterday, Richardson caught the State Department saying that “North Korea has complied with [the]criteria” for removal from the terror sponsor list. So take Condoleezza Rice’s public humiliation of Jay Lefkowitz for what it’s worth. Her Department has its own message discipline problem.
Just when I thought we were finally rid of the UniFiction Ministry, another one grows out of this soil.
[Update: Miss that warm, moist pungence rising around your ankles? Here’s your fix for that:
“I’m going to have a great deal more to say about elevating the issue of human rights in North Korea, which is clearly a priority for the president and Congress,” he said. [N.Y. Times, Helene Cooper]
Exactly how stupid do these people think we are? Condi Rice has scarcely uttered a word about this in four years, has prevented anyone else but the marginalized Lefkowitz from doing so, and has made a cruel joke of the North Korean Human Rights Act by (a) not funding it, (b) locking our embassy gates to refugees, and (c) taking the position that North Koreans in China aren’t refugees without a ChiCom seal of approval. Can we expect more of the same hollow, occasionally caustic, and reliably meaningless rhetoric this Administration sometimes says and sometimes means? Not that the rhetoric bothers me, but talk is cheap. For once, I’d like to see Condi do something that will save just one North Korean life. More here.]
Wow. Just, wow.
SECRETARY RICE: Since Jay Lefkowitz has nothing to do with the six-party talks and I would doubt very seriously that they would recognize the name, no, I don’t think they’re confused.
QUESTION: You don’t think the Chinese (inaudible)?
SECRETARY RICE: No.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) a Boston Journal editorial page doesn’t (inaudible) suggested that he was (inaudible) the Administration.
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I can tell you in no uncertain terms that he wasn’t. He’s the human rights envoy. That’s what he knows. That’s what he does. He doesn’t work on the six-party talks. He doesn’t know what’s going on in the six-party talks and he certainly has no say in what American policy will be in the six-party talks.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
SECRETARY RICE: And by the way, the President has spoken as to what our policy is in the six-party talks. I think that’s what –
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
SECRETARY RICE: I know where the President stands and I know where I stand and those are the people who speak for American policy. [Briefing, en route to Berlin, emphasis mine]
Yes, Lefkowitz broke a Washington rule when he commented on an area beyond his portfolio. But Rice’s offense, by publicly, deliberately, repeatedly, and gratuitously insulting a subordinate, was at least equally severe. And if Lefkowitz’s error was an unguarded lapse of truth, Rice’s error revealed her as mean, classless, immature, and defensive.
WHAT HE SAID: Richardson has a must-read commentary on State’s persistent clinging to the assinine idea of removing non-complaint, non-performing, unreformed North Korea from the terror-sponsor list. He does a terrific job on tracking how State airbrushes its justification for listing North Korea year-by-year. I could only add that the idea of rewarding people who do absolutely everything we want them not to do has to be the dumbest idea since Windows Vista. I have to wonder if Congress would approve, with so many influential members — mostly in this President’s own party — lining up to oppose it. How much of his remaining capital does President Bush want to expend on giving terrorism a free pass and alienating Japan? How much does he relish the prospect of a skeptical John McCain opposing this flawed and failing deal on the campaign trail?
Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. — Albert Einstein
Plan A, gentle diplomacy, has again failed to disarm Kim Jong Il. Whenever this happens (every time it’s tried) advocates of doing the same thing over and over again fall back on The False Choice, whether expressly or by implication: it’s their way or war. They know better, of course, which technically makes this a lie. And usually, this lie stands uncorrected:
“People lambaste the six-party process, and sure, it offers no refuge for those in need of instant gratification,” Mr. Hill, the negotiator, said in an interview. “But when asked for alternatives” to the nuclear pact, Mr. Hill said, “even the noisiest critics fall silent.” [N.Y. Times]
Hill knows better. Last year, North Korea talked him into abandoning the one alternative that’s ever succeeded in modifying Kim Jong Il’s behavior: economic constriction. In just 17 months, the Treasury Department’s sanctions against one small bank in Macau brought Kim Jong Il’s palace economy to the brink of the same catastrophe the rest of the North Korean economy reached 15 years ago. Not only did the State Department force Treasury to abandon that pressure, Hill even helped Kim Jong Il launder $25 million in mostly ill-gotten gains. In exchange, Hill bought us some exceedingly nebulous North Korean promises to disarm, eventually. Not only did North Korea predictably renege, it continued to proliferate nuclear materials and/or technology to Syria right under our noses.
Quietly, the appeasement camp is now talking about an alternative of its own — negotiating an acceptance of North Korea as a “responsible” nuclear power (see here, here, and here). This is madness; not just for the obvious reasons, but because we have yet to even try a comprehensive, sustained effort against Kim Jong Il’s regime-sustaining finances. In the year President Bush has left in office, he could inflict a shock such of such voltage that it could deprive Kim Jong Il of the ability to pay and feed the military, intelligence, and bureaucratic organizations on whom his survival depends. Plan B starts with ten executive decisions, but President Bush must make them now:
1:Declare Bureau 39 of the North Korean Workers’ Party to be an “entity of special concern” for money laundering under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Then impose the so-called Fifth Special Measure on Bureau 39 and its bankers. Bureau 39 is the carotid artery of Kim Jong Il’s palace economy. It is responsible for earning, laundering, and recouping foreign exchange through such illegal businesses as drug dealing, counterfeiting, and missile sales. The Fifth Special Measure prohibits the designated entity from holding correspondent accounts in U.S. banks and would cut off most of Kim Jong Il’s access to international finance. This same sanction proved devastating when applied to Banco Delta Asia, and when applied to foreign jurisdictions such as Nauru and the Ukraine. Nuclear option: Apply PATRIOT 311 to the entire government of North Korea.
2:Sue. File criminal and/or civil RICO and/or money laundering charges against Bureau 39 for any criminal conduct occurring inside the United States, such as the distribution of counterfeit currency, cigarettes, or pharmaceuticals. Putting the evidence before an impartial tribunal places it before the eyes of the world. By adding forfeiture counts, prosecutors would gain the means to attach and seize Kim Jong Il’s personal assets. If North Korea can be proven responsible for crimes of violence against U.S. persons, it lacks many of the protections of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because of its listing as a state sponsor of terrorism. The clearest case of this may be North Korea’s suspected abduction, torture, and murder of the Rev. Kim Dong Shik, one of whose suspected abductors now sits in a South Korean jail. Korea North Korea would almost certainly not send a lawyer to defend itself in U.S. courts, in which case, the U.S. government (or Kim Dong Shik’s widow) would win by default judgment. Nuclear option: Charge Kim Jong Il as an individual defendant.
3:Strictly and aggressively enforce U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, using the Proliferation Security Initiative to stop and search North Korean ships believed to be carrying prohibited cargoes such as missiles or nuclear material. These important resolutions ban North Korea from trading in most major weapons systems, components, and technology. They also require those tendering payment to the regime to ensure that those funds are not used for its WMD programs, never an easy thing to do in the case of secretive North Korea. Nuclear option: A “soft” blockade. Search any North Korean merchant ships we find on the high seas, seizing any we find carrying illegal cargo.
4:Halt the sale of North Korean blood gold. Following Treasury’s sanctions against Banco Delta, Kim Jong Il began selling off his nation’s gold reserves to buyers in Thailand and on the London exchanges. President Bush should ask Britain to halt the sale of North Korean gold, subject to appropriate assurances required under resolutions 1695 and 1718. He should also raise publicity and awareness of the fact that concentration camp prisoners mine much of that gold as a prelude to seeking international sanctions.
6:Push China aside. Let’s be realistic: China isn’t going to help us force Kim Jong Il to disarm. China has undermined every previous multilateral action against North Korea and still subsidizes Kim Jong Il. China prefers a divided Korea that acts as a distraction for U.S. influence and power in Asia. Under Executive Order 13,382, however, Treasury can sanction and freeze the assets of entities that support or finance North Korea’s WMD programs. We have already sanctioned Chinese companies under 13,382 for transferring sensitive techology to North Korea. Treasury could let the Chinese know that we’ll also apply it to any finanancial institutions acting as conduits for China’s aid to North Korea. After all, China voted for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 but still does not “ensure” that North Korea isn’t using Chinese aid money for WMD programs; thus, the language of 1718 supports this more aggressive interpretation of E.O. 13,382. Because North Korea continues to engage in continuing acts of international terrorism, another possible vehicle would be E.O. 13,382’s terrorist financing counterpart, Executive Order 13,224. Nuclear option: Investigate larger Chinese banks for money laundering, something Treasury may already suspect in the case of the Bank of China. Even a whisper of a PATRIOT 311 designation might cause a bank run.
7:Work with South Korea and Japan. Japan has already cut off most commerce with North Korea, and it probably wouldn’t take much coaxing to get Japan’s full support. A greater opportunity lies in the potentially cooperative government about to take power in South Korea. Seoul had provided billions of dollars in unconditional aid to Kim Jong Il’s regime in the last decade, but incoming President Lee Myung Bak has already stated that he wants to condition continued aid on North Korea’s disarmament. Lee also wants some things from us, such as a delay in the handover of wartime operational control to the ROK military. In return, he might agree to end all subsidies for the unprofitable and unpopular Kumgang tourist project, a cash cow for Kim Jong Il whose proceeds are suspected of financing North Korea’s military. We should also ask Lee to end direct bilateral aid and channel all of South Korea’s humanitarian aid through the World Food Program (this would also mean better monitoring and less diversion). We could leave the Kaesong Industrial Park mostly alone for now, but ask South Korea to enforce laws prohibiting direct payments to North Korea strictly. We should also encourage strictly humanitarian aid to the North Korean people. That leaves the South Koreans some leverage to hold in reserve. Nuclear options: “Rotate” more of USFK’s forces home for temporary exercises; apply Executive Order 13,382 to Hyundai Asan Corporation and Woori Bank.
8:Restrict trade. North Korea’s trade with the United States is infinitessimal, mostly because North Korea can’t produce high-quality consumer merchandise and has no credit rating. Still, it’s important to recall that President Clinton eased trade sanctions in 1999 as a reward for North Korea’s missile testing moratorium. Those sanctions should have been reimposed after North Korea’s July 4, 2006 missile test, but never were. After the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, however, the United States accepted an obligation to account for where Kim Jong Il spends any money our corporations are sending him. Today, most imports, exports, and other large transactions with North Korea require approval from Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). OFAC should deny permission for transactions with North Korea unless the applicant can verify a non-military use for the funds to be tendered.
9:Engage the people. Kim Jong Il’s hermetic seal around the North Korean people is breaking down, thanks to (a) radio, (b) curiosity, (c) capitalism, which drives a thriving black market, (d) corruption among the border guards, and (e) the regime’s financial inability to maintain control over its borders. Even as we seek to weaken Kim Jong Il’s capacity to oppress, we should do what we can to feed, strengthen, and empower the North Korean people. Our quarrel isn’t with them; they’re Kim Jong Il’s greatest victims and potentially, our greatest allies. First, the Bush Administration must make good on its cheap talk about human rights by implementing the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. Congress passed this legislation unanimously, but the State Department has blocked its implementation ever since President Bush signed it more than three years ago. This is not to say that the Administration shouldn’t also talk about human rights. But instead of childish epithets like “pygmy,” President Bush should simply restate what we know about the concentration camps, the infanticides, the mistreatment of the handicapped, the persecution of Christians, and the political manipulation of the Great Famine. At the same time, we should offer the North Korean people food aid, conditioned on strict monitoring and independent distribution by the World Food Program. We should also tell the North Korean people that we stand ready to help them by broadcasting into their country 24 hours a day. We should tell them about the depraved opulence of Kim Jong Il’s life, the corruption of their government, and the prosperity of South Korea. We should demand that the Red Cross be given access to the concentration camps, and that the World Food Program be given access to the hungry. The P.R. battle has great power to constrain or support our options. Bad P.R. for Kim Jong Il can deter leaders, investors, and candidates from defending policies that have prolonged Kim Jong Il’s misrule, and the misery of the North Korean people.
10:Start preparing for reconstruction. Unless Kim Jong Il believes that we’re prepared to accept the collapse of his regime as an alternative to verifiable disarmament, he won’t disarm. We should also understand that rebuilding North Korea will be a task of incalculable scale that we’ll eventually have to face, one way or another. Even if South Korean and Chinese aid continues indefinitely, it’s probably just a matter of time before Kim Jong Il’s regime collapses or dissolves into chaos. Kim Jong Il is over 60, his health is said to be bad, and he has no suitable successor. The economic system is in steady decline, resistant to reform, and probably incapable of reform. Information is leaking in and discontent is spreading. The food situation, which had recovered to more-or-less subsistence levels after the Great Famine, has worsened again following Kim Jong Il’s rejection of international aid and severe floods. North Korea is a failed state — stripped, gutted, and traumatized. Its reconstruction challenges could dwarf those of post-Saddam Iraq. That’s why we must wrap our minds around how big a problem we’re facing, financially, politically, diplomatically, militarily, and psychologically. Legislation such as the the North Korean Refugee Relief and Reconstruction Act would be a good start toward preparing to deal with those problems.
None of this requires us to close off our diplomatic channels to North Korea. We should keep talking, but we should also be realistic about our approach to those talks and widen their agenda. Even if negotiated disarmament seems exceedingly unlikely, we should express our willingness to talk any time, even if only for P.R. reasons. We should also be realistic enough to understand that a bad deal is not better than no deal, and a meaningless deal is a bad deal. We’ve learned that deals must be backed by pressure, that they must have clear terms and strict deadlines, and that we must extract tangible and immediate concessions instead of vague and distant promises. North Korea is such an exceptionally opaque place that we can’t begin to hope for success without turning “trust but verify” on its head. The first goal — not the last — should be to push inspectors and verification teams through North Korea’s walls of secrecy. Kim Jong Il will never give us an honest declaration. We’ll have to help him write it.
We should also expand the agenda to cover all of our disagreements with North Korea: missiles, chemical and biological weapons, human rights, food aid, and conventional weapons. That way, prolonged North Korean recalcitrance imposes a political and economic cost on its government. Our goal here should be nothing less than full access for international aid workers, investors, development teams, journalists, and Red Cross teams. Call it “compassionate self-interest” – when North Koreans receive food and medical aid from foreigners instead of the regime, decades of xenophobic propaganda will lose all credibility. It is the transparency that leads us to truth, not a worthless signature, that will tell us when Kim Jong Il has committed himself to disarmament.
I’m under no illusion that Kim Jong Il is likely to agree to this. He knows what it could cost him. But then again, Kim Jong Il should be under no illusion that he could easily survive a year of Plan B, and I don’t think he is. To say that pressure doesn’t help or harms diplomacy requires one to believe that any relationship between the events of September 15, 2005 and September 19, 2005 was mere coincidence. Last year, we saw what happens when we relax our pressure prematurely. Even if the next Administration chooses a different course, implementing Plan B will at least demonstrate what other, better options we have than trusting Kim Jong Il to use his nukes responsibly.
