Another Nuke Test?

On Saturday, I had coffee with a very well-connected South Korean friend, who suggested in passing that North Korea might respond to this-or-that sanction with another nuke test. After having expostulated for the next 45 seconds about why such a move wouldn’t further North Korea’s interests at this time, I think I now understand why my friend just sat there and smiled while I yammered on:

According to a high-level source in North Korea, Kim Jong-Il instructed at the meeting with party and military leaders in Wonsan on August 26, that North Korea will carry out a third nuclear test if sanctions from the U.S. and the world are strengthened.

According to the source, on August 26 in Wonsan, Kim Jong-Il gave important instructions on strategies against the U.S. and the nuclear issue. These instructions were reflected in a letter sent to the chairman of the U.N. Security Council. [Open Radio]

As you read the rest of this post, remain mindful of the words, “a high-level source in North Korea.” Open Radio claims that the goal of this test would be to pressure the Obama Administration to engage in bilateral talks that end with U.S. recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state.

The source said it is more than possible for North Korea to carry out a third nuclear test. Additionally, if the U.S. and international community starts conversation with North Korea and relaxes sanctions, North Korea may not carry out another nuclear test. The source also said the third nuclear test will involve uranium as “stronger” nuclear test means nuclear test with uranium.

A third nuclear test, if carried out, is likely to happen between September 20 and October 10. September 20 is when the 150 days of battle is over. October 10 is the anniversary of the establishment of the Chosun Central Party.

Elsewhere, Open Radio offers this rather shocking assessment of North Korea’s uranium bomb program, alleging the North Korea has been manufacturing its own centrifuges for years at a plant near Kaechon (also the vicinity of Camps 14 and 18), using alloys specially made at Bukchang. According to Open Radio, North Korea may already have several uranium bombs, an assessment that would be dramatically at variance with most of what the U.S. intelligence community has said publicly, although the intelligence community will also tell you that it has very little idea of how advanced North Korea’s uranium program is at all. Here’s one assessment I’ll make with moderate-to-high confidence: if North Korea does test a uranium bomb, it would be a massive embarrassment for the CIA. Leon Panetta has already been the subject of resignation rumors. Panetta has denied those rumors, but this (however unfairly, imho) could cost him his job.

It’s times like this when I wonder why our presidents hate peace so much they just can’t learn to talk to their enemies. I mean, if someone had sent nice people like Robert Galluci or Wendy Sherman to sit down and sign some sort of “Agreed Framework” with the North Koreans years ago, we wouldn’t be worrying about this now, right? It’s still not too late to send Selig Harrison, or David Albright to give us their objective assessment and negotiate another one.

AFP also picks up the story, citing Open Radio, which continues to gain cred as a news source about North Korea. But who knows if this actually true? The delectable irony of it certainly is tempting, to the point where I hope they do test the damn thing. The simplest benefit of that would be that North Korea has one less nuke to sell, and hopefully, this would discredit many of the right people — not all of them Democrats by any means. Still, I have to question the authenticity of any “inside” rumors from North Korea itself. I wouldn’t think North Korea’s nuclear secrets would tend to leak to reporters for upstart dissident news services.

Frankly, I’m still mystified as to why another nuke test gets North Korea closer to those goals. They know the State Department wants to give them what they want if they just wait and sustain a moderate level of crisis. But over time, North Korea has been at least as likely to misread America as the converse. With North Korea, anything is possible and nothing is certain, except this: whatever shape of table we use, North Korea only uses talks to stall us, squeeze us for money, and ultimately, to get more nukes. If we continue to view this as an exclusively diplomatic problem, North Korea will eventually manufacture, possess, and distribute all the nukes it wants.

5 Responses

  1. Had to read quickly….

    I say – test away. Have a test of the week contest where you run an internet lottery where people can buy slots of time and day for when it will happen. Test daily…

    …use up as much weapons-grade and other grade nuke material you have…

    ….It will only isolate you further and cut down on the stockpile.

    (Until the US is stupid enough to cave into your rather pitiful ploy at this point. The first test would have been enough if it had not been a dud. The last was good enough. You have nothing to gain from more tests or you wouldn’t if we weren’t so often stupid….)

  2. I’m mystified about something too. If the recent policy toward the north has produced a hostile country that is recognized as nuclear weapons capable in every way but formally, then what is to gain by staying on that road? What is not being said here? Keep in mind that our media has already reported north korea to have wmd and theres been no disagreement of that publicly by our cia. We’ve been led to believe they have the bomb.

    Given that, i would like to see more independent verification of their nuke tests, so another one would be an opportunity for that. Those that have dug a little into the subject can find how suspicious the evidence is, given the unusual way they’ve tried to convince scientists about their capabilities. It should naturally generate distrust. Both sides have something to gain by inflating the threat, so we need the most reputable verifications possible for something so important. This issue has been too driven by rhetoric at the expense of the facts, for too long now. That is totally unnecessary for anyone with the facts on their side.

    I’m a bit ignorant as to why a “third test” could be deemed a “threat” that would force negotiations. Why would this test be a threat to anyone outside of north korea?? Please, who is concerned and what reason do they give for that – or was this just an opinion of what other people are thinking?

  3. Mike, everything related to North Korea, including our “policy” foundation is pure speculation – it could be that the so-called nuclear threat has nothing to do with the decision to negotiate directly with North Korea.

  4. In fact, the only “facts” that we know of is the fact that millions of people have suffered horribly and are still suffering and are not free to leave.

  5. If the recent policy toward the north has produced a hostile country that is recognized as nuclear weapons capable in every way but formally, then what is to gain by staying on that road?

    Our recent policy has not created a hostile nation – North Korea. Our policy historically has not “produced” hostile nation – North Korea. There is probably no other country on the face of the earth in modern history in which hostility to the outside world has been more thoroughly and consistently defined by the state itself.

    There is no way to understand Juche beyond this. Well, I guess we could say it was produced by the 40+ years of colonization by Japan that came to an end in 1945 and allowed NK to form itself.

    But then, you’d open up a discussion about the 19th century and much longer and how Korea became known as the Hermit Kingdom in the first place….

    Our policy makers in the West have a habit at looking at recent history – especially that of recent administrations not their own – as the basis for “what’s wrong” with NK policy —– time and time and time again, they fail to show they have a firm grasp as to what exactly North Korea is ——— and that is why we fail and fail and fail to deal with a nation that is pretty much incompatiable with the outside world and thus impossible to deal with…

    Back to the whole comment, I’d agree with the verification and taking NK’s statements of nuke tests with at least a few grains of salt – however – it is a “threat” because of this “do something” and “try anything” and “talk for the sake of talking” mentality that is produced in part as noted above — by a failure to understand just exactly what NK is — a nation who believes and has always believed it can only survive (the regime) by keeping as isolated from the rest of the world as possible…

    — You know, Christopher Hill’s work on NK the last few years is exactly what I’ve been bitching about for years — a perfect example of it.

    Carter’s 1994 deal is less so as far as an example because he went and sat down with NK for a much shorter time and came up with his deal.

    Hill, as was reported in the press, just wanted to go to the North and sit down and work this all out —- and he was given a few years to accomplish it —– and we got what we got………..a perfect example of failure to begin to build on a foundation that understands the basic nature of North Korea’s regime and state….