Archive for February, 2010
Posted by Dan Bielefeld on February 28, 2010 at 12:11 pm · Filed under Refugees
Stumbed upon (lower case) this fascinating UNHCR chart of countries that have accepted refugees from North Korea. 23 countries have accepted at least one refugee — definitely an international problem. Original article here at RFA (Korean).
First of all, as of the end of 2008, Germany has granted refugee status to 1390 North Korean refugees. I had NO idea so many have been accepted in any single country outside of South Korea. The article says over 2000 have been accepted in other countries through 2008. In other words, over 10% of all North Koreans granted refugee status have received it outside of South Korea. (I can’t find the precise number who’d settled in South Korea as of the end of 2008, but a rough estimate would be 14,000-16,000.)
If you take a closer look at the table above, there are all kinds of interesting things that stick out. For example, before the NKHR Act was passed in the US, a handful of refugees had already been accepted. And several of the countries on the list are not exactly rights-respecting countries, which makes one wonder the particulars of these cases.
Should anyone be able to find the original UNHCR chart on their website — hopefully with a related report or explanation — please leave a comment.
Posted by Joshua on February 26, 2010 at 10:35 pm · Filed under Activism
We’re down to the final days, so click the cheesy icon in my sidebar.
Posted by Joshua on February 25, 2010 at 3:56 pm · Filed under Anju Links
Only a few more days left to vote for LiNK!
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Must Read No. 1: Christian Whiton, “How to Weaken Kim’s Grip”
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Must Read No. 2: B.R. Myers, “North Korea’s Race Problem”
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Must Read No. 3: Don Kirk writes on China and sanctions-busting.
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Despite all the food aid North Korea is receiving, one-third of North Koreans are still in need.
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Oh, No: I sense a great disturbance in the force.
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You Don’t Say, Pt. 1: The Federation of American Scientists is worried about North Korea selling man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, quite possibly to terrorists. President Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008, and President Obama recently refused to reverse this decision. Discuss among yourselves.
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You Don’t Say, Pt. 2: Pro-North Korean schools in Japan have an image problem.
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Quote of the day: “A single photograph has become the symbol of North Korea’s utter darkness, moral, political, economic and technological. It shows the two Koreas at night by satellite. The cities of the South are ablaze with electric light. In the North, there is only a single, dim pinprick of illumination, the capital Pyongyang; surrounded by a black void, a country hidden from sight, held prisoner in the dark, a vast memory hole.”
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Open Radio interviews a Yodok survivor.
Posted by Joshua on February 25, 2010 at 10:47 am · Filed under Ling/Lee Incident
Lisa Ling has written to Kushibo, responding to his criticisms. Kushibo, obviously wanting to choose his next words carefully, will respond in the coming days.
For the record, I think Kushibo’s fury is motivated by the best of intentions, but I respectfully differ with him on this point. I criticize Lisa Ling for absolutely nothing. Laura Ling, in the course of trying to tell an important story, also with the best of intentions, made a foolish decision to cross into North Korea that might have gotten other people hurt or killed — we’ll probably never know for sure. Without knowing that, it’s difficult to answer the question of what Laura and Euna Lee can do to redeem themselves. That leaves me feeling deeply ambivalent about both of them.
Lisa Ling has taken much more justifiable risks to tell another important story about North Korea, and she and her husband Paul Song have long supported LiNK and the cause of ending Kim Jong Il’s brutality toward his subjects. Some have suggested that Lisa Ling’s “Inside North Korea” may have set back access for other humanitarian groups to get into North Korea, but the evidence doesn’t support this view. This regime has long manipulated humanitarian aid, has never allowed in much of it, and has recently rejected most offers of humanitarian aid to the extent of mass expulsions of American aid groups and canceling a 500,000-ton aid commitment from the U.S. government. Far better, then, for some intrepid journalist to help Americans understand the terrible nature of this regime so that they can know the futility of their own generosity. “Inside North Korea” was intrepid and, for many viewers, profoundly enlightening.
Some of the criticism of Lisa Ling, not necessarily Kushibo’s, has implicitly criticized her for using her fame to gain publicity. This strikes me as more envy than principled criticism. For one thing, the publicity itself brought needed attention to this regime’s brutality. For another, there is no inherent evil in being famous or, to drive to the real emotional focus here, beautiful. In saying this, I certainly don’t refer to Kushibo, but I don’t doubt that fame and beauty are objects of resentment for some. But this is irrational, and if I were fortunate enough to be famous and drop-dead gorgeous with a loved one in distress, I’d sure as hell go on CNN to appeal for her release. It would be different if Lisa Ling had counseled her sister to cross the border, but I’ve seen no evidence to support that. Lisa Ling and Laura Ling are different people. Isn’t it at least fair to judge each by her own actions?
Posted by Joshua on February 25, 2010 at 7:56 am · Filed under NK Economics, Resistance
Shortly after North Korea announced The Great Confiscation came The Ajumma Rebellion, an event that may prove to be one of the most significant in North Korean history. The historical perspective comes into focus as I read this analysis at the Daily NK, not so much of why The Great Confiscation failed, but why the regime even tried something so clearly predisposed to fail. It concludes with this:
Decades after the leader promised “boiled rice and beef soup” to everyone and with no sign of it on the horizon, strengthening state control will only incite more and greater resistance. Most citizens already know that the government is neither willing nor able to give boiled rice and beef soup to them. Therefore, the only choice is to introduce a system where anyone can have boiled rice and beef soup as long as they are prepared to work for it. [Daily NK]
It certainly looks as if revolutionary capitalism is North Korea’s destiny, no matter how much Pyongyang and Berkeley may wish otherwise. The author, perhaps hoping to appeal to Pyongyang’s softer side, suggests that this will actually strengthen the North Korean system. I disagree and embrace the coming chaos. The victory of those brave ajummas who protested in the markets means — who stood up to the world’s scariest tyranny and won — means that for the first time in North Korean history, the regime’s power isn’t absolute. It has not lost, but has begun to lose, its power to starve and terrorize its subjects into submission. It has not lost, but has begun to lose, its control over its borders and over the flow of information across them. The regime’s unprecedented retreat in the face of unprecedented open opposition will accelerate all of these trends during the years to come.
Posted by Joshua on February 24, 2010 at 10:26 am · Filed under Kim Jong Il, Kremlinology
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently had age spots removed from his face to look healthy but is becoming more and more fretful and dependent on old friends or family, the National Intelligence Service said in a report at the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee on Tuesday. [Chosun Ilbo]
You’d think a man with absolute power would set higher expectations than this:
No word on the whereabouts of his plastic surgeon, but then again, I’m sure there’s a built-in incentive to compliment the quality of his work.
And in more substantive news guesswork, the Chief of the National Intelligence Service says that His Dessicated Majesty is increasingly isolated from everyone but his inner circle (all that on-the-spot guidance notwithstanding, apparently) and worried about popular unrest after he managed the impressive accomplishment of making the North Korean economy even worse.
Posted by Joshua on February 24, 2010 at 7:12 am · Filed under Human Rights, History
Open News has an interesting history of the camps that, among other interesting educated guesses, suggests that 50% of the largest camps’ (kwan-li-so) population is composed of people who are merely family members of those accused of disloyalty to the state:
The North Korean regime, as it consolidated its power, killed religious leaders, the pro-Japanese, and landowners, while imprisoning their family members in the so called “forced labor camps.” In 1947, there were 17 of these forced labor camps. Between 1953 and 1956, Kim Il-Sung got rid of those who were against his regime, and there was a large-scale regulation and supervision of party members, and other civilians regarding their ideology. North Korea created a controlled district in order to isolate those who were brought in through regulation and supervision, this district contained several prison camps later on.
Between 1960s and 1970s, the North Korean regime consolidated the succession and dictatorship of Kim Jong-Il, and reinforced control and isolation over those against the regime. This process resulted in an expansion of prison camps.
The North Korean government also imprisoned family members of those who went to South Korea during the war. This happened during the education project for party members and categorization project of all citizens. The government also searched for Gapsan line, returned Korean-Japanese, Kim Dong-Gyu, who were decided to be a threat to the North Korean regime. #13 Jongsung Kwan-li-so had 5,000 prisoners in 1962, but in 1975, it held 20,000. For effective management, it was then divided into #12 Changpyung Kwan-li-so and #13 Jongsung Kwan-li-so. [Open News]
The camps are an essential part of the regime’s control over its subjects. In the past, the unspoken horror of being sent to a camp suppressed unhappy thoughts. Now that the regime is more-or-less openly hated, the horror of being sent to the camps mostly keeps that seething hatred in a passive state. Fear of the camps also has profound foreign policy implications for the United States, no matter how much the State Department may pretend otherwise. It is that fear that guarantees that North Koreans posted overseas will continue to obediently smuggle drugs, sell banned weapons, procure luxury goods, embezzle international development aid, defraud foreign insurers, violate U.N. resolutions, and launder the proceeds as ordered. It assures Kim Jong Il that North Korean scientists, technicians, and soldiers will never be forthcoming with American or U.N. inspectors or monitors who try to verify any disarmament agreement. It will continue to frustrate any attempt to distribute international food aid fairly.
New readers can see satellite imagery of the camps, in addition to a great deal of information culled from scholarly studies, at this page.
Posted by Joshua on February 24, 2010 at 6:27 am · Filed under Refugees, Activism
We’re coming up on the final days of the Pepsi’s “Refresh “Everything” campaign. Some of you, like me, have been voting for LiNK faithfully every day. Thank you. For the rest of you, I humbly ask you to join the effort in a last push. You can go here to vote.
If LiNK can make it to second place, it wins the money. The problem is, it’s still stuck in 4th place. Now, I’m one of those people who doesn’t “do” Facebook, but LiNK tells me it’s an effective way to spread the word. You can go here, here, or here for those links. Please vote for LiNK every day until the 28th. Thank you.
Posted by Joshua on February 23, 2010 at 10:51 pm · Filed under Africa, Sanctions
Not for the first time, North Korea is implicated in shipping weapons to one or more belligerents in the civil war in Congo, and not for the first time, North Korea is caught selling tank parts to a warring African nation in violation of a U.N. resolution. This time, however, the North Korean shipment has been seized in the course of what “Western diplomats” call a “clear-cut violation” of UNSCR 1874 (full text in my sidebars):
South Africa has told a UN Security Council committee it intercepted a North Korean weapons shipment bound for Central Africa, which diplomats said was a violation of a UN ban on arms sales by Pyongyang.
The seizure took place in November, when South African authorities received information that a ship headed for Congo Republic was carrying containers with suspicious cargo, according to a letter sent by South Africa to the Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee. [Reuters]
Oh, and guess which member of the U.N. Security Council handled the cargo and didn’t alert anyone about any suspicious contents:
The letter, parts of which were seen by Reuters Monday, said a North Korean company was the shipping agent and the cargo was first loaded onto a ship in China, then transferred to a vessel owned by French shipping firm CMA CGM in Malaysia.
Diplomats said the French company alerted authorities to the fact it had suspicious cargo on board and was not believed to have done anything wrong.
If only the North Koreans had Charles Pascua’s number in their rolodex, this whole misunderstanding could have been avoided:
The South Africans intercepted the vessel and seized the containers, which held tank parts. The letter, which the committee received last week, said the South Africans discovered “that the contents fell within the definition of conventional arms in that the contents consisted of components of a military tank T-54/T-55.”
The letter said the documentation for the containers described the cargo as “spare parts of bulldozer.” T-54 and T-55 tanks were designed and produced in the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s but were later upgraded and made in other countries.
Neither the French company nor the countries involved had any immediate comment.
Fortunately, it is possible to enforce a U.N. Security Council resolution somewhat effectively, even without the full cooperation of all members of the Security Council.
The UN sanctions and the cut-off of handouts from South Korea have dealt a heavy blow to the North, which has an estimated gross domestic product of $17 billion, and may force it back to nuclear disarmament talks in the hopes of winning aid, analysts say.
Yeah, they’ll come back to talks some day, for the right payoff. But so what? They still won’t disarm. Just ask them.
Update: Additional details on the cargo and its interception from Kyodo News, via the Mainichi Shimbun.
Most of the shipment consisted of components for T54 and T55 tanks, made in the former Soviet Union, said the report, obtained by Kyodo News. In addition to gun-sights, seats, tracks, storage boxes and periscopes for the tanks, radios with Chinese markings were also discovered, as well as protective head gear and search lights.
North Korea apparently tried to hide the true nature of the shipment as it was described as “spare parts of a bulldozer” and the containers were lined with large quantities of rice in sacks. After seizing the goods in November, South African authorities secured the containers in a warehouse in Durban, where they remain pending the completion of the investigation.
According to the report, the goods, bound for Pointe Noire, the Republic of Congo, were first loaded onto a ship in Dalian, China, on Oct. 20. The cargo was then transferred to another ship, the Westerhever, which was chartered by a subsidiary of a French company, CMA CGM. The vessel left Port Klang, Malaysia, on Nov. 16. The ship was due to refuel at Durban harbor in late November, but because of fuel shortages was instructed to bunker at Walvis Bay. On Nov. 27 while on route to Walvis Bay the captain was ordered to return to Durban and discharge the two containers in question.
Walvis Bay is in Namibia, a former South African protectorate that became independent in 1990 — the same year I visited this town in Namibia — and is ruled by veterans of the leftist South West African Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO). As was the case with Ethiopia, senior North Korean officials have made state visits to Namibia and have cultivated ties with its government. It’s not hard to see why. Namibia is a major producer of such mineral products as diamonds and uranium.
Posted by Joshua on February 23, 2010 at 10:35 am · Filed under NK Economics
More proof that times have changed in North Korea: in the 1990’s, Kim Jong Il allowed perhaps millions to starve and did next to nothing about it. This year, the regime is ordering the urgent distribution of rice rations to prevent starvation in the most vulnerable areas. Well, it’s a modest step in the right direction that the regime is actually trying to prevent starvation, even if, as the Daily NK suggests, that it’s because the regime is afraid of unrest. Of course, if it really wanted the people to eat well, it wouldn’t have rejected U.S. food aid and severely restricted the World Food Program’s operations.
It demonstrates that the only way for the North Korean people to improve their lives even marginally is to oppose it. When the tyrants also fear for their lives, there is a balance of terror, which results in some small measure of accountability.
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How Kim Jong Il reached the conclusion that The Great Confiscation had failed.
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More on the growing acceptance of the Chinese yuan as North Korea’s de facto currency. I expected that this would happen, and I also expect that within the next year or so, the regime will try to set confiscatory limits on the possession of foreign currency.
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An interesting CNN podcast, in which Christiane Amanpour interviews a U.N. official and (in the second half) my friend Professor Sung Yoon Lee on hunger, food aid, and North Korea’s palace economy, a term that seems to be catching on in the media. I don’t recall having seen that term used elsewhere before I used it here, although I suppose it’s always possible.
Posted by Joshua on February 23, 2010 at 7:45 am · Filed under Anju Links
Kim Jong-Eun still has a way to go to gain the adoration, much less acceptance, of the North Korean elites:
According to a high-level source, the nickname of Kim Jong-il’s heir, Kim Jong-Eun, is “the little one.” According to multiple sources, the North Korean elites officially call Kim Jong-Eun “the great leader” and “successor of the great accomplishments of the military-first policy,” but inofficially, Kim Jong-Eun is referred to as “the little one.” “The little one” is usually used in North Korea to refer to children or younger siblings. It is also used to refer to a boss who does not have enough credentials.
Kim Jong-Il’s nickname is “pot belly.”
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Did China oppose the succession of Kim Jong-Eun? While I can see reasons for China to oppose anything that would make North Korea a less stable puppet, I’m skeptical about any reports sources to high levels in the North Korean or Chinese regimes.
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What is the likelihood of Kim Jong Il’s indictment in the international criminal court? Low, if it depends on governments taking action:
“Under ICC rules of procedure and evidence, it’s impossible for the court to investigate or indict North Korea on its own, because North Korea is not a signatory to the Rome Statute,” Kwon said. “But South Korea and Japan can ask the ICC to place Kim on trial if they are determined, because crimes like abuse of South Korean POWs and abduction of South Korean and Japanese citizens took place within the territories of the two countries, which are signatories to the Rome Statue and are within ICC jurisdiction.”
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Another report that South Korea will step up demands for the return of its abducted citizens.
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A Korean expert suggests putting a time limit on the six-party talks to discourage North Korean stalling. Personally, I see much cosmetic value in the six-party talks, and I like the idea that there are open lines of communication — at least among the other five parties — in the event the Kim regime becomes unstable, or in the event that there’s a striking enough change in conditions that real progress becomes possible. That isn’t the case now, of course. But the answer isn’t to cut off diplomacy, it’s to invest our policy in the constriction and subversion of the regime while pretending to emphasize diplomacy. President Obama seems uniquely well postured to carry off that pretense credibly, if he’s smart enough to shift the emphasis of his policy toward more promising directions.
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North Korea’s indigenous word processing software is called Changdeok 7.0:
Another Changdeok system indicating the absolute power of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il are CTRL modifier keys. for “Kim Il-Sung” and for “Kim Jong-Il” are only modifier keys allowed in the Changdeok system These special characters and modifier keys is one side of Kim Il-Sung’s and Kim Jong-Il’s idolization. But, considering “Kim Il-Sung” and “Kim Jong-Il” in North Korean published works must be in bold text, special characters and modifier keys are for convenient editing processes as well.
Someone has managed to invent software even crappier than Vista. The lack of competition tends to have similar results in different places.
Posted by Joshua on February 22, 2010 at 3:39 pm · Filed under Kremlinology
Will the failure of The Great Confiscation set back Kim Jong-Eun’s “succession?”
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Kim Jong Il’s sister, Kim Kyong-Hui, is the reported beneficiary of a power shift in North Korea. That makes sense from a certain logical perspective: the regime needs a “bridge figure” to maintain the magic of Kim Il Sung’s dynastic bloodline, and Kim Jong-Eun just isn’t looking very ready to be that figure.
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But behind the scenes, my guess is that Jang Song Thaek will end up in control:
Quoting an anonymous source in Washington, Radio Free Asia said yesterday that Jang Song-thaek, brother-in-law of Kim Jong-il and a senior Workers’ Party official, recently had extensive discussions with economic experts. During the sessions, which reportedly went on for several days, participants analyzed the causes of the reform’s disastrous failure and brainstormed ways to revive the economy.
Posted by Joshua on February 22, 2010 at 10:50 am · Filed under Anju Links
Some 56 percent of South Koreans have a negative view of North Korea and 70 percent feel threatened by the North’s nuclear arms, a poll suggests. But 87 percent support another inter-Korean summit. [….]
“The percentage of people with a negative view of the North in the latest poll is now as high as before the Sunshine Policy,” said Choi Jin-wook, a senior researcher at KINU. “It seems that the poll reflects how people were affected” by the North’s second nuclear test, long-range rocket launch, and an inter-Korean skirmish in the West Sea last year.
Some 90.8 percent of respondents said there is a “slim” chance that the North will abandon its nuclear weapons. Some 53.1 percent believe that there has been no big progress in inter-Korean relations while 15.8 percent said relations deteriorated. Some 51.5 percent hold the North responsible for the worse relations. A vast majority, or 80.3 percent, of respondents approved of the South Korean demand to investigate the fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang resort in July 2008 and promise prevention of similar incidents as preconditions for resuming package tours to Mt. Kumgang. [Chosun Ilbo]
The dissolution of the unifiction fad that peaked during my time in Korea relieving, but the distrust of North Korea and hatred of America aren’t mutually exclusive, either. South Korean public opinion is so unstable and fundamentally anti-American that it’s difficult for any South Korean president to behave like an ally of the United States, as opposed to a dependent. Probably the best that can be done is to slowly weed out and fire the teachers who continue to indoctrinate South Korean children with fascist ideology.
[Update: More from the Joongang Ilbo.]
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Another sign that South Korea continues to move right: Park Geun-Hye is polling well for the next presidential election, which is still two years away. A lot can change in two years in Korea. []
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More evidence that the sanctions are working: weapons interdictions are certainly a good thing, but my suspicion is that Treasury’s warnings to financial institutions are having the greatest impact.
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North Korea can’t keep the lights on at night or feed its people, but somehow, it finds the money to buy expensive gear to detect and jam cell phones, and the electricity to run it:
One defector, who uses the alias Han Kyung Il, was previously in contact with relatives in Onsung-kun, North Hamgyong province, in North Korea.
“The North Korean authorities are jamming cell phone signals, and it is practically impossible to make a call,” he said in an interview. “You can switch phone cards, and the call appears to go through, but nobody in North Korea picks up.”
North Korea also appears to have made overseas purchases of expensive cell phone tracking and jamming equipment, which it has installed at various locations in Shinuiju, Hyesan, and Hweryong in the border area near China, according to North Koreans living in border areas as well as those in South Korea.
North Koreans in the border areas—still reeling from a recent currency devaluation that wiped out many people’s savings—say this new difficulty in communications has made it harder to request much needed assistance from North Korean defectors in South Korea. [Radio Free Asia]
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North Korea releases census data: While there’s little reason for confidence in any data compiled by the North Korean regime itself, there’s a nice hat tip to Curtis at the end.
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Another earthquake in North Korea’s far northeast.
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More on the penetration of North Korea by independent journalism.
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A moving “mission accomplished” essay, from someone who fought and endured loss to accomplish it.
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Anti-Semitic incidents are now at their highest level since World War II.
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Posted by Joshua on February 22, 2010 at 7:15 am · Filed under Human Rights, Defectors, Propaganda
To Oh, a left-leaning South Korean economist, defecting to North Korea with his entire family seemed like a peachy idea at the time (1985). Today, Oh is one of a very few people who has a souvenir photograph of his family standing in the snow at Camp 15, the infamous Yodok Camp described by Kang Chol-Hwan in “The Aquariums of Pyongyang.”
As it turns out, “the relevant organ” means the large intestine.
His activism attracted the attention of North Korean agents, who approached Oh and offered help with a family medical problem. His wife, Shin Sook-ja, a South Korean nurse, was sick with hepatitis. The North Koreans convinced Oh that she would get free first-class treatment in Pyongyang and he would get a good government job.
“My wife did not want to go,” Oh said. “I ignored her objections.”
Via East Germany and Moscow, the family arrived in Pyongyang on Dec. 3, 1985, Oh said, and was immediately taken to nearby mountains for indoctrination at a military camp. “The moment we stepped into that camp, I knew my wife was right and that I had made the wrong decision,” Oh said. [Washington Post, Blaine Harden]
As it turns out, the reality of North Korea’s universal health care fell significantly short of Oh’s expectations. Instead, Oh and his wife were put to work broadcasting propaganda to the South until he was ordered to return to Europe:
[A]uthorities ordered Oh to return to Germany and recruit more South Korean students to live in North Korea. His wife and daughters, he was told, could not go along. Oh recalls that he and his wife argued bitterly about what he should do.
“She hit me in the face when I said I would come back with some South Koreans,” Oh said. “She said I could not have that on my conscience. She told me to leave North Korea and never come back. She told me to think of her and our daughters as being dead from a car accident.”
Technically speaking, of course, “slave laborer at a political prison camp” is a government job.
Yes, Mr. Oh, you’re a fool. How unfortunate that your wife and daughters paid such a terrible price for that.
Posted by Joshua on February 22, 2010 at 6:50 am · Filed under Six-Party Talks, Diplomacy
The North Korean regime seldom makes a promise, in my opinion, that it really intends to keep. For instance, I don’t think it has the slightest intention of spending all that confiscated cash on meat soup instead of yachts and other goodies of that sort for The Great Fishwife. But I think, for once, they’re sincere when they say this:
North Korea vowed Friday (February 19) not to give up nuclear arms for “petty economic aid”, claiming it has only developed them to counter what it called US nuclear threats, according to South Korea’s Yonhap News. The North’s official Korean Central News Agency said the reason the communist country pursued nuclear arms is not to bargain them for economic benefits but to counter “the deepening US nuclear threats.”
“We have tightened our belts, braved various difficulties and spent countless (amounts of) money to obtain a nuclear deterrent as a self-defense measure against US nuclear threats,” the KCNA said in an editorial monitored in Seoul. “We never meant to seek ‘economic benefits’ from someone or threaten others.” [….] “Only fools will entertain the delusion that we will trade our nuclear deterrent for petty economic aid,” the KCNA said. [Korea Herald]
Fortunately for Kim Jong Il, Washington in general and the State Department in particular are densely populated with delusional fools. Some of them would still extend a lifeline to Kim Jong Il’s regime for nothing more than returning to six-party talks, despite the fact that North Korea’s return to the talks by itself is of no consequence if it’s determined to concede nothing, or to abide by nothing it concedes.
I seize on statements like this, while engagement-minded analysts have seized on occasional statements that disarmament was Kim Il Sung’s dying wish. Who’s right? Me, of course! First, Kim Il Sung is dead; second, the wording of those statements is consistent with preconditions that make them completely meaningless; and third, I have two decades of well-documented insincerity going for my side of this argument.
Despite some very naive-sounding rhetoric from Candidate Obama, the Obama Administration’s policy, unlike Bush’s, has been consistent with a growing acceptance that North Korea has no intention of disarming. I have several working theories for this, which aren’t mutually exclusive: (a) President Obama really doesn’t care enough about North Korea policy or foreign policy in general for the Christine Ahn types to have any influence over him; (b) just as Roh Moo Hyun exerted undue influence on Bush’s Korea policy, Lee Myung Bak’s manifestly more competent diplomacy may have undue influence over Obama’s; (c) North Korea’s own behavior in early 2009 made further concessions politically toxic; and (d) a fairly hard-headed group, probably in the NSC, has dominated the making of policy toward North Korea.
The real test will be what the Administration decides to do as its affirmative policy once they accept that diplomacy alone will get us nowhere. That will require an epiphany that the regime itself is the problem, that China is not helping us, and that it would be better for China to deal with some unrest on its border than for North Korea to continue exporting weapons and WMD technology to terrorists and their state sponsors (the latter risk being one that China’s rulers gleefully accept).
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