Avoiding the Next Korean War

Of course, it is premature for any government to assign blame for the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan before reviewing the detailed findings of a completed investigation. But for many South Koreans, the conclusion is already inescapable that North Korea did it. That’s my hunch, too. If I had to pick a favorite theory, it would involve North Korea’s semi-submersibles — they operate well in shallow waters, are hard to see on radar, can move quickly on the surface, and can carry mines or torpedoes — although the use of frogmen and submarines are also possibilities. Let me start by explaining the basis for my own speculation (please see these posts for additional citations):

– The extensive history of North Korean provocations that are as bad as this, or worse.

– The extensive history of North Korean provocations in these very waters, the most recent of which was a defeat for the North Korean Navy that would have created a motive for revenge.

– The recent rise in North-South tensions as President Lee refused to give in to Kim Jong Il’s increasingly extortionate demands to bail out his politically and financially bankrupt regime.

– North Korea’s recent unilateral renunciation of the 1953 Armistice that did not end, but did scale down, the surge of hostilities we call the Korean War.

– The elimination of other plausible theories. First, we can eliminate early theories that the Cheonan struck a rock or sank due to an internal explosion. Both the surviving crew members of the Cheonan and an investigator who has presumably seen the severed hull (and thus the direction in which its metal was bent by explosion) has told reporters that the blast came from the outside. Could this have been friendly fire? I’ve seen nothing to rule that out, but nothing to suggest as much, either. It has been suggested that a sea mine left over from the Korean War could have been the cause. Sea mines can certainly remain destructive for many decades, but this area is a heavily trafficked sea lane and fishing ground. No other sea mines have been found in the area since 1986 1984. It seems unlikely that the next one would be struck by a ROK naval vessel at a time of increased tensions.

– A radar blip was seen heading North cross the Northern Limit Line at about 30-40 knots shortly after the explosion, and ROK Navy commanders on shore ordered the frigate Seokcho to open fire on it (or them). I continue to have some difficulty believing the early reports that this blip was a flock of birds moving with deliberate haste from where a South Korean warship had just sunk, through disputed waters, in the middle of the night, and at approximately the same speed that a North Korean semi-submersible moves (or perhaps two, thus explaining why the “blip” divided into two at one point). Maybe some ornithologist our there knows something on this subject that can enlighten us. I also find it significant that the radar on smaller ROK Navy vessels apparently couldn’t determine the blip’s altitude. I don’t completely rule out that hypervigilant sailors could have shot at almost anything in those tense hours; I just doubt that a flock of birds would have been moving with such deliberate speed in that time, place, and manner. I’ll be interested in seeing the investigation’s findings about this.

– Some less probative evidence: the idea that North Korea sank the Cheonan certainly doesn’t seem implausible to those who’ve spent their lives under North Korean indoctrination.
For what it’s worth (probably not much) hearsay reports echoing widespread rumors claim that many North Koreans think their own “government” was behind the sinking. The manner of the Cheonan‘s sinking may or may not bear some resemblance to a popular North Korean movie. Also for what it’s worth North Korea has finally gotten around to denying that it sank the Cheonan, but significantly, it didn’t initially broadcast that denial. Now, North Korea is saying that it’s being framed.

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For now, I think President Lee is doing the right thing. He has restored enough message discipline in his own government to staunch the flow of ever-changing speculation about the cause. Nothing is concluded, and nothing is ruled out. He has reached out to his allies for investigative assistance, probably to inoculate the investigation’s findings against charges that President Lee fabricated the evidence (the allegations and theories will still circulate, only with a more anti-American tint). Despite some early misgivings, I’m glad to see the U.S. Navy is already helping with the investigation. Fox publishes these photos of the U.S. Navy on scene.

I recently said that it might take a North Korean attack to finally break the spell of many South Koreans’ inexplicable sympathy for Kim Jong Il’s regime. It may be that that moment is on us now. Editorials in major South Korean newspapers have begun to call for the unspeakable. Says one, “[N]o developed country tolerates provocation without punishing the offender. If Korea is a proper nation, it should, in principle, destroy the North Korean submarine base.” This may not be so surprising coming from the staunchly conservative and nationalist Joongang Ilbo, but look what the editors of the center-left Korea Herald are saying. The Herald is the most liberal of the mainstream Korean papers and at least used to republish an English supplement from The Guardian. The Herald also calls for war:

It will take weeks or even months until a joint civilian-military inquiry panel comes to a final conclusion on the cause of the incident based on technical findings by top-rated international experts. Yet, outside the official process, the South Korean public, who listened to the statements of the surviving sailors at a press conference last week, has become more than 90 percent sure about “who did it.

When President Lee Myung-bak spoke of “resolute actions” to take against whoever is responsible for the tragedy, he was sharing the belief of the people. The government and military leaders may have some more information that has not been made available to the public, but they need concrete proof to move over to the phase of making a response.

Still, even before we get hold of conclusive evidence, the relevant authorities need to study what to do about this apparent grave act of provocation. They should provide the president with diplomatic and military options to help him make an appropriate decision and to ensure that no time will be wasted after a decision has been made. [Korea Herald]

The Herald then points to a long series of North Korean attacks and provocations that have gone unanswered, thus inviting more attacks, even escalation, and concludes:

A military retaliation is a justified response to an unprovoked attack. It can be reserved when the adversary admits guilt and makes an apology, promises no recurrence and punishes the directly responsible individuals in cases where it acknowledges their involvement but denies the state’s role. Whether or not North Korea will take any of these steps is anybody’s guess.

Among possible reactions, the government could bring the Cheonan case to the U.N. Security Council with proof that North Korea violated Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter which asks all members to refrain “from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The attack on a ship engaged in a routine mission inside Southern territorial waters calls for punishment in the form of a U.N. sanction. The problem is that North Korea has already proved its resilience against U.N. sanctions over the past years of international pressures for its denuclearization.

Here we are seeing a shortage of options to punish North Korea in the event its involvement has been confirmed. Still, we have to do something to manifest the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Korea. That something should be resolute and effective to guarantee that there is no recurrence of the wanton attack. [Korea Herald]

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As gratifying as it is to see a lucid confrontation of reality at the Korea Herald, no less, I would say in response that not everything that is justified is necessarily wise. I do not read either of these editorials as calling for all-out war but a limited one. They assume that the war would start as a limited war and would end as a limited war. On balance, they’re probably right. Kim Jong Il isn’t about to risk an OPLAN 5027 scenario.

On the other hand, there are a few risk factors that these editorial writers may not have thought through, but which President Lee and his advisors probably have. The major premise of this still-hypothetical discussion is that Kim Jong Il and/or Kim Jong-Eun ordered the attack on the Cheonan, facially a grave miscalculation of the likely South Korean reaction. Consistent with the characteristics of a sociopathic personality is a high tolerance for risk and a tendency to misjudge risk. What would Kim’s next miscalculation be? A “limited” artillery barrage of Camp Casey, Uijongbu, or Seoul? Ordering terrorist attacks by commandos or sleeper agents? Delivering some dreadful weapon via North Korean’s suspected tunnels under the DMZ, believing that his responsibility would be (as with the sinking of the Cheonan) plausibly deniable?

It is important for us to remember the cheapness of life between the Imjin and the Yalu. That is one reason why the question of human rights matters in our diplomatic and military thinking, and why the horrors of Camp 12 and Camp 22 (to name just two) can’t be isolated from our calculation of the North Korean threat. The loss of life on either or both sides of the DMZ would not be punishment for Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Eun. A military humiliation might be, assuming that word of that humiliation spread widely within the North Korean armed forces, but despite the advanced erosion of North Korea’s information blockade, the regime probably still has substantial control over what its armed forces hear and know. And in any event, there are plenty of other demoralizing things a determined South Korean government could tell the North Korean armed forces without risking war.

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In contrast to the risk that a limited war would demoralize North Korea’s armed forces and population, we must balance the risk that a limited war is actually the very outcome that Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Eun want most. Imagine yourself as Kim Jong Il today — your nation’s long-moribund economy may have starved a million or so of your most expendable subjects, but by keeping the secret police well-fed, blaming the troubles on American sanctions, and characterizing the arrival of international food aid as the payoff for your masterful act of nuclear extortion, you muddled through. Despite widespread discontent, the loss of much control over the food supply, and even a rumored mutiny by a corps-level army unit, the system defied the predictions of foreign experts and held. Now you’re under unprecedented pressure from international financial sanctions and have lost the no-questioned-asked, unmonitored humanitarian aid that helped you keep the army and your party minions fed. The “wavering” and “hostile” portions of your civilian population no longer depend on the state’s rations and rely on capitalists markets to earn an independent living. Your recent desperate effort to confiscate the wealth of a nascent middle class and regain control over the food supply was a fiasco that caused more open public anger — and even some rioting — than at any time in North Korean history (there is even some empirical evidence to support this). Your subjects appear unwilling to blame the Americans this time; they’re holding your government responsible, and shooting a few scapegoats won’t restore their confidence in you. All of the crises you’d slogged through for the duration of your misrule have reached a critical phase. The world is closing in on you.

Worse, you’re dying, and in the only way that really matters, you’re dying intestate. Your eldest, the natural successor under traditional Korean concepts of primogeniture, is too corrupted by foreign influences, and besides which, starving people aren’t going to give unquestioned devotion to Jabba the Kim. Your second son has all the manly command presence of Richard Simmons and performed poorly when tested in a leadership position. Your third son has the necessary DSM-IV diagnosis to be a proper successor, but he’s just 27 years old, and lacks the experience or the cred to survive (much less rule) in that octagenarian vipers’ nest known as the National Defense Commission. If you want your legacy to outlast you, you need to find a way for him to “make his bones,” and fast. In a society where every citizen is inculcated with the ideology of war, fearlessness, and sacrifice, a “limited” war is precisely the thing to legitimize your successor and to change the topic of national conversation to anything but the hardship that your misrule has caused.

Which is to say, South Korean military “retaliation” would be anything but: because Kim Jong Il knows that South Korea will want to avoid all-out war as much as he does, he would be able to cast almost any outcome to a limited war in terms that would consolidate and legitimize a transfer of power from the father to the son. Without such a war, and given the current mood among North Koreans, it seems doubtful that such a transition would have the Mandate of Heaven.

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Perhaps for some of the same reasons, my friend Andrei Lankov says that even if North Korea is found to have sunk the Cheonan, that President Lee can’t do anything about it. I would agree with him that the balance of risks and rewards does not favor a military response, but this does not mean that there is nothing that President Lee can do.

What Kim Jong Il fears is the weakening of his political control, not the loss of a few old boats, and certainly not the loss of a few dozen, hundred, or thousand lives. For the aforementioned reasons, a limited war would only strengthen his political control. What Kim Jong Il wants is to consolidate his power, restore the credibility of his propaganda, and to extort more money from South Korea, but without starting a total war. If what President Lee wants is to deter future North Korean aggression, throwing Kim Jong Il the political lifeline of a limited war is no way to do it. Instead, Lee should intensify what is already working: the economic constriction and political subversion of Kim Jong Il’s regime, both of which have significantly eroded the regime’s influence over its domestic economy, food supply, public opinion, and capacity to suppress dissent. That’s why President Lee still has options.

First, he can stop feeding the beast — he can cut off South Korean economic aid to the North. For cosmetic purposes, he can offer to resume aid if Kim Jong Il cooperates fully with the investigation and personally apologizes (don’t worry; he won’t). Lee can stop importing goods from North Korea and cut this flow of hard currency. The other main conduits of South Korean hard currency for Kim Jong Il include the Kumgang Tourist Project, whose property the North has just begun to confiscate anyway, and the Kaesong Industrial Park, which has fallen victim to North Korean political meddling and clearly won’t ever become a profitable export manufacturing center now. Lee can also order his banks to take a more aggressive approach to enforcing the financial provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874. Politically, he should increase his government’s support for a community of 17,000-plus North Korean defectors who are leading efforts to broadcast independent news back into their homeland, news that seems to have attracted a significant following in North Korea. He can increase the number of defectors his government admits, and do more diplomatically to force China to let would-be defectors in China travel to South Korea safely. He might even permit defectors to establish a North Korean transitional government-in-exile on his country’s soil; after all, with proper education and training, those defectors could be a key part of President Lee’s strategy to stabilize North Korea if, as seems increasingly likely, the Kim Dynasty ceases to exist within the next five years.

Certainly these options carry with them some risk that North Korea will engage in further provocations, but the risk will probably still be less than the risks of paying extortion, doing nothing, or launching military retaliation. In any event, it seems unlikely that as long as Kim Jong Il inhabits a series of palaces whose location is known to the American and ROK air forces, that he would launch a full-scale attack or use nuclear weapons. And as is clear even to the editors of the Washington Post now, the end of the Kim Dynasty is the only realistic end of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and all of the proliferation it threatens. They might also have said that it’s the only way life for the vast majority of North Korea’s people will ever become something other than a living hell.

26 Responses

  1. It’s more likely to be a bottom-dwelling influence mine than a torpedo.

    See this link for a book on Chinese mine development, which appears to be world-leading. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_33/china.html. A naval mine could be one of ours, given the area. It could have been a self-propelled DPRK torpedo mine, that navigates itself into an area underwater and then lies quiet until detonated. But I think it is that most frightening of all problems — a new weapons system, a rocket-launched naval mine, and that it was laid during the January artillery events in that neighborhood.

    If such a mine exists, it is a game changer, since it can be freely seeded into coastal waters at any time, even during a sea-based assault, and can absolutely deter any NATO invasion by sea. Such an (almost random) live test as this confirms its efficacy and sends warning signals to us — with very little we can do about it until we confirm what it really was.

    If it is a new system, then its use was defensive — not offensive, despite the deaths of 45 innocent victims. It is a political act of the DPRK to tell the South and the West to “stay away while we work through our problems — and if you don’t stay away, we in the DPRK Rocket Forces now have the means to make you stay away.” And they do. This is the only way to make sense of a weird act of belligerency.

    There is one part of your excellent commentary with which I actually disagree: there is no possibility of a hot but “limited” war with a nation that has, and will use, biological and chemical weapons. We simply have no limited war doctrine in the face of those misnamed “weapons of mass destruction.” They don’t destroy mass. Biochem weapons destroy people, not things, and are in their nature uncontrollable. They are not “limited” weapons in scope or in effect, so the war situation they create cannot readily be “limited.” They are, in so many ways, far more destructive, effective and frightening than a nuke. A nuke creates total devastation over a limited area. Biochem weapons create lingering death over a vast area. There is little doubt that the DPRK would use them on Seoul…. and therefore, on the entire Western world. A smallpox outbreak in Seoul would not stay in South Korea.

    I thought your link (“a rumored mutiny”) to your 2007 analysis of Jasper Becker’s book was worth the entire price of admission! It is both superb and stimulating. Can you periodically update and republish it?

  2. Instead of fighting a true limited war, why not just destroy important symbols in the Kim regime? Take down Juche Tower, Kim Il Sung’s mausoleum, or one of a number of statues that promote the Kim family to an almost god-like status? I think that would be more effective than actually killing North Korean troops.

  3. Excellent analysis! As I read further and further, I had each question and concern answered.

    A few weeks ago, when the possibility of the North having been responsible first emerged, I had a post asking for discussion on how, if at all, the South should respond. Partly in response, GI Korea of ROK Drop provided what seems one of the best and most comprehensive answers:

    So if this was an intentional North Korean provocation than the next obvious question is what should the South Korean response be? Launching a bombing campaign of some sort should not be the first option in my opinion. It would only serve the North Korean regime’s best interests by rallying a now increasingly disenfranchised DPRK public around their leadership.

    Here is what I think should be done:

    • Take any reopening of the Geumgang Resort off the table
    • Officially close the Kaesong Complex and withdraw all South Korean workers
    • Stop all aid of any kind to North Korea until an apology is issued from Kim Jong-il
    • If the North Koreans still refuse to apologize and accept responsibility for sinking the ship than South Korea should seriously consider enforcing the PSI.

    The most provocative of these options would be to strictly enforce the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which would require searching North Korean ships. That is why this should only be done after implementing the first three options and judging North Korean reactions. If they know a serious enforcement of the PSI is hanging over their heads they may not attempt to cause other provocative incidents like they have been threatening to do.

    I think this approach, particularly the fourth point, addresses the concerns that you have laid out: aggressive and sustained enforcement would hobble and humiliate the regime, rather than providing a strong rallying point that would come from, say, an attack on the submarine base (although if that is the source of continued attacks, taking it out could become a military necessity).

    But the PSI enforcement ship-boarding is risky, too, as it raises the possibility of further escalation, simply because each time a North Korean vessel is boarded it raises the possibility of a shooting match or other attack. That shouldn’t deter us from doing it, but instead just gird us for the possibility.

    But just about any reaction comes with such risks of further retaliation, and we’ve already seen that no reaction comes with risk of further attacks.

  4. Another excelent summary of where the Cheonan situation is at present.

    Mr. Woolley…If a mine was laid via rocket launch wouldn’t there be SOSUS derived data that would have detected it’s location? Is it possible that the Cheonan may have been attempting to physically locate it and the device detonated during such an opperation?

    This whole incident has pretty much dropped off the radar of US media but as was pointed out here the consequences of ROK actions in the coming weeks and months could be dire indeed.

  5. I wrote:

    As I read further and further, I had each question and concern answered.

    For clarity, that should have read, “As I read further and further, I had each of my own questions and concerns answered.”

  6. RDietz,
    as you suggest, it is of course possible that Cheonan was mine hunting at the time. A single entry splash is very difficult to pinpoint, so I doubt that any fixed array would’ve detected anything better than a general location. Then, to find the object, one tends to use specialized vessels with very high quality sonar — and divers. I don’t know that was Cheonan’s mission because I don’t know that it was equipped that way. Also, there is weather to consider: the West Sea is rough, choppy, cold, swift and often murky, and the weather was not very good that day. So I tend to think it may’ve been in the area for a purpose, and that may’ve had something to do with the strange NorK artillery exercises into the sea in January, but it could’ve just been “day-running” or training the crew.

    I just don’t think Cheonan was a designated target, or that a weapon system with human operatives (like a motor torpedo boat) was used. That’s too dangerous. Given the absence of other contemporaneous aggression, I don’t think this was an orchestrated attack at all. I just tend to think that Cheonan was unlucky, and the NorKs were sending a message. That is, if it was their weapon.

  7. David, I think you introduce another plausible possibility. You’ve made a number of useful comments that seem to come from a background in naval operations. Care to tell us?

  8. About the radar blip that you mention:

    A flock of birds remains the most likely cause of this radar detect, for one simple reason: It crossed onto land (specifically the Jangsangot Peninsula) and kept going. Also, its not unusual for radar, especially on smaller vessels, to not be able to detect altitude. The frigates are not designed for air defense, and as such have no need for the specialized radars that can determine altitude.

    Of course, since this detect went over land, it may have been a helicopter. But no air search radars in the area detected it. Only the Seokcho did.

    This information came from a MND press conference I had translated in real time. I unfortunately can’t find an English version of it.

    I’m not saying North Korea didn’t do this, just that the radar blip is most likely a red herring.

  9. Thank you for asking. I was a junior officer in the Royal Navy a very long time ago, and spent time in minehunters and submarines. That means I have some background, but not much recent knowledge!

    I do like this site: no, it’s more than liking; I think you’re performing a really important service in keeping in one place the tribulations of a weary people, and the risks associated with their lunatic rulers. best regards, David

  10. I admire the thoughtfulness on this website and from the commenters.

    In regards to the bird flock issue, some birds do migrate at night over the ocean, and fly north in the spring to raise hatchlings. More specifically, a bird called the Bar-tailed Godwit may have been in the area at the time. Perhaps a wise decision by the ROK military would be to get their hands on a whole lot of unmanned aerial drones. This wouldn’t help them a lot in finding submersibles at night, but at least it might help them quickly identify if a target is a flock of birds.

    I also agree that military action toward the North would be favourable in regards to their current internal problems. However, difficult as the North’s succession issue is, I think it is wise not to characterize all of their behaviour as misguided acts of desperation. To us, the North’s leadership is deluded and irrational, but if you understand the nature of their interests, it becomes calculating and logical. Foremost, we know that KJI considers his people expendable. If he is most concerned about his immediate financial situation, succession being passed to his son and his legacy as an opponent of the South, then an attack of this nature seems highly logical. Anything more or less would likely not have the desired repercussions. I also think that the North’s leadership had the capacity to predict the mature reaction of the LMB government that we are seeing. In my opinion, the North’s leadership is brutal and criminal, but it is not stupid.

    Also, I think that the theory of the attack being some kind of military experiment can only be partially true. If it was an experimental stealth mine, then there would have been no great need to arm the warhead. It may have been a test of a stealth torpedo, but then it would have made most sense to target one of the newer Aegis-equipped destroyers, rather than the ageing Cheonan, which has trouble detecting whether a radar blip is in or out of the water. Therefore, if there was an experimental element involved, I think that alone would not be justification enough to launch an attack.
    We now know that it was almost certainly caused by an external explosion. The chances of it being a friendly fire incident or accidental mine drift are extremely low in my mind. In a time of heightened tensions with two countries technically at war, near a disputed sea border involving a ship performing miltary manoeuvres, Occam’s Razor points to an attack.
    For geographical and political reasons we can pretty much conclude that it would probably only have been one of two countries responsible, North Korea or China (or both). Economically speaking, the risks to China if it were to be proven responsible are too great. The ROK is a major trading partner, and has a lot of diplomatic clout to punish them if even a fragment of an explosive device could be proven to have originated in China. Also, it is hard to define any worthwhile benefits that the Chinese could gain from this, that outweigh the risks.

    In terms of the ROK response, I think the government here is in a difficult situation. Naval officials, families of the deceased and many in the general public would support a limited military retaliation if the North is proven to be behind the attack. But this runs the risk of playing into their hands and giving them what they had been hoping for. There is also the complicating factor of the need for deterrence. If there is no retaliation, what kind of attack might the North plan next?
    Time has elapsed considerably since the incident, so my guess is that the eventual response of the ROK government will not be a military strike. In the eyes of the world, the ROK has more to gain by giving a mature response, which is what LMB has alluded to in some of his interviews. It will be heavily diplomatic and may involve closing Kaesung, like you said. Also, the rules of engagement for any vessels from the North crossing the NLL will probably be altered.

    One possibility that we should also consider: What happens if the culprit cannot be definitively proven?

  11. Joshua wrote,

    What Kim Jong Il wants is to consolidate his power, restore the credibility of his propaganda

    And PlanetExpressDelivery said,

    Instead of fighting a true limited war, why not just destroy important symbols in the Kim regime? Take down Juche Tower, Kim Il Sung’s mausoleum, or one of a number of statues that promote the Kim family to an almost god-like status? I think that would be more effective than actually killing North Korean troops.

    1. It is not economics, or even the Saftey Commission (propaganda police) that holds the DPRK together. It is the compulsory brainwashing in Jucheism, 24/7, everywhere they go. It is waning, perhaps very badly outside Pyongyang, and the momentum is on the side of any/all forms of (potential) dissent. It’s coming. It has become more compulsory since KJI replaced his evil father, and in the last 5 years has reached the level of a feverish religious cult.

    2. PED has the right idea, but the wrong weaponry. There is a day coming when rank and file North Koreans will tear down the Orwellian idols of the Kims, in complete and utter repudiation of their sick facade , provided that as Mr. Stanton suggests, the ROK supports defectors to the hilt. That includes most especially tacit support for the balloon launches, the weapon of choice that weakens Jucheism.

    3. There is no scenario for a limited war in Korea. Scratch it. There is only Big War, and a Stability Operation after a NK collapse. It is highly likely that KJI would elect for Big War should he be thinking war at all, as this is the way cults often die in pyhrric finality (SEE: Jonestown, David Koresh and the Branch Davidians, Raeliens, etc…). Let us hope not.

    4. China wants a NK that looks like China, and the only obstacle in the way is the Juche cult. China wants the DPRK to remain a socialist state and maintain its separation from the ROK. Korea’s chief topographical icon Paektusan (Mt. Paektu) has already been culturally annexed as Xaibeng and the Chicoms are building an airport there. They ain’t no dummies. Cultural annexation is how things work in Asia (SEE: Dokdo).

    5. I don’t know how much cooperation Seoul can expect from Beijing in advancing the demise of Jucheism, but it is a goal of both states, no doubt. Unless Juche turns out to be a real actual Heaven-sent religion (hahahahaha…), its day are numbered and its collapse will leave a massive spiritual, moral, social and intellectual vacuum in what is today North Korea. The missionaries in the ROK already have mature plans and abundant resources to address that vacuum.

    6. Big War or Limited War, what the Norks can NOT afford is a protracted war. They have neither the supplies nor the materiel depth to fight a sustained conventional war. I believe that a gueriila war is much more plausible after a conventional war is over and the UNC has subdued the DPRK regulars. The objective being to drag out an unpopular counterinsurgency that will exhaust the political will of the ROK so that the NK insurgents can declare victory by means of not being utterly obliterated. Eventually, the rats and the ROKs will come to the same peace table. This was Saddam’s plan and were it not for David Petraeus it might’ve worked.

    7. My counsel for President Lee would be DO NOT SETTLE FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN REUNIFICATION UNDER THE ROK GOVERNMENT. If the DPRK survives as a third state under Chinese suzerainty, it is only a matter of time before Korean War 2.0 is waged to reunify Korea under PRC-like conditions. This will be easy once the threat of DPRK conventional weapons has been removed reduced and the Korean Lefties finally toss the USFK off the peninsula.

    My thanks to Mr. Stanton for his excellent analysis and exceedingly generous toleration of fools such as I who suck up OFK’s bandwidth.

    KCJ

  12. Joshua wrote,

    What Kim Jong Il wants is to consolidate his power, restore the credibility of his propaganda

    And PlanetExpressDelivery said,

    Instead of fighting a true limited war, why not just destroy important symbols in the Kim regime? Take down Juche Tower, Kim Il Sung’s mausoleum, or one of a number of statues that promote the Kim family to an almost god-like status? I think that would be more effective than actually killing North Korean troops.

    1. It is not economics, or even the Saftey Commission (propaganda police) that holds the DPRK together. It is the compulsory brainwashing in Jucheism, 24/7, everywhere they go. It is waning, perhaps very badly outside Pyongyang, and the momentum is on the side of any/all forms of (potential) dissent. It’s coming. It has become more compulsory since KJI replaced his evil father, and in the last 5 years has reached the level of a feverish religious cult.

    2. PED has the right idea, but the wrong weaponry. There is a day coming when rank and file North Koreans will tear down the Orwellian idols of the Kims, in complete and utter repudiation of their sick facade , provided that as Mr. Stanton suggests, the ROK supports defectors to the hilt. That includes most especially tacit support for the balloon launches, the weapon of choice that weakens Jucheism.

    3. There is no scenario for a limited war in Korea. Scratch it. There is only Big War, and a Stability Operation after a NK collapse. It is highly likely that KJI would elect for Big War should he be thinking war at all, as this is the way cults often die in pyhrric finality (SEE: Jonestown, David Koresh and the Branch Davidians, Raeliens, etc…). Let us hope not.

    4. China wants a NK that looks like China, and the only obstacle in the way is the Juche cult. China wants the DPRK to remain a socialist state and maintain its separation from the ROK. Korea’s chief topographical icon Paektusan (Mt. Paektu) has already been culturally annexed as Xaibeng and the Chicoms are building an airport there. They ain’t no dummies. Cultural annexation is how things work in Asia (SEE: Dokdo).

    5. I don’t know how much cooperation Seoul can expect from Beijing in advancing the demise of Jucheism, but it is a goal of both states, no doubt. Unless Juche turns out to be a real actual Heaven-sent religion (hahahahaha…), its day are numbered and its collapse will leave a massive spiritual, moral, social and intellectual vacuum in what is today North Korea. The missionaries in the ROK already have mature plans and abundant resources to address that vacuum.

    6. Big War or Limited War, what the Norks can NOT afford is a protracted war. They have neither the supplies nor the materiel depth to fight a sustained conventional war. I believe that a gueriila war is much more plausible after a conventional war is over and the UNC has subdued the DPRK regulars. The objective being to drag out an unpopular counterinsurgency that will exhaust the political will of the ROK so that the NK insurgents can declare victory by means of not being utterly obliterated. Eventually, the rats and the ROKs will come to the same peace table. This was Saddam’s plan and were it not for David Petraeus it might’ve worked.

    7. My counsel for President Lee would be DO NOT SETTLE FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN REUNIFICATION UNDER THE ROK GOVERNMENT. If the DPRK survives as a third state under Chinese suzerainty, it is only a matter of time before Korean War 2.0 is waged to reunify Korea under PRC-like conditions. This will be easy once the threat of DPRK conventional weapons has been removed reduced and the Lefties finally toss the USFK off the peninsula.

    My thanks to Mr. Stanton for his excellent analysis and exceedingly generous toleration of fools such as I who suck up OFK’s bandwidth.

    KCJ

  13. David: Thanks for pointing out the limitations of fixed array detection systems…no doubt the bad wx would not help. I can’t but agree that somehow the sinking was not something that was actually meant to occur.

    I am somewhat of a newcomer to the present day Korean situation. I was attracted to this blog by Mr. Stanton’s in-depth presentation of facts and considered opinions and to the knowledgeable contributions of the commenters…myself excepted… I’m here to learn :0)

  14. I agree economic pressure is probably better than a military response, however I believe Obama and Lee will engage in a contest to see who can be the most feckless leader. They will make it appear that Chris Hill had a brain and a spine. If you want a military response, wait 2 months and sink a NK cargo ship (one that is not insured) in at least a mile deep water so it can not be recovered by the North. Wait another 3 months and sink another ship. Also try to engage in economic sabotage in the North and break up their criminal activities that raise money -drugs, cigarettes and funny money. The Chinese real estate market may blow up by the end of the year and they might reconsider sending billions to the N Koreans, but I doubt it. Your could also apply pressure and use blackmail on the bankers in Luxemburg to force them to leak financial information about the Kim’s holdings.

  15. *In 1994 the North manufactured the first political crisis,

    That should read “nuclear crisis”

  16. The North Korean Super Achievement of Eternity Public Broadcasting Corporation has just featured a story of Kim Jong-Il playing a round of golf to calm the nerves of the natives. (He is known as the “Great Putting Leader” after his website reported that he shot a world record 31 under par 41 at the Pyongyang Golf Course in 1952 as a wee-pup.) In keeping with the schizophrenic and contrary messages emanating from the DPRK golfing-fanatic Kim resting in the clubhouse after the round summoned his caddies around to issue an ultimatum to the USA. If he is not allowed to play Tiger Woods in a match play tournament to prove he is the worlds best he will nuke Seoul.